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7INTRODUCTION
A Violent Panorama
Fig. 1: Southern Jerusalem hills (2011).
In the documentary Rebel Architecture: The Architecture of Violence, directed by Ana 
Naomi de Sousa and broadcast by Al Jazeera in September 2014, we follow Eyal 
Weizman, the Israeli architect and theorist of spatial and visual cultures, on a tour 
of the West Bank and Jerusalem. “Everything in this panorama is a tactical tool in 
the architecture of occupation. You just need to know how to decode it”, Weizman 
says, looking at the seemingly quiet hillsides and valleys of southern Jerusalem.1 
Here, the weapons of the battlefield are not guns, drones and bombs, but trees, ter-
races, houses and their cladding.
 With Weizman as guide and interpreter of the landscape, the close relation-
ship between architecture and violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict becomes 
visible. The violence of almost half a century of Israeli occupation is inscribed 
1  Ana Naomi de Sousa, “The Architecture of Violence,” in Rebel Architecture (Al Jazeeera, 2014), 3:40.
8on the Palestinian landscape through its built artefacts. The ruins of demolished 
houses are evidence of violence done to built structures; the brutal presence of the 
separation barrier is evidence of violence performed by built structures.
 However, in most cases the violence embedded in built artefacts is less 
self-explanatory. It might appear in the form of ordinary homes and infrastruc-
ture that provide the spatial and material means for inhabiting a place, for exam-
ple, or through significant historical buildings imbued with symbolic and religious 
meaning. In the political configuration of the built space of the Occupied Palestin-
ian Territories (OPT), architecture appears as a tactically deployed weapon of ter-
ritorial control. Standing in the dual position of being both a means to achieve an 
objective and the objective in itself, the elementary gestures of architecture — to 
control and inhabit a place — are employed in a conflict that concerns, fundamen-
tally, who has the right to a future in this land.
 Invoking Weizman’s statement, my aim with this thesis has been to learn 
how to ‘decode the panorama’ of a landscape saturated by violence. To this end, 
the present text is concerned with reading architecture and its related practices 
as a weapon in a political conflict. This spatial instrumentalisation is effected by 
Israel through the commonplace civic practices of urban planning, house build-
ing, and archaeological excavation by turning these practices into a means of spa-
tial control and dispossession. Further, the restrictions pertaining to Palestinian 
building, the destruction of Palestinian houses, the construction of the separation 
barrier, and the settlements built on occupied land, have had a profound impact 
on shaping physically a landscape that attests to violence. Together, these prac-
tices form a distinct category that will later be referred to as unplanning, whose 
attritional effect is the production of unliveable spaces. Conversely, Palestinians 
inhabiting Palestinian land also turn to a number of tactical tools: disguised con-
struction to escape Israeli surveillance, the creation of infrastructural bypasses, 
or the establishment of Palestinian ‘facts on the ground’, for example.2 While some 
of these counter-tools are employed to challenge the mechanisms of the occupa-
tion, others are used for survival in everyday life. Together, these practices form a 
spectrum of practices that will be explored as situationally moulded acts.
 However, given that power is evidently distributed asymmetrically between 
the two adversaries, the tools deployed by each side in this struggle differ in scale 
2  ‘Facts on the ground’ is a commonly used term in the Israel-Palestine conflict, designating primarily 
the Israeli settlements in the OPT. The term denotes the specific practice of expanding Israel’s territory by 
creating an ‘irreversible’ reality through the construction of a built and lived Israeli fabric on Palestinian 
land, with the objective of preemptively affecting the partition of the territories between the two parties 
in a potential future peace agreement. Conversely, Palestinians have attempted to copy and subvert the 
tactic of building facts on the ground as political acts of resistance; the activist intervention of creating the 
‘Bab al’Shams’ tent camp in the contested E1 area outside Jerusalem is an example.
9and impact. If both occupier and occupied turn to architecture as a tactical means 
to invent or preserve an attachment to land, Israel’s tactical and strategic appara-
tus has historically shown itself to be the more efficient by far, having enabled a se-
quential manipulation of borders and continuous expansion of Israeli-controlled 
areas deep into the West Bank. For Palestinians to live under occupation, to resist 
occupation and to build despite occupation, requires the capacity to navigate a 
landscape saturated with violence on a daily basis. 
 The architecture of Israel’s violations and transgressions into Palestinian 
territory is a subject explored in great depth elsewhere during the past decades.3 
My objective with this thesis is to focus on the relation between Israel’s unplan-
ning apparatus and architecture that is antagonistic to the occupation: spatial 
structures created with the aim of preserving or enhancing a Palestinian presence 
in the West Bank. ‘Decoding the panorama’ of a landscape imprinted by violence 
is undertaken as an investigation into the related spatial practices in which built 
objects emerge. This is a task compelled, fundamentally, by a desire to understand 
how the enduring and bitter conflict over this small piece of land is woven not only 
of official politics, ideologies and formal warfare, but of a spatial complexity re-
produced every day in the form of weapons of dispossession and a dialectical resis-
tance to displacement.
 My contribution to the vast and diverse field of research concerned with spa-
tial aspects of the Israel-Palestine conflict is, in short, a perspective on the ways in 
which the — often mundane — characteristics of spatial practices compose pat-
terns that are intrinsic to historical and present dynamics of the conflict.
*
In terms of methodology, the gathering of material for this thesis was conducted 
through fieldwork and academic research. Fieldwork in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem provided knowledge of spatial conditions and access to sources of in-
formation. My visits contributed the initial and most important insights, as well 
as a basic cognitive learning of the complex geography of a fragmented and layered 
landscape. Navigating between and across boundaries in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem, be it on the map or in real life, can be a confusing affair.
 I visited Israel and the OPT five times between 2010 and 2014, for peri-
3  Building and erasing architecture and infrastructure as a means of control and territorial expansion 
as part of Israel’s occupation has been explored by scholars from a wide array of fields. Although not an 
exhaustive list, and limited to English language publications, the works of Nurhan Abujidi, Ariella Azou-
lay, Robert Bevan, Stephen Graham, Sari Hanafi, Saree Makdisi, Nur Masalha, Adi Ophir, Omar Jabary Sal-
amanca, Sharon Rotbard, Rafi Segal, Lisa Taraki, Eyal Weizman, and Oren Yiftachel are essential in this 
regard. Further, several organisations provide not only data but also analyses that serve as background 
for much of what is written on the subject, for instance reports from Bimkom, B’Tselem, and UN OCHA.
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ods ranging between two to five weeks. Fieldwork included formal and informal 
conversations; interviews with people — professionals and others — engaged in 
various ways with spatial transformations in the OPT; planned and chance obser-
vations of sites and places in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; and visual regis-
tration. Many places were visited more than once.
 The reason for my focus on the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and not the 
closed Gaza Strip, is partly a question of access, but also one of focus; the spatial 
filigree of the every-day in the West Bank has, at present, a different complexity to 
Gaza, which, conversely, has been militarily controlled from outside its borders — 
ground, air and sea —since the withdrawal of Israeli settlements in 2005.
 In light of the many contributions of academic, artistic and activist projects 
concerned with spatial opposition to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land, a note 
on my own affiliations, and thus contribution, is required. I participated in the col-
lective studio work of Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency (DAAR) in 2011; 
guested PhD seminars at Centre for Research Architecture at Goldsmith’s Univer-
sity, London, in the period 2010-13; volunteered for Architects Without Borders 
(AUG) Denmark working with the case of Lifta in Jerusalem, which resulted in 
a workshop for architects held in Copenhagen in 2013; participated in two urban 
design workshops with the NGO International Peace and Cooperation Centre 
(IPCC) in East Jerusalem in 2014; and contributed to the artist Joachim Hamou’s 
speculative fiction movie United Israel-Palestine UIP27 (2015).4 Naturally, these 
engagements have influenced my approach to the spatio-political aspects of the 
conflict, forming my interests, directing my research and affecting my terminol-
ogy. However, in this thesis, my aim is to describe and reflect on a condition from 
an academic perspective. Though I acknowledge that my position — any position 
— cannot be neutral, my intent is to be descriptive and analytical with regard the 
matters in question, rather than normative. 
 The work on this thesis began with a project description that differed sig-
nificantly from the result in hand. The initial project was concerned with the prac-
tice of the professional architect as one who can provide speculative scenarios 
as a means of analysing spatial dimensions of a conflict: research by proposition. 
By proposing scenarios for building interventions with structures that ‘act oth-
erwise’, the intention was to construct methods that could detect lacunae in how 
we understand the spatial order of the conflict. Trained as an architect, I found 
this idea exiting. However, it occurred to me while doing research that ‘acting 
otherwise’ was already taking place. Indeed ‘acting otherwise’ is characteristic of 
spatial practices, be they practices of resistance or not. I thus became far more in-
4  Joachim Hamou, “United Israel Palestine UIP27,” (Denmark, Sweden, France2015).
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Fig. 2: Geographical area of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
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terested in understanding the actual ’speculations’ that already take place in the 
OPT, than in making spatial proposals of my own. Learning from these practices 
that ‘act otherwise’ thus became my central focus.
 My motivation for writing the present thesis is two-fold. When visiting 
the West Bank for the first time in 2010, I found it impossible not to be affected, 
both ethically and politically, but also professionally as an architect. Seeing the 
entrenched way in which architecture is used as political instrument reinforced a 
growing desire to question architecture as a political manifestation. When I chose 
to engage with this conflict despite my distance from its every-day — and despite 
troubling questions as to whether I had any right to comment on a conflict to which 
I have no previous personal nor professional relation — it was from a feeling of 
urgency to understand, firstly, a conflict that has come to saturate global politics, 
and secondly, how architecture has come to perform a vital role.
*
The thesis proceeds over six chapters where the task of ‘decoding’ is approached 
from different perspectives. The first chapter, ‘Spatial Antagonism’, establishes a 
theoretical and historical frame for the thesis’ overall objective of exploring con-
flict dynamics through spatial practices. The chapter unfolds the proposition that 
spatial practices can be seen as antagonistic to occupation as an amalgam of situa-
tional acts, and links these acts historically and theoretically to everyday practic-
es of resistance against violent dispossession. Resistance to occupation through 
everyday acts has been a part of a Palestinian discourse of resistance and relat-
ed practices for decades, represented by the concept of sumud (‘steadfastness’). 
Departing from the historical development of sumud, it is suggested that Michel 
Foucault’s notion of a ‘practice of freedom’ can contribute to an understanding of 
the political agency of mundane practices. Finally, it is suggested that viewing ar-
chitecture as a spatial practice may enable an understanding of its instrumentality 
as a tactical weapon for processes of territorialisation. The aim of the chapter is 
not to assess which antagonistic spatial practices have a greater or lesser ability to 
restructure, affect, or overthrow dominating powers, but to explicate how spatial 
practices that can be characterised as ‘acting in the situation’ are part of a territo-
rialising dynamic, and thus constitute a mode of inhabitation.
 In the second chapter, ‘Mughrabi Bridge,’ a move is made from the general 
frame of spatial conflict to the investigation of a particular case of spatial dispute. 
The chapter describes the long-standing controversy concerning the temporary 
pedestrian pathway, Mughrabi Bridge, in the Old City of Jerusalem. Situated at 
the geographic and symbolic heart of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the bridge il-
lustrates the inscription of territorialising processes in a built structure. The first 
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part of the chapter captures the controversy that the bridge engenders, as well as 
its historical roots, which have fuelled recurrent violent confrontations. The sec-
ond part of the chapter proposes that the bridge may be seen as an unintentional 
monument, allowing the conflict to be read from the vantage point of its spatial 
products.
 Advancing from the investigation of a particular case in chapter two, the 
third chapter, ‘Unplanning,’ presents a broader perspective on structural con-
ditions of the occupation. The chapter argues that a recognition of the systemic 
functioning of the occupation as an order with violent effects is necessary to an 
understanding of the spatial violence of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The term 
‘unplanning’ is proposed as a means to describe Israel’s violent organisation of the 
built environment of the West Bank. Unplanning covers destructive and depleting 
territorial practices that target the lived environment rather than human bodies. 
The chapter outlines the historical trajectory of the occupation, and describes un-
planning as a practice composed of judicial means and physical interventions in 
the form of construction and destruction of spatial structures. Unplanning alters 
the physicality of the landscape and, in consequence, also alters the political reali-
ty of the territories under occupation.
 In the fourth chapter, ‘Unliveability,’ I turn toward a theoretical reflection 
on violence. The chapter elaborates on the violent effects of unplanning and ar-
gues that it creates ‘unliveable spaces’. Unliveability is here understood to be a re-
sult of the degradation of the infrastructure of lived space; the very organisation 
of life in its spatial dimension. The chapter explores the interdependent phenome-
na of manifest and structural violence and engages in a discussion on the problems 
of the temporality, visibility and invisibility of violence. It is proposed that Israel’s 
rule over Palestinians belongs to a necropolitical order whose combined legal and 
extra-legal mechanisms amplify structural and manifest violence, and forcefully 
repress resistance. Temporal dispersions, and the visibility and invisibility of vio-
lence through the necropolitical calculation of restraint versus eruptive violence, 
are explored through the concept of potential violence. Unliveable spaces are con-
sidered to be those where spatial practices are immanent to violence, as well as to 
power.
 With the fifth chapter, ‘Time Matters’, a perspectival shift is made from the 
previous chapters’ predominant focus on spatial conditions to a deliberation on 
temporal disfigurations engendered by the long-standing occupation. On the ba-
sis of case studies, the chapter explores time as intrinsic to matter in relation to 
Israel’s unplanning policies and Palestinian responses to these policies in the Jor-
dan Valley. While temporal terms such as ‘stagnation’ and ‘impasse’ are temporal 
axioms, often applied to express the political intractability of the Israel-Palestine 
14
conflict, a sense of effluxion with regard the possibility for a politically negotiated 
solution is engendered by the territorial reconfigurations caused by unplanning. 
The temporality of the conflict is thus not only a question of its long duration or 
an impasse in negotiations, but relates also to the political instrumentalisation 
of time into matter. The chapter presents two actors in the Jordan Valley who, 
through building, act to alleviate the exhaustion of Palestinian possibilities for 
sustaining life in the valley. These responses are distinguished by their approach 
to the temporality of the interventions. The actors under discussion are: a hu-
manitarian NGO that provides temporary shelters as emergency assistance in the 
wake of house demolitions, while also attempting to defer destruction by ‘buying 
time’ in the legal system; and a grassroots organisation that builds solid houses 
from home-made mud bricks in order to engage with the cycle of destruction and 
construction through a ‘sustainable’ practice, thus projecting the house as a ‘fu-
ture ruin’ into the building scheme. The chapter concludes with the topic of ‘time 
matters’ through a deliberation on temporal collapses engendered by unplanning.
 Similarly as the previous chapter, the sixth chapter, ‘Probing the Terrain,’ 
takes a specific case as a point of departure in order to understand the ways in 
which spatial practices are inextricably linked to dynamics of the occupation. 
Furthermore, attention is turned toward conceptually expanding on the situa-
tionally moulded practices previously explored in ‘Spatial Antagonism’. The chap-
ter examines the covert building of a chicken farm and house-to-become in order 
to consider the modality of situational spatial practice based on cunning abilities 
under the conditions of Israel’s strict control of building activity in Area C in the 
West Bank. Shifting lines and frontiers create elastic zones of uncertainty that ne-
cessitate navigational agility in the conduct of everyday life. The chapter describes 
the ways in which Palestinian landowner HH speculates within the potential flex-
ibility of the line that crosses his plot, dividing Area B from Area C. HH’s disguised 
building efforts illustrate how endemic uncertainty informs a situational spatial 
practice of navigating unstable conditions by deploying mêtis, akin to but not iden-
tical with Michel de Certeau’s notion of tactics. By providing an account of how 
flexibility adheres to the territory through its ambiguous boundaries, the objec-
tive is to make visible how a spatial practice informed by mêtis may compensate 
for the fleeting nature of the terrain that HH is probing. In conclusion, a possible 
relation of exchange between HH’s project and other speculative practices is sug-
gested.
 The concluding chapter, ‘Yet Unborn Realities’, enquires into a moment of 
friction between reality and possibility; the present and the future; the actual and 
the fictional. The point of departure is an encounter with the artwork ‘State of Pal-
estine’ by the Palestinian artist Khaled Jarrar, which evoked an experience of hes-
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itant uncertainty that finds parallels in encounters with mechanisms that invoke 
such uncertainties in real life. Two orders of reflection in relation to Jarrar’s work 
are pursued: one which deals with tactical considerations in daily life, and another 
that deliberates on a mode of thought that imbues both daily practices and specu-
lative imaginaries in a context saturated by uncertainty toward the future. It is 
proposed that speculation into the future mirrors the present and enables it to be 
viewed differently. The conclusion  explores what it might mean to have a sense of 
a possible future, and how speculation can be seen as an operation that stimulates 
this sense. In conclusion, it is suggested that political imaginations that go beyond 
the ‘real’ (im)possibilities of the present take place as a transversal dialogue be-
tween artistic, architectural, activist and everyday practices.
 The appendices include two interviews conducted during fieldwork in the 
West Bank. Appendix A: ‘Emergency Response to Demolition: Interview with Hu-
manitarian NGO Project Manager’, on emergency responses to house demolitions 
in Jordan Valley, is of referential relevance to the fifth chapter, ‘Time Matters’. 
Appendix B: ‘Post Oslo Urbanism: Interview with Yazid Anani’, on the building 
of a state by proxy through building projects, and the intersections of speculative 
imagination and tactical pragmatism, is of referential relevance to the concluding 
chapter, ‘Yet Unborn Realities’.
*
The chapter ‘Mughrabi Bridge’ was published online in short form under the ti-
tle ‘Unintentional Monuments’ (2015) by the gallery Another Space.5 The chapter 
‘Probing the Terrain’ is published in a different version in Architecture and Control 
(forthcoming).6 The case of mud brick building in the Jordan Valley was present-
ed in embryonic form as ‘Mud Brick Resilience’ in Dear… Magazine (2012) and in 
a short version in the Danish architecture magazine Arkitekten as ‘At Bygge un-
der Besættelse’ (2016).7 ‘Yet Unborn Realities’ is based on a paper presented at 
the conference ‘F(r)ictions of Art’ in Berlin (2014), with proceedings published in 
Paragrana Journal (2016).8
5  Runa Johannessen, “Unintentional Monuments: The Mughrabi Bridge in Jerusalem,” Another Space, 
http://anotherspace.dk/runa-johannessen-unintentional-monuments/. Last access 12.7.2017
6  “Probing the Terrain: Architectures of Control and Uncertainty in the Occupied Palestinian Territo-
ries,” in Architecture and Control, ed. Annie Ring, Henriette Steiner, and Kristin Veel (Leiden: Brill, Forth-
coming).
7  ”Mud Brick Resilience,” Dear…Magazine, 2, 2012. ”At Bygge under Besættelse,” Arkitekten, 6, 2016.
8  “Yet Unborn Realities: Imprints of Possibility in Khaled Jarrar’s State of Palestine Stamp.,” Paragrana 
Journal 25, no. 2 (2016).
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Fig. 3: Zoning of the West Bank. Based on OCHA maps, for reference see (UN OCHA oPt 2017) 
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Spatial tactics are used by both Israeli and Palestinian actors as weapons for 
achieving or maintaining territorial control in the conflict. However, their tactical 
tools differ greatly in scale and impact: clearly, power is not equally distributed be-
tween the two adversaries.
 Marked by Israeli domination, this is a conflict between state and non-state, 
coloniser and colonised, and state-military and civil-body, to mention only the 
most obvious instances of institutionalised power structures. Recognition of the 
general asymmetry in the parties’ abilities to take action in the conflict, either as 
authorities or as individuals, is necessary in order to apprehend the political and 
physical space in which they operate. Pertinent to the deployment of spatial tac-
tical tools, this asymmetry means that Israeli and Palestinian capabilities for de-
termining how to build, where to build, what to build and when to build are funda-
mentally different.
 As a general axiom, Israel is the spatial aggressor, in so far as the scope of Is-
rael’s strategic and tactical techniques are predominantly offensive — expansion 
of territory, seen notoriously with the construction of settlements, for instance 
— while the scope of Palestinian tactics is predominantly defensive — protection 
of lands against expropriation and reconstruction after demolition, for instance. 
Defensive preservation and strengthening of Palestinian presence on the ground 
is consequently a question of resistance, in that it is an opposition to forces of dom-
ination. However, this does not entail that ‘everything Palestinian’ is resistance, 
nor that every act of resistance is political per se, but rather that any act that at-
tempts to defy domination must be defined as resistant.
 Resistance in the form of spatial practices that are antagonistic to the occu-
pation is the object of inquiry of this chapter. Antagonistic spatial practices should 
here be understood in the dual sense of material and performative practices led by 
individuals or groups that oppose various forms of domination exerted through 
the mechanisms of Israel’s colonial apparatus. ‘Spatial practice’ denominates a 
host of disparate phenomena that, in one way or another, recalibrate the use of 
space. More often than not, they are tactical in nature and connected to everyday 
life. Within this domain of antagonistic spatial practices, we are confronted with 
CHAPTER I
SPATIAL ANTAGONISM
18
a continuum of goals, intentions, logics, procedures and material outcomes that 
recalibrate space by intersecting, in various ways, the power they oppose.
 The purpose of this chapter is to unfold the field of antagonistic spatial prac-
tices and to offer an interpretation of how such disparate classes of action, togeth-
er form a discrete category of resistance. My objective is not to define a ‘proper’ 
mode of resistance by asking what the most effective forms of resistance might be, 
but rather suggesting that the continuum of these resistances can be defined as 
a medium of more or less extemporised practices that come to define the lives of 
those living under occupation. 
 The chapter develops through four sections. First, the ontological relation 
between power and resistance is established in light of Michel Foucault’s later writ-
ing on the subject. Second, I will propose a characterisation of antagonistic spatial 
practices that attempts to go beyond common perceptions of a binary of proactive 
and reactive modes of resistance. Instead, it will be suggested that they can best be 
recognised as situationally moulded practices with modalities of destabilising and 
adaptive relations to power. Third, the notion of resistance will be contextualised 
through a historical outline of the Palestinian concept of sumud (‘steadfastness’), 
showing subsequently how everyday resistance in the discourse of sumud exceeds 
simple determinations of proper modes of resistance. I will argue that the political 
agency of sumud is the ability to articulate the need for the practice of freedom 
despite domination. Fourth, the chapter concludes with a deliberation on spatial 
contingency and inscription: the way in which constant processes of re-territori-
alisation that occur in the interplay of spatial tactics between adversaries, consti-
tute a form of life and thus a mode of inhabitation. I will thus jump back and forth 
between conceptual deliberation and historical contextualisation, but it is hoped 
that this predisposition will prove to be productive for an identification of archi-
tecture as an instrument within this spatial conflict.
Resistance and Power
Despite its centrality to the expression of political imagination and action alike 
in the course of the last century, in On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance (2013) 
the philosopher Howard Caygill argues that the concept of resistance has been re-
markably under analysed, and even itself resistant to philosophical analysis.1 Rath-
er, he suggests, resistance seems to be “rooted in practice and articulated in tacti-
cal statements and justifications addressing specific historical contexts.”2 Caygill 
asserts that, while there is no single and consistent form of resistance as it must be 
1  Howard Caygill, On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 6.
2  Ibid.
19
constantly reinvented, a conceptual account of some form is still required. To this 
end, he turns to the discourse of force characteristic of Newtonian mechanics and 
electromagnetics, where the idea of resistance is thought to have originated. Force 
has been the single most pervasive framing discourse of resistance, its equivocal 
and inherently apolitical framework contributing to both the intractability and re-
sourcefulness of resistance as a concept.3
 While the problem of the nature of resistance has informed questions such 
as whether it constitutes a reactive response to repression, or rather ceaseless defi-
ance to oppression, the dynamic idea of force relations avoids reducing resistance 
to a binary opposition of action and reaction.4 Repression and defiance collide, 
notes Caygill, who situates resistance within:
A complex and dynamic spatio-temporal field that manifests itself in postures of domi-
nation and defiance… There is never a moment of pure resistance, but always a reciprocal 
play of resistances that form clusters of sequences of resistance and counter-resistance 
responding to each other in surrendering or seizing initiative.5
The practice of resistance and the practices resisted serve to form one another. 
Conceptually, the interplay of forces is applicable both in the shape of collective 
acts of resistance and in the formation of resistant subjectivity. This does not in it-
self give an indication of when, why, or how resistance becomes a political catego-
ry within which questions of justification, legitimacy, forms of practice and their 
eventual effectiveness may be addressed. Yet the dynamic view will be pursued 
here, with the help of Foucault, in order to capture the relational nature of resis-
tance. Once more, the aim is not to propose a recipe for a politics of resistance, but 
to provide a frame for embedding antagonistic spatial practices within the field of 
resistance.
 A dynamic and reciprocal play of forces is central to Foucault’s analyses of 
resistance as an opposition to power. Power and resistance constitute a force re-
lation, in which resistance is determined by the power to which it is in opposition. 
Yet as part of the relation, it also restructures the power it opposes. Consequently, 
to understand what is meant by resistance, one must understand what is meant by 
power.
 When Foucault speaks of power, it is neither in the negative sense of a de-
structive ‘evil’, nor as a positive virtue, but as an omnipresent and productive re-
3  Ibid., 6,10–11.
4  Ibid., 2,4.
5  Ibid., 4-5.
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lation of forces between human beings.6 Its condition of possibility is not localis-
able in a central point, but is in constant motion: it is a “moving substrate of force 
relations” produced from one moment to the next.7 A crucial point of emphasis is 
that power is not fixed within a specific structure, nor in an institution such as the 
state or the law. Neither is it something that one can be given. Rather, according to 
Foucault, power is a “complex strategical situation in a particular society.”8 
 Within this model derived from military logic, resistance appears as imma-
nent to power, which therefore cannot be escaped. This is famously articulated in 
The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 (1978) as “where there is power, there is resistance, 
and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority 
in relation to power.”9
 The conditions of possibility for resistance are thus immanent to a strategic 
field of power relations, within which it can exist in multiple, irregularly distribut-
ed points. Resistance is “the odd term”, as Foucault describes it, inscribed in pow-
er as an opposite. According to Foucault, it is “the strategic codification of these 
points of resistance that makes a revolution possible.”10 The application of tactical 
acts of resistance would therefore need to be enacted according to a coordinated 
strategy in order to overthrow power; yet in such an event, resistance would elide 
into its former counterpart, namely power.
 Although Foucault asserts that resistance is not merely reactive, it is diffi-
cult to see how resistance, being never exterior to power, can free itself or its object 
from power.11 Caygill notes that resistance in Foucault’s conception remains in-
scrutable, as do the means by which the strategic model of analysis might be used 
for a revolutionary politics of resistance that would not substitute resistance with 
power. Similarly, for other critics of Foucault, the main problem is that resistance 
becomes entirely reactive. Therefore, without any possibility of acting on its own 
6  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, vol. 1, The History of Sexuality (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1978).
7  Ibid., 93.
8  Ibid.
9  Ibid., 95.
10  Ibid., 96.
11  Critics have noted several inconsistencies in Foucault’s various models of power and resistance: his 
tendency to trap resistance in cycles of power; his refusal to place limits on resistance; and, his lack of 
an indication as to how autonomous subjects capable of resisting power can emerge. However, my task 
is not to resolve this aporia, nor to rescue Foucault from his various critics. For an analysis of Foucault’s 
different models, see for example: John Hartmann, “Power and Resistance in the Later Foucault,” in 3rd 
Annual Meeting of the Foucault Circle (Cleveland, Ohio2003).; Brent L. Pickett, “Foucault and the Politics of 
Resistance,” Polity 28, no. 4 (1996).; Aurelia Armstrong, “Beyond Resistance: A Response to Zizek’s Critique 
of Foucault’s Subject of Freedom,” Parrhesia 5 (2008).
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terms, resistance leaves no space for emancipation. It becomes caught in endless 
cycles of reaction or, as Slavoj Žižek puts it, is trapped in a “deadly mutual em-
brace” with power.12 In his critique of Foucault’s aporia in the relation of resistance 
to power Žižek claims that, though Foucault wishes to assert that resistance is not 
exclusively reactive, his cyclical power-resistance model does not actually allow 
him this conclusion without returning to his earlier model of resistance in which 
agency precedes disciplinarity.13 The closed trap of resistance as a product of pow-
er has also been criticised on the basis that is does not allow for liberation. The 
sociologist John Holloway, for example, posits this critical position in his discus-
sion on the fight for radical social change by contemporary movements. Holloway 
argues that “in Foucault’s analysis, there are a whole host of resistances which are 
integral to power, but there is no possibility of emancipation. The only possibility 
is an endlessly shifting constellation of power-and-resistance.”14 
 Emancipation, however, is not the central concern for Foucault. What is at 
stake, as becomes clear in his lecture ‘The Subject and Power’ (1982), is the anal-
ysis of the different means by which power produces individuals as subjects.15 Ac-
cording to Foucault, in Western modernity it is the struggle against subjection 
that has become most important, though other forms of struggle — against domi-
nation, against exploitation — have clearly not disappeared.16 The exercise of pow-
er in modern government is explicated by Foucault as a structuring of the possible 
field of actions of others. Power thus forms the subject, which itself is subject to 
the structuring of action formed by power relations: 
In itself the exercise of power is not violence; nor is it a consent which, implicitly, is re-
newable. It is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, 
it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains of for-
12  Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London; New York: Verso, 
1999), 252.
13  Foucault’s earlier model, expounded in Madness and Civilization (first ed. 1961), holds another defini-
tion of power than that of his later writings. In the earlier model, Foucault’s focus is on juridical power; in 
the later, on productive power. In the earlier model, resistance thus appears as the struggle against oppres-
sive forces exterior to resistance, contrary to resistance as immanent to a power relationship in the later 
model.
14  Holloway continues: “The emphasis on understanding power in terms of a ‘multiplicity of relations 
of force’ does not give us any basis for posing this question [of emancipation]. Indeed, on the contrary, it 
tends to exclude the question, for, while resistance is central to Foucault’s approach (at least in his later 
work), the notion of emancipation is ruled out as being absurd, for it pre-supposes, as Foucault correctly 
points out, the assumption of a unity in the relations of power.” John Holloway, Change the World Without 
Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 40.
15  Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982).
16  Ibid., 782.
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bids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting 
subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other 
actions.17
The objective for Foucault is to identify means to create new forms of subjectivi-
ty through the refusal of subjection; a twofold refusal of being subject to other’s 
control and of being tied to one’s own identity.18 To pursue a political strategy of 
resistance, therefore, is to refuse identity formed by power and to actively create 
one’s own subjectivities.
 This does not in itself resolve the aporia of the “mortal embrace” of power 
and resistance, however. On the contrary, another double-bind in the relationship 
of forces appears: the exercise of power and resistance presupposes that the sub-
ject is free. According to Foucault, “power is exercised only upon free subjects, and 
only insofar as they are free.”19 At the same time, freedom disappears when power 
is exercised, meaning that freedom appears as both condition and precondition 
for power to be exerted and, subsequently, “power and freedom’s refusal to submit 
cannot, therefore, be separated.”20 
 In consequence, there is no such thing as an essential freedom or an essential 
power, but rather an agonistic relationship of reciprocal incitation and struggle.21 
The agonistic conception of force-relations helps us to understand that emanci-
pation as such cannot be the central concern, since struggles for freedom against 
being acted upon are constant processes; there is never any single event that can 
overthrow power and instantly free the subject.
 Foucault is here concerned with the formation of resistant subjectivity un-
der modern governmentality. This delimitation might give rise to an objection 
against the application of his model of power and resistance to a case where the 
subject is fundamentally not governed but rather dominated — even violently — 
as is the case with Palestinians under occupation. In the quote above, Foucault 
himself draws attention to the implication of his model: the exercise of power is 
not violence in itself. However, to this I would respond that violence may certainly 
17  Ibid., 789.
18  Foucault writes: “There are two meanings of the word ‘subject’: subject to someone else by control 
and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a 
form of power which subjugates and makes subject to… Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what 
we are but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind 
of political ‘double bind’, which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power.” 
Ibid., 781,85.
19  Ibid., 790.
20  Ibid.
21  Ibid.
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appear as a subset in a power relation, and especially so in an asymmetrical rela-
tion, a point to which I will return in chapter IV, ‘Unliveability’. For the present 
argument, suffice it to say that despite its asymmetrical distribution, the interplay 
of forces is still actively present as a moving substrate: given that domination is not 
total, resistance is possible as an ‘odd term’ inscribed in a power relation. I would 
also argue that the formation of resistant subjectivity in such a relation is not re-
stricted to those that can be recognised as being free, but rather is integral to the 
constant struggle of becoming free. As we shall see in the sections on sumud and the 
practice of freedom further below, the very formation of a resistant subjectivity is 
central within Palestinian discourses on resistance.
 For these reasons, I believe Foucault’s fundamental axiom — that power 
and freedom/resistance are tied together in an agonistic relationship — can be 
transported usefully into analyses of struggles in a context of colonial oppression. 
Furthermore, I hold that it is within this dynamic spatio-temporal field of recipro-
cal force interactions that antagonistic spatial practices are situated. While these 
spatial practices, which must be understood as tactical tools, are formed by the 
structuring actions of the forces of occupation, they simultaneously affect the an-
tagonist’s field of action — in this case, that of Israel — through their resistance to 
being acted upon. 
Situational Spatial Practice
The infrastructure of military and civilian control, and restrictions precipitated 
by the occupation, cannot be avoided by any Palestinian living in the West Bank 
or East Jerusalem. Navigating these powers is a daily activity. In ‘The Order of Vi-
olence’ (2009) Israeli cultural theorist Ariella Azoualy and philosopher Adi Ophir 
describe Palestinian survival strategies that are deployed in order to negate Isra-
el’s exertion of power as a kind of improvisation:
Most of the time, the majority of Palestinians are afraid to resist ... Since they also cannot 
totally give in to the dictates of the ruling apparatus, they try to survive through impro-
visation and manipulation, looking for ways out, smuggling, calculating the costs of daily 
activity, deciding every morning anew which path to take, how to avoid encounters with 
the forces on the ground and how to address the soldiers. They must not be perceived as 
threatening, yet they cannot afford to remain without resources for coping with the situ-
ation … For the ruling apparatus, their resistance is not just their actions, but their mere 
presence, their insistence on staying.22
22  The notion of ’smuggling’ is also evoked by others, for example in relation to movement in a fragment-
ed and highly controlled territory. Geographer Ariel Handel notes that everyday Palestinian resistance can 
be summarised as a double-faced mode of action: that of staying present on the land, and of smuggling. 
See: Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir, “The Order of Violence,” in The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: Anatomy of 
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Improvisation, manipulation, calculation and smuggling: it is significant that in 
this state of domination, where Palestinian presence is perceived by the ruling ap-
paratus to be a threat in itself, ordinary activities become tactical gestures whose 
appearances change according to the situation. The particular order of uncertain-
ty that engenders such swift changes of procedure will be elaborated in chapter 
III, ‘Unplanning’, and chapter IV, ‘Unliveability’. However, the task in the follow-
ing section is to describe how resistance through spatial practice is constituted as 
a situational act characteristic of the interplay of asymmetrical forces in the Isra-
el-Palestine context. The structure of the occupation as fundamentally fleeting, 
rapidly changeable and dominant, effectively — if not totally — blocks Palestinian 
fields of action. Within this near-total state of dominance and suppression, defiant 
practices appear as ‘odd terms’ according to the logic of the situation that obtains.
 Such spatial practices cover a spectrum of tactical everyday acts that serve 
to generate space and, consequently, constitute a mode of inhabitation in them-
selves. Whether or not these practices may be characterised as political resis-
tance is not relevant to this specific analysis. Rather, my aim is to emphasise the 
common anatomy of spatial practices and resistance, given that these modes of 
inhabitation are formed both in an interplay between restrictions and obstacles 
produced by the mechanisms of occupation, and through the resistance to dom-
inant power that emerges from the activities of daily life. These practices can be 
understood as an amalgamation of reactive and proactive components in different 
constellations. Of the components constituting an act, some adapt to the regula-
tions of the occupation while others seek to circumvent a situation with the effect 
of destabilising the force relationship.
 The sociologist Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration shares aspects 
with the Foucauldian dynamic anatomy of resistance and power. In The Consti-
tution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (1984), Giddens synthesises 
‘structure’ and ‘agency’ as a ‘duality of structure’ within which structuration is cy-
clical, in the sense that the structure is both a medium for and a product of agents’ 
social practices.23 ‘Agency’ refers to the capability of an agent to do something; to 
have a transformative capacity, that is, the power to produce an effect.24 Following 
Giddens, action and thus agency are intractably tied to power: 
Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, ed. Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni, and Sari Hanafi (New York: 
Zone, 2009), 120.; Ariel Handel, “Where, Where to, and When in the Occupied Territories: An Introduc-
tion to Geography of Disaster,” ibid., 216.
23  Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1984).
24  Ibid., 9.
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What is the nature of the logical connection between action and power? Although the 
ramifications of the issue are complex, the basic relation involved can easily be pointed to. 
To be able to ‘act otherwise’ means being able to intervene in the world, or to refrain from 
such intervention, with the effect of influencing a specific process or state of affairs. This 
presumes that to be an agent is to be able to deploy (chronically, in the flow of daily life) 
a range of causal powers, including that of influencing those deployed by others. Action 
depends upon the capability of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to a pre-existing state 
of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to 
‘make a difference’, that is, to exercise some sort of power.25
To have agency means to be able to ‘act otherwise’ and to create possibilities for 
changing the course of events according to one’s own motives. As an ideal posi-
tion, one acts ‘proactively’ and influences a state of affairs when acting with agen-
cy: it is an expansion of one’s conditions of possibility. As a counterpart, a loss of 
agency — and thus a loss of capability to influence a state of affairs — implies that 
one’s actions become ‘reactive’. A purely reactive action would be to fully adapt to 
a given power structure, to conform to already prescribed regulations, and thus to 
lack the active capacity to influence the pre-given structure. While reactive action 
can answer present needs, it does not have an impact on the structural context 
within which it is embedded; it adapts to circumstances, and complies with regu-
lations defined outside of one’s own condition of possibility.
How can we conceive, however, of actions that take place within a predefined 
hegemonic structure, yet seize the opportunity of the moment in order to effect 
change? In an interview on agency and architecture in Footprint Magazine (2009), 
the cultural theorist Scott Lash suggests a modification of the Western perception 
of agency which I find useful for understanding how spatial practices can exceed 
the binary of agency/non-agency or proactivity/reactivity.26 Against a goal-ori-
ented understanding of agency, Lash suggests the notion of ‘activity’. By this, he 
means a more situational version of agency:
At least for a sociologist like Giddens or myself, agency comes from the classic notions 
25  Ibid., 14.
26  Scott Lash, Antoine Picon, and Margaret Crawford, interview by Kenny Cupers and Isabelle Doucet, 
2009, Footprint Magazine, 4.
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developed by Weber and Parsons, and presumes two kinds of actions: ends-oriented and 
means-oriented ones. Or, in other words, instrumental and substantively rational ones. … 
Both presume that the agent sets up a model that he or she will follow. Goal-oriented stuff 
basically. It presumes a disembodied, rational kind of model. 
 Against this, I would like to suggest the notion of activity. Activity is much less 
goal-directed, it is much more situational. It’s like situationism in a way: you put yourself 
down anywhere, and see where it takes you. In China, it’s like that: you analyse the situ-
ation, and see what arises from it. This also involves abstract thinking, but of a different 
kind than agency-type thinking. Agency-type thinking presumes a subject-verb-object 
kind of thinking: this is the object, and this is my plan. It’s almost a kind of scientific model 
you follow.27
In the context of the unpredictable situation of Israeli domination, the very activi-
ty of Palestinian spatial practice that in one way or another attempts to destabilise 
force-relations, relies on the situation: practices are circumstantial and mutate 
relative to contingencies and thus the opportunities one is able to create in the 
moment. When one analyses a situation and sees what arises from it, as Lash in-
terprets the Chinese model of activity, one invests in the situation by improvising 
within it in order to achieve what one wants. Situational practices include modali-
ties of both proactive and reactive activities, which can be expressed as a folding of 
oppositions into situational acts.
To act situationally is an aspiration to secede from a predefined dynamic or lin-
earity of how modes of power and their effects unfold, and to attempt to locate 
apertures for ‘acting otherwise’ through improvisation: to act in situ, on one’s own 
behalf, with aims, goals and visions. While this does not necessarily produce an 
effect of true change or transformation of the structures one is situated within, 
it does, in my view, suggest a particular mode of analytical thinking that conse-
quently affects one’s capability to take action. In this sense, situational acts of de-
fiance are a disruption of the implied regulations of a power structure and embed 
27  Ibid., 8.
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a goal of circumventing, changing, or anticipating the intended effects of exerted 
power. As much as situational spatial practices take place within existing power 
structures — given that they are, like resistance, intersectional with power — they 
entail an activity of thinking ahead in a tactical-reactive way; of taking the present 
moment as a starting point.
 The Palestinian architect, artist and curator Yazid Anani explains in a con-
versation with Arena of Speculation (2009) how situational planning has become 
an ordinary way of dealing with obstacles, through an illustration of what he calls 
“popular collective non-systematic planning for solving issues.”28 His example 
comes from the period during the Second Intifada when taxi drivers in the Jericho 
area found routes across the road-less desert, despite the trenches dug precisely in 
order to obstruct movement of Palestinian vehicles by the Israeli military. This is, 
certainly, a type of planning in the face of restrictions that comes proactively from 
people themselves. But for Anani, it is a need-oriented planning for “dealing with 
problems in a reactive way.”29 
 Can acting proactively but dealing with obstacles reactively be thought of as 
an oppositional practice? There is an ambiguity to antagonistic practices that rely 
on acts in the moment: one can act proactively when confronted with obstacles, 
yet still deal reactively with the problem that causes the obstacle to occur. The 
inventiveness of a practice is not enough in itself for it to become a destabilising 
force. Within a continuum of situational practices, it is thus more interesting to 
look at how a specific action seeks to destabilise a power relationship, rather than 
to decide whether it is proactive or reactive in itself. Illustrative of the ambiguity 
of practices developed to resist the negative effects of the occupation is the check-
point app serviced by the Palestinian telecommunications company Jawwal. The 
app, to be installed on a smartphone device, delivers updates on current waiting 
times for the Qalandia checkpoint, and enables the user to improve the calculation 
of travel times between Ramallah and Jerusalem. It is undoubtedly helpful for the 
traveller and attempts to make things work a little more smoothly in daily life — 
for those who own a smartphone, at least. However, even if the app becomes a help-
ful tool to overcome the daily denigration of wasted time in checkpoint queues, it 
does not change or challenge the structure of the checkpoint itself, but rather the 
pattern of Palestinian movement, thus ‘conforming’ to Israeli regulations.30 In the 
critical discourse of normalisation, one could even argue that the app contributes 
to the sustenance of the occupation by creating a means of Palestinian self-disci-
28  Yazid Anani, interview by Ahamad Barclay and Tashy Endres, 2009, arenaofspeculation.org
29  Ibid.
30  The checkpoint app is dealt with critically and in depth in an article by media theorist Helga Taw-
il-Souri. Helga Tawil-Souri, “Occupation Apps,” Jacobin Magazine, 17, 2015.
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pline that decreases instances of friction with the occupying power.
 Another example of a practice that emerged as a means to cope with re-
strictions, and which sought to exploit a (temporary) loophole in Israel’s regime 
of control, is found in the case of the development of illegal housing surrounding 
the refugee camp Shu’fat in East Jerusalem.31 After the separation wall was built 
around it, the Shu’fat Refugee Camp found itself on the West Bank side of the wall 
while still being part of Jerusalem municipality; building speculation boomed as a 
result. This must be seen in correspondence with one of the most pressing issues 
for Palestinians living in East Jerusalem: the task of finding ways to stay despite 
the numerous limits imposed through Israel’s restrictive planning laws.32 
 When Shu’fat Refugee Camp was pushed outside the separation wall it was 
left in a state of exception within which Palestinians, determined not to lose their 
blue Jerusalem ID cards or West Bank residents hoping to obtain one, surmised 
an opportunity to stay or become Jerusalem residents by taking up residence on 
the fringe of the camp. Without any infrastructural support, the built border zone 
around the camp became extremely dense and unsound, both spatially and so-
cially, and added to already vast problems within the camp itself. While buildings 
mushroom to meet present need and their construction is complicated by Israel’s 
policies, their existence does not affect these policies, at least in a positive manner. 
In fact, moves toward a full exclusion of Shu’fat refugee camp and its border zone 
from Jerusalem have accelerated, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanya-
hu’s 2015 proposal to cancel the residency of 80,000 East Jerusalem Palestinians 
living in Shu’fat and Kafr Aqab.33 In Shu’fat, the evolution of this practice of build-
ing was a way of coping with everyday obstacles in a somewhat opportunistic way, 
even if this did not influence, advantageously, the power structures themselves.
 Unlike the app and the densification of Shu’fat, the actions taken to stop the 
building of the separation wall in the West Bank village of Battir provide an exam-
ple of a set of interventions that have enabled a destabilisation of power. In Bat-
tir, the concerted efforts of local and international stakeholders consisted, inter 
31  For sociological perspectives on Shu’fat, see for example: Sylvaine Bulle, “Domesticating and Enlarg-
ing One’s Territory: Day-to-day Politics in a Confined space—The Shu’fat Refugee Camp in East Jerusa-
lem,” in The Social Ecology of Border Landscapes, ed. Anna Grichting and Michele Zebich-Knos (London, 
New York, Delhi: Anthem Press, Forthcoming).; “‘We Only Want to Live’: From Israeli Domination To-
wards Palestinian Decency in Shu’fat and Other Confined Jerusalem Neighborhoods,” Jerusalem Quarter-
ly 38 (2009).; Tina Sherwell, “Routes: Journeys from Behind the Wall,” ibid.
32  For a critical analysis of Jerusalem’s planning laws, see Francesco Chiodelli, “The Jerusalem Master 
Plan: Planning into the Conflict,” ibid.51 (2012).; and, Margalit Meir, Discrimination in the Heart of the Holy 
City, vol. VII, Jerusalem Strategic Planning Series (Jerusalem: The International Peace and Cooperation 
Center, 2006).
33  Itamar  Eichner and Attila Somfalvi, “PM considers canceling residency of 80,000 East Jerusalem Pal-
estinians,” Ynetnews, 26.10.2015.
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alia, in the physical preservation of the dry stone terraces of the village’s ancient 
irrigation system; the creation of hiking routes and maintenance of the cultural 
landscape in the valley; a successful application to be listed as a UNESCO world 
heritage site; and, a petition directed to the Israeli High Court to making the case 
that an implementation of the separation wall would create environmental and 
cultural damage.
 Unlike other legal cases concerning the route of the separation wall that 
have only achieved amendments, the legal case succeeded in freezing the Israeli 
state’s plans to build a wall in Battir.34 While the legal ruling on the case was of 
course the decisive factor, this must be viewed in conjunction with the efforts 
made to build the case. In a number of steps taken that invested in Battir as a place 
of significance, symbolically and physically, the case was made — virtually and 
materially — through ‘acting otherwise’, and subsequently succeeded in ‘influenc-
ing the state of affairs’.
 In order to ‘act otherwise’, and in line with Giddens, knowledge of the struc-
tural context one is situated within is necessary, as well as knowledge of one’s mo-
tives, purposes, and means.35 Knowledge of how to decode the field of forces that 
striates the OPT is thus crucial in order to restructure it. However, of equal im-
portance to knowledge of existing structures is knowledge of what to change. In 
order to identify how to ‘act otherwise’, one has to know what the ‘otherwise’ is; 
to imagine the ‘otherwise’. Resistance is thus not only a question of knowing what 
one is directly in opposition to, but the ability to imagine and articulate that which 
is beyond a present state of domination. In order to be able to “influence a specific 
process or state of affairs”, following Giddens, an articulation of one’s motives is a 
prerequisite.
 Situational spatial practices combine reactive and proactive modalities of 
action/activity — a synthesis of destabilising and adaptive relations to force. ‘Act-
ing otherwise’ is thus, by various means, an attempt to redefine what is actually 
offered by the structure one is acting upon.
34  For historical background, and on development of tourism in Battir, see Alessandra Gola, Nicola Pe-
rugini, and Samir Harb, “The Recovery of Historical Paths for Tourism as Tools for Social and Territorial 
Development: The Palestinian case of Battir,” AlmaTourism - Journal of Tourism, Culture and Development 
1 (2010). Preparation and investigation for the legal case was led by Forensic Architecture, described in 
various publications. For an overview, see Forensic Architecture (Project) et al., “The Wall in Battir: Land-
scape and Heritage against the Logic of Separation,”  http://www.forensic-architecture.org/case/wall-bat-
tir/#toggle-id-1. Last access 5.6.2017
35  Knowledge of the structural context is, according to Giddens, based in three types of consciousness: 
the unconscious, practical consciousness and discursive consciousness. The unconscious refers to the 
‘ontological security’ e.g. that given by trust in routines, practical consciousness is knowledge of how to go 
about one’s daily life, and discursive consciousness is the verbalisation of knowledge of the condition of 
one’s actions. Capability of acting is rooted in the agent’s knowledgeability about the structural context. 
Capability to draw on structures-within-knowledgeability is divided into three types of structures in struc-
turation theory: domination, signification, and legitimation.
30
Sumud and Everyday Resistance
As has been shown, situational spatial practices are closely connected to resis-
tance. This is not because situational spatial practices are necessarily articulated 
or conceived as resistance, but because they are structurally similar, as defined by 
their inextricable power-relation and their attempt to alter this relation. Palestin-
ian resistance, whether in violent or non-violent form, is part of the dynamism of 
Israel’s colonial apparatus as one of the many interactive forces within this appa-
ratus.36
 My aim in this section on non-violent forms of resistance in the conceptual-
isation of sumud is to unfold a continuum of goals and practices with which situa-
tional spatial practices share attributes. 
 Non-violent resistance in a Palestinian context has a spatial foundation 
within the concept of sumud, meaning steadfastness in Arabic.37 Sumud is a com-
mon term used to describe Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation. 
While it entered discourse in the 1960s, it is likely to have been part of a collec-
tive Palestinian consciousness of clinging to the land, dating from the period of 
the British Mandate (1917–48).38 The concept has acquired multiple and complex 
meanings over the years, throughout which its varying definitions and applica-
tions have found different resonances at various junctures of the conflict.
 As a non-violent form of resistance, sumud covers a wide variety of cultur-
al, economic and ideational practices. Present-day practices of sumud range from 
what are perceived as normal everyday activities like going to school, building a 
house, keeping culture and memory alive or cultivating the land, to activities that 
have more distinct political expressions such as going to demonstrations, writ-
ing graffiti on the separation wall or exercising non-compliance.39 Whether these 
practices are perceived to be in direct confrontation with the apparatus of the oc-
cupation or not, they are different aspects of the same concept: interconnected by 
the insistence on being steadfast despite restrictions and obstructions. To build a 
home, for instance, is an act of creating material steadfastness and thereby attach-
36  For a genealogy of the occupation and the dynamism of Israel’s violent colonial dispositif (‘appara-
tus’), including Palestinian resistance to it, see Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occupation (Berkeley, Calif.; London: 
University of California Press, 2008).
37  Al-sumud, as steadfastness, refers at its origin to an Islamic divine attribute. See Leonardo Schiocchet, 
“Palestinian Sumud: Steadfastness, Ritual, and Time among Palestinian Refugees,” in Palestinian Refugees: 
Different Generations, but One Identity. (Birzeit: Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies, Bir-
zeit University, 2012), 67.
38  Alexandra Rijke and Toine van Teeffelen, “To Exist Is to Resist: Sumud, Heroism, and the Everyday,” 
Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 59 (2014): 86.
39  See, for instance, political scientist Craig Larkin’s discussion of graffiti as political enactment of su-
mud: Craig Larkin, “Jerusalem’s Separation Wall and Global Message Board: Graffiti, Murals, and the Art of 
Sumud,” Arab Studies Journal 22, no. 1 (2014).
31
ing oneself to the ground through a building and, by doing so, contributing to the 
collective cause of remaining on Palestinian land through an individual act. To be 
steadfast – in the very literal sense of being able to stay – requires active and per-
sistent engagement with maintaining a presence in the OPT. In this sense, sumud 
appears as a mode of inhabitation responsive to the pressure of forces that takes 
the displacement of Palestinians as its objective.
 Although not limited to everyday practices, sumud shares characteristics 
with everyday resistance in other contexts. Here, a few remarks on shared theo-
retical groundings are useful in order to understand how practices of sumud con-
sist of ways of operating that transcend simple dualities of agency and adaption. 
Everyday resistance against oppression as a field of study was opened by politi-
cal scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott in his seminal work on peasants’ 
struggles, Weapons of the Weak (1985).40 For Scott, the significance of everyday re-
sistance had been overlooked, partly because historians and social scientists rely 
on written records that provide a poor record of silent forms of class struggle, and 
partly because a historical emphasis on rebellion overshadows continuous strug-
gles that take place in the everyday.41 Scott lists practices such as “foot dragging, 
dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabo-
tage, and so forth” as part of the arsenal of ordinary weapons available to relatively 
powerless groups that seek to meet pressing needs.
 Everyday resistance departs from other forms of resistance, Scott argues, 
through its disavowal of public and symbolic goals. Indeed, it is a kind of infrapol-
itics that goes hidden or un-noticed, and is not therefore recognised as political. 
Further, tactical acts of everyday resistance take place somewhere between de-
fiance and compliance. According to Scott, such struggles, marked by quiet eva-
sion rather than massive confrontations within a hegemony, are “equally massive 
and often far more effective.”42 What Scott argues, consequently, is that more is 
achieved for subordinate groups in terms of survival and the protection of basic 
needs through concealed resistance than through outright defiance. However true 
this might be as a diagnosis of the effectiveness of everyday resistance in Scott’s 
analysis of resistance for survival, it leaves unanswered the pressing question of 
whether everyday resistance has the capacity to alter or overturn a situation of 
subordination and oppression, given that it arguably lacks an analysis of the rela-
tionship of concealed acts to power. Moreover, even if we acknowledge everyday 
resistance as a form of hidden politics, it is difficult to see how concealed resis-
40  James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven; London: Yale 
University Press, 1985).
41  Ibid., 29,37.
42  Ibid., 20.
32
tance might lead to political recognition.
 In ‘Everyday Resistance: Explorations of a Concept and Its Theories’ (2013), 
social scientists Anna Johansson and Stellan Vinthagen suggest a theoretical 
framework for everyday resistance that expands Scott’s analysis.43 By introducing 
the dynamics of power and resistance as decisive for understanding resistance as 
a continuum of oppositional acts with plural articulations, they attempt to over-
come the simplification of resistance as either public or hidden. In their contribu-
tion to theoretically strengthening the field of resistance studies, Johansson and 
Vinthagen define everyday resistance in four steps: as a practice; as historically 
entangled with power; as intersectional with the power that it engages with; and, 
as heterogeneous and contingent to contextual changes. Everyday resistance “be-
gins with a double identification of something as being part of the everyday, and 
that part as being an expression of resistance to power”, and must be understood 
as a different kind of resistance that is related also to other forms of resistance: “It 
constitutes an initial, off-stage, or later stage activity in relation to other more sus-
tained, organized and conventional political forms of resistance. Thus, everyday 
resistance goes on between or at the side of the dramatic resistance events.”44 In 
Johansson and Vinthagen’s definition of this ‘off-stage’ activity, resistance is first 
and foremost an act, and not a particular effect; it is defined by routine, and is not 
— yet — politically articulated or formally organised. However, this delimitation 
excludes struggle in the everyday that is actually regarded as a political and recog-
nisable act, despite being part of a realm of the ‘non-political’ everyday. As we shall 
see, this dual aspect is integral to the enactment of sumud.
 Scott’s analysis is useful as a means to understand how everyday resistance, 
as disguised and unrecognised acts, has a capacity to form a culture of struggle 
against exploitation within a hegemonic order that may not be fought with outright 
rebellion. Johansson and Vinthagen’s theoretical explication shows how such acts 
are to be found within a spectrum of oppositional acts that relate to other forms 
of resistance, thus avoiding the complete isolation of everyday resistance within 
hidden realms. These analyses assert, firstly in the case of Scott, that everyday re-
sistance is a political act even if it ‘hides’ in the private domain and secondly, ac-
cording to Johansson and Vinthagen, that it is a continuum of goals and practices 
responsive to contextual change because it is intersectional with power. However, 
what is not developed is how everyday resistance emerges as a practice with politi-
cal potential across acts. How and for whom is everyday resistance an articulation 
of political recognition? The focus on acts rather than effects also raises the ques-
43  Anna Johansson and Stellan Vinthagen, “Everyday Resistance: Exploration of a Concept and its Theo-
ries “ Resistance Studies Magazine, no. 1 (2013).
44  Ibid., 9-10.
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tion of whether, in defining the concept of resistance, the intention of being in op-
position is enough to count as resistance, or if there is a need for closer calibration 
of the transformative effect of an oppositional act in a power relationship. 
 Sumud spans disguised, unrecognised and routine-based practices, to out-
right articulation of defiance in events such as demonstrations. As such, it clear-
ly crosses the boundaries of everyday resistance and relates to other resistances, 
as Johansson and Vinthagen have written. However, spatially and temporally it is 
founded in everyday life, informing a stance toward how to lead one’s life under 
occupation. In what follows, I will outline how sumud has appeared as a continuum 
of goals and practices responsive to changes in a volatile context and, subsequent-
ly, suggest how the political potential of sumud may be conceived as an encourage-
ment to resistant subjectivity through everyday resistance to power on the part of 
individuals. The first step presents a historical outline of sumud’s various defini-
tions and applications, while the second considers sumud in line with Foucault’s 
notion of a ‘practice of freedom’.45 
Historical Outline of Sumud
Sumud was taken up as a national symbol in the 1960s and further promoted as a 
political term by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the 1970s and 
80s. The denomination samidin (‘those who are steadfast’) was first used to iden-
tify those living in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon, and Pales-
tinians living inside Israel, but came to be associated in particular with Palestin-
ians living in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza during the 1970s.46 In the 
early discourse on sumud as a symbol, emphasis was placed upon commitment to 
the national cause through remaining on Palestinian land or in the refugee camps 
despite hardship, resistance to forced expulsion, and the encouragement of re-
production as a strategy in the demographic struggle. However, the nationalist 
symbolism promoted by the PLO was criticised by many Palestinians for being 
“passive non-resistance focusing on survival only” and for over-romanticising ru-
ral society and the fecundity of women.47 Moreover, the initiative of the Jordanian 
PLO’s Sumud Aid Fund of the late 1970s caused sumud to be associated with po-
litical rhetoric and corruption.48 This form of sumud was labelled as static sumud 
45  Michel Foucault, “The Ethic of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Ethics: Subjectivity 
and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow, The essential works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984 (New York: New Press, 
1997).
46  Rijke and van Teeffelen,  87.
47  Anna Johansson and Stellan Vinthagen, “Dimensions of Everyday Resistance: The Palestinian 
Sumūd,” Journal of Political Power 8, no. 1 (2015): 110.
48  Rijke and van Teeffelen,  88.
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by the Palestinian activist and co-founder of the Palestinian National Liberation 
Front (PNLF) Ibrahim Dakkak.49
 A distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ resistance thus emerged, creat-
ing a polarity between resistance as an offensive strategy and sumud as a protec-
tive and defensive strategy. From within this polarity sumud muqawim (resistance 
sumud) developed, when grassroots movements re-appropriated sumud as an ac-
tivist concept in the early 1980s, focusing on self-sufficiency strategies.50 In this 
reconceptualization, sumud was expanded to encompass strategic development, 
and various forms of non-violent resistance and civil disobedience, moving beyond 
symbolism to become a more articulated ideology and practice. These collective 
efforts in the framing of sumud muqawim were decisive for building momentum to-
ward the First Intifada, the Palestinian popular uprising of 1987–1993. According 
to sociologists Samih K. Farsoun and Jean M. Landis in a case study on the First 
Intifada that applied a theoretical perspective from Antonio Gramsci, the mobili-
sation of resistance through building alternative institutions in the 1980s was part 
of a process of “transforming a war of position into a war of maneuver”: of moving, 
that is, from a strategic building-up of forces to open conflict.51 The strategic im-
plementation of sumud muqawim before and under the First Intifada did indeed 
constitute a capacity to destabilise the structure and conditions of the occupation. 
The resolution of the uprising in the Oslo Agreements during the mid-1990s even 
promised a restructuring of power that would lead to self-determination.52 As we 
know, however, this restructuring did not result in a sovereign Palestinian state, 
but instead led the occupation into a new phase: from colonial exploitation to a 
principle of separation that abandoned administration of the colonised popula-
tion’s lives.53
 As a political term spanning the 1960s–90s in discourse on resistance, su-
mud thus appeared as a polyvalent concept that was attributed divergent and 
shifting meanings. It was subject to disagreements over whether it represented an 
effective form of resistance, or was merely static and “characterised by an attitude 
49  Samih K. Farsoun and Jean M. Landis, “Structures of Resistance and the ‘War of Position’: A Case 
Study of the Palestinian Uprising,” Arab Studies Quarterly 11, no. 4 (1989): 76.
50  Ibid.; Rijke and van Teeffelen,  88.
51  Antonio Gramsci’s terms, developed in The Prison Notebooks, denote stages in a Marxist class strug-
gle: ‘war of position’ is the concealed and strategic building up of forces to gain influence, while ‘war of 
manoeuvre’ is the exertion of strength in open conflict. In their article, Farsoun and Landis expose how 
Palestinians before the First Intifada “waged a successful war of position.” See Farsoun and Landis,  63.
52  For background on the First Intifada, see e.g. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, Intifada: Palestine at 
the Crossroads (New York: Praeger, 1990).
53  A shift from ‘colonisation principle’ to ‘separation principle’ in the 1990s is a central thesis in Gordon, 
xix.
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of resignation”, as Farsoun and Landis phrase it. 54 Parallel to these debates, anoth-
er meaning of sumud was articulated by the Palestinian lawyer Raja Shehadeh, who 
presented the term to an international audience in The Third Way: A Journal of Life 
on the West Bank (1982).55 Shehadeh describes sumud as a ‘third way’ between two 
opposites — neither violent resistance nor passive acceptance, but rather a state of 
mind.56 The ‘third way’ should thus not be understood as an alternative position 
between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ sumud, but rather as a form of resistance that differs 
both from violent resistance as represented by the fedayeen (Palestinian freedom 
fighters), and submission to Israeli power. Shehadeh’s book, published in English, 
was an important contribution that brought a degree of nuance to otherwise rela-
tively one-sided media depictions that equated Palestinian resistance to terrorism 
for an international public.
 According to Shehadeh, sumud had been practiced by anyone living under 
and coping with occupation long before it entered political discourse:
Sumud is watching your home turned into a prison. You, Samid, choose to stay in that pris-
on, because you fear that if you leave, your jailer will not allow you to return. Living like 
this, you must constantly resist the twin temptations of either acquiescing in the jailer’s 
plan in numb despair, or becoming crazed by consuming hatred for your jailer and your-
self, the prisoner. It is from this personal basis that sumud for us, in contrast with poli-
ticians outside, is developing from an all-encompassing form of life into a form of resis-
tance that unites the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.57
The ‘third way’ is to not allow oneself to be cornered into the choice between “ex-
ile or submissive capitulation”, or “blind, consuming hate.”58 The ‘third way’ is 
“where you are free, your own master – because your mind is the one thing that you 
can prevent your oppressor from having the power to touch…it is this freedom that 
is most vulnerable under the long-drawn-out occupation.”59 To Shehadeh, being 
samid is therefore a test of day-to-day living.
 In After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives (1993), Edward Saïd similarly empha-
sised the importance of sustaining a day-to-day life, notably the way in which work 
“becomes a form of elementary resistance, a way of turning presence into small-
54  Farsoun and Landis,  76.
55  Raja Shehadeh, The Third Way: A Journal of Life on the West Bank (London: Quartet, 1982).
56  Ibid.
57  Ibid., viii.
58  Ibid., 38.
59  Ibid., 38-9.
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scale obduracy.”60 To sustain oneself through work, Saïd writes, however limited 
this might seem, is thus a strong expression of sumud as “an entirely tactical solu-
tion to a predicament for which no clear strategy is available for the moment.”61 
Following Saïd, the maintenance of, and investment in, everyday activities is a tac-
tical form of resistance in lieu of a political strategy.
 Since the time of Saïd’s writing, this situation has not changed a great deal: 
clear strategies for resistance remain conspicuously absent. In fact, political stra-
tegic solutions to the Palestinian predicament seem today further away than ever. 
This must be understood in light of the above mentioned restructuring of politi-
cal power in the post-Oslo era, where resistance is thwarted not only by Israel di-
rectly but also from ‘inside’, by the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a ‘quasi-author-
ity’ under Israel. In a critique of the Palestinian leadership’s lack of thought-out 
strategies for combatting Israeli hegemony, Israeli anthropologist and activist Jeff 
Halper has dubbed sumud a “strategy within a non-strategy.”62 This ‘non-strate-
gy’, comprising sumud, negotiation and attrition, is not consciously formulated, 
according to Halper, but is a collective reaction to the occupation that has — so 
far — prevented defeat. A similar critique is voiced by social anthropologist Ruba 
Salih and social scientist Sophie Richter-Devroe, according to whom the PA’s posi-
tion in relation to resistance not only lacks a strategy, but is also double. Salih and 
Richter-Devroe argue that since the PA’s inception in the mid-1990s, it has held a 
contradictory position in relation to resistance, where they have “sponsored ‘re-
sistance culture’, on the one hand, and ‘normalized’ the very occupying power that 
was being resisted, on the other.”63 Cultural and symbolic expressions of sumud 
have been promoted, while direct political forms of opposition to the occupation 
such as demonstrations and civil disobedience have been repressed.
 Shehadeh and Saïd’s conception of sumud as closely connected with the indi-
vidual’s tasks in daily life is consistent with its contemporary meaning. According 
to social scientist Alexandra Rijke and anthropologist Toine van Teeffelen, many 
Palestinians today see no opposition between resistance as direct confrontation 
with the apparatus of occupation and resistance as a form of survival.64 In this 
view, the polarity of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ as determinants for designating a ‘prop-
er’ mode of resistance becomes redundant, as previously seen in the opposition 
60  Edward W. Saïd and Jean Mohr, After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives (London: Vintage, 1993), 100.
61  Ibid., 146.
62  Jeff Halper, “A Strategy within a Non-Strategy: Sumud, Resistance, Attrition, and Advocacy,” The Insti-
tute for Palestine Studies 35, no. 3 (2005/06).
63  Ruba Salih and Sophie  Richter-Devroe, “Cultures of Resistance in Palestine and Beyond: On the Poli-
tics of Art, Aesthetics, and Affect “ Arab Studies Journal XXII, no. 1 (2014): 9.
64  Rijke and van Teeffelen.
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between static sumud and sumud muqawim. Sumud is today broadly understood as 
a concept that comprises the many various actions people take against “politics 
of erasure.”65 It is expressed in the common refrain ‘al-hayat lazim tistamirr’ (‘life 
must go on’),66 and has also been explained as a “way-of-life”,67 “the agency of the 
everyday acts that prevent Israel’s successful subordination of Palestinians”,68 or a 
“Palestinian anticolonial mode of being.”69 Together, these expressions weave the 
resisting subject into the object of resistance in such a way that they appear as one: 
resistance is a form of life, and the body itself is a site of resistance from which re-
sistance emanates.
 This historical outline of sumud elucidates a concept that has embraced 
shifts in the way that non-violent resistance against occupation is defined. It is 
enunciated as a symbol or political ideology, an indicator and call for concrete ac-
tion, a collective consciousness, a state of mind, or a way of life. 
 However, while sumud is a continuum of different goals and practices, and 
thus does not have a singular specific signification, it is characterised by an em-
phasis on the subject as the locus of resistance. This is present, for instance, in the 
writing of both Shehadeh and Saïd, and generally in the emphasis on sumud as a 
form of life.
Practice of Freedom
The coalescence of the subject body and the object of resistance is forcefully ar-
ticulated in the popular idiom ‘to exist is to resist’, an expression that frequently 
accompanies the idea of sumud. The implication is the equation existence = re-
sistance.70 I have often mulled over the semantically ambiguous meaning of the 
65  Ibid.
66  Johansson and Vinthagen, “Dimensions of Everyday Resistance.”
67  Mikko Joronen, “‘Refusing to Be a Victim, Refusing to Be an Enemy.’ Form-of-Life as Resistance in the 
Palestinian Struggle against Settler Colonialism,” Political Geography  (Forthcoming): 12.
68  Anthropologist Lori Allen, quoted in Rijke and van Teeffelen,  92.
69  In an essay on Palestinian prisoners’ practice of sumud, Israeli cultural anthropologist Lena Meari 
describes sumud as a constant process of desubjectivation. To Meari, sumud is an “anticolonial revolu-
tionary potentiality actualized through the assemblage of singular practices. The subject and its political 
agency are formed throughout the actual practices of sumud in the interrogation, and the politics of sumud 
emerges through these subjective formations.” Meari makes clear that she is interested in the mode of sub-
jectivity that emerges from practices of sumud, rather than in “salvaging the agency of the Palestinians by 
invoking their practices of sumud.” See Lena Meari, “Sumud: A Palestinian Philosophy of Confrontation in 
Colonial Prisons,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 113, no. 3 (2014): 548-52, 75.
70  ‘To exist is to resist’ is a popular slogan: a simple internet search gives numerous hits from different 
sources (in English), many from grassroots movements. It is also the title of Rijke and van Teeffelen’s es-
say, quoted above, referring to a graffito on the separation wall. According to social anthropologist Leonar-
do Schiocchet, in his research on sumud and refugees, the historically conditioned fear of self-effacement 
has caused an idealisation expressed in the equation existence = resistance. Schiocchet, 67, 77.
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phrase: is it that existence — to live in the OPT — is resistance in itself? Or inverse-
ly, does it imply that resistance is a precondition for the possibility of existence, 
meaning that in order to continue a life in the OPT — both individually and col-
lectively — one is obliged to resist in order to avoid effacement? While the former 
interpretation is what I understand to be the customary perception, the latter is 
my semantic induction. The difference might seem negligible, but I find in the lat-
ter reading of the idiom an ontological implication that compels a more thorough 
reconsideration of the equation between existence and resistance beyond norma-
tive values of what constitutes the ‘proper’ mode of resistance. In the colonial re-
pressive context of Israel and Palestine, saturated by an asymmetrical power re-
lation of Israeli domination, Palestinian resistance to the occupying power is an 
existential question for both polity and individual (“existence = resistance”). But 
resistance is still defined as both act and practice. How can existence be a political 
practice of resistance with power-destabilising potential?
 I suggest that Foucault’s notion of a ‘practice of freedom’ as the subject’s 
resistance to power can contribute to an understanding of the power-destabilis-
ing potential in sumud, actualised by practices in everyday life. However, as stated 
earlier, applying Foucault’s analyses of power and resistance to a Palestinian colo-
nial context is not without complication, not least due to its basis in a genealogy of 
Western state power that leans on a conception of the free and governed subject. In 
a colonial situation where Palestinian subjects are — often violently — dominated 
by sovereign power rather than governed by a state apparatus, rendering Palestin-
ians as ‘free subjects’ is troublesome.71 Are people, in Foucault’s terms, free when 
the relation of power that structures the possible field of action of others is one 
of domination, or a ‘rule by violence’ that eliminates the possibility for action of 
others? Both domination and violence take place, and put serious limits on Pales-
tinian action. Yet, so long as violence is not total, a subject or group can create pos-
sibilities for their conduct — and thus ‘act otherwise’, as Giddens puts it — as long 
as the subject insists on a certain freedom, however limited it might seem. I will 
71  Foucault writes from a Eurocentric perspective, and his analyses of power and resistance are tied to 
a genealogy of Western state apparatuses. For Foucault, it is the governed subject that resists. This leaves 
open a question of the applicability of a full Foucauldian framework on resistant subjectivity in a colonial 
oppressive setting such as Palestine. In Israel’s Occupation, Neve Gordon, using Foucault’s concepts, has 
shown convincingly how the occupation has changed its apparatus of power from a rule predominantly 
exercised through biopolitical and disciplinary power, to rule through sovereign power. This is a reversal 
of Foucault’s genealogy of power in Western societies. Rule by sovereign power implies that the Palestin-
ian subject is not governed, nor subsequently formed by the kind of power Foucault considered influential 
for formation of the subject. Another discussion of the idea that Palestinians are fundamentally ungov-
erned is unfolded by Ariella Azoualy, who explicates the state of Palestinian non-citizenship and Israel’s 
sovereign rule. Azoulay proposes a new kind of political imagination, namely a civil imagination, in order 
to integrate Palestinians into the frame of those who are to be governed. Ariella Azoulay, Civil Imagination: 
A Political Ontology of Photography (London ; New York: Verso, 2012), 150.
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maintain that it is the creation of freedom through practice that mobilises the free 
subject: resistance in spite of domination and even violence. The process of subjec-
tivation — a more autonomous means of self-constitution — has a central political 
value, in this sense. Echoing the words of Frantz Fanon in relation to the struggle 
for Algerian independence from France, the colonised might be overpowered but 
not necessarily tamed.72 Independence is not something that can be granted, but 
a reality one has to build. This is why subjectivation is required of the subjugated 
subject in order to enable them to resist and contest mechanisms of power.73 The 
struggle represented by sumud as a form of life is an example of a struggle against 
subjection, notwithstanding the lack of the kind of freedom enjoyed by subjects 
that are truly governed.
 The conflation of the active-passive binary of sumud is productive insofar as 
it dismisses a normative evaluation of what the ‘proper’ mode of resistance might 
be. The reason for this is that the former normative evaluation was based on a cat-
egorisation that ultimately rejected a number of everyday practices fundamental 
for mobilising political agency. However, what is left unarticulated is the existence 
or location of a threshold useful for mediation between the struggle for survival 
and the struggle for building political agency through resistance. As a conceptual 
figure, I hold, this threshold is not a sharp limit, but rather a ‘thickening’ of mul-
tiple resistances or a codification of points of resistance. As a normative stance, I 
believe that the practice of freedom is a necessary mediating agent that makes this 
‘thickening’ possible.
 How does the unfree — the ungoverned and dominated — subject individ-
ual or group, formed by power, emerge free to resist; to radically restructure the 
field of forces toward liberation? In the interview ‘The Ethic of the Concern of the 
Self as a Practice of Freedom’ (1984), on practices of the self as self-formation, Fou-
cault expresses suspicion of the idea of the liberation of the subject. On the level 
of subjectivity, the idea of the subject as an individual capable of liberation from 
oppressive power risks collapsing into the notion of a ‘true’ human nature that for 
certain reasons has been concealed. On the level of force relations, Foucault’s cau-
tion is based in his own analytical approach to power, where liberation as such can-
not exist, given that it inevitably paves the way for new power relationships.74 Yet, 
Foucault admits that there are also instances where political liberation is required; 
crucially, it must be accompanied by practices of freedom:
72  Fanon cross-referenced in Daniele Lorenzini and Martina Tazzioli, “Confessional Subjects and Con-
ducts of Non-Truth: Foucault, Fanon, and the Making of the Subject,” Theory, Culture & Society  (Forth-
coming).
73  Ibid.
74  Foucault, 283.
40
I am not trying to say that liberation as such, or this or that form of liberation, does not 
exist: when a colonized people attempts to liberate itself from its colonizers, this is indeed 
a practice of liberation in the strict sense. But we know very well, and moreover in this 
specific case, that this practice of liberation is not in itself sufficient to define the prac-
tices of freedom that will still be needed if this people, this society, and these individuals 
are to be able to define admissible and acceptable forms of existence or political society. 
This is why I emphasize practices of freedom over processes of liberation; again, the latter 
indeed have their place, but they do not seem to me to be capable by themselves of defining 
all the practical forms of freedom.75
As seen in ‘The Subject and Power’, resistance toward power requires freedom. 
Similarly, practices of freedom require a certain degree of liberation from states 
of domination, because in states of total domination the field of possible action 
in a power relation is blocked. In other words, total domination does not allow for 
freedom. This is why “liberation is sometimes the political or historical condition 
for a practice of freedom.”76 At the same time, a state of domination does not mean 
the end of power relations: the possibility of resistance — without which there 
could not be a power relation at all — continues. It is crucial to note here that Fou-
cault distinguishes between power relations understood as strategic games be-
tween free subject (‘conduct of conduct’) and states of domination. Domination 
designates what is commonly called ‘power’ in the negative sense of oppression.77 
Foucault holds that within a state of domination, actions are conditionally limit-
ed to ‘stratagems’: isolated instances of recalcitrance and opposition that, taken 
together, do not constitute freedom.78 Clearly, some situational spatial practices 
can also be perceived as isolated stratagems, applied randomly and without stra-
tegic significance. Yet this is also the problem for power in states of domination: 
the appearance of resistance is unpredictable and cannot be properly calculated, 
as the unbalanced force relationship fixes the ‘moving substrate’ of relations. In 
such cases of domination, the problem for the powerful party is knowing where 
resistance will develop from, and what form it will take.79
 How, therefore, can the dominated subject practice freedom, given that 
resistance requires freedom and freedom requires liberation? Where does resis-
tance develop in a case of domination? For an answer, we may return to Fanon’s 
75  Ibid., 282-3.
76  Ibid., 283.
77  Ibid., 299.
78  ‘Stratagems’ would thus be more or less equivalent to Scott’s definition of everyday resistance: 
foot-dragging, pilfering, slander etc.
79  Foucault, 292.
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statement: the colonised may be overpowered but not tamed. Resistant subjectiv-
ity — and thus freedom — emerges within the subject’s refusal to be interpellated 
and subjected. Although resistance to political power does not dwell solely in the 
relationship of the self to the self, the shift from an analysis of power on the basis 
of political institutions to one of force relations, affords a conception of the subject 
that surpasses that given by law, within which the subject is either with or without 
rights. A practice of freedom is, in other words, not determined by one’s legal sta-
tus, but by the constant enactment of subjectivation. 
 An attentiveness to the need for practicing freedom, discernible in Sheha-
deh and Saïd, has made sumud a forceful concept that refers not only to confron-
tational activity, but to an insistence on self-formation. This is not the same as 
saying that existence equals resistance. Resistance is, rather, a presupposition for 
existence-as-self-formation. It is a critical stance, and a reflection on our own con-
dition: cognitively, the learning of how to enact the practice of freedom, not just as 
thought, but as somatic action.
 The idiom ‘to exist is to resist’ raises this concern in a double sense. Indeed, 
existence-as-survival in the OPT requires resistance. However, it is not mere sur-
vival that creates a resistant subject: it is constant desubjectivation through vari-
ous practices that cumulatively create political agency. Furthermore, the practice 
of freedom is not only a question of the individual’s inner strength and determi-
nation to endure, but the collective task of resistance to subjugation. This does 
not mean that liberation from colonial power can be achieved through everyday 
acts, and neither is resistant subjectivity sufficient in itself to destabilise a power 
relation to the extent of precipitating liberation. Nevertheless, it changes both the 
subject and the power it opposes through conscious and critical resistance to pow-
er.
 The form of resistance articulated by sumud is a necessary precondition for 
resistant subjectivity to emerge, and it prepares small agencies for conjoint ac-
tion.80 In this way, sumud exceeds the limits given by a dominant power even if it 
does not lead to liberation. Sumud is thus not to be defined by its effects as an agent 
for liberation, nor understood through a definition of ‘proper’ modes of resistance. 
The force of sumud as a concept of resistance is its ability to articulate the need for 
an existential practice of freedom despite domination. In this sense sumud is one 
80  Small agencies in conjoint action are here understood in line with the philosopher John Dewey’s the-
orisation of the forming of a public: “Singular things act, but they act together. Nothing has been discov-
ered which acts in entire isolation. The action of everything is along with the action of other things. The 
‘along with’ is of such a kind that the behavior of each is modified by its connection with others.” Dew-
ey calls this ‘conjoint behaviour’ and ‘conjoint action’: elements that relate by association and in conse-
quence have effects that differ in kind from isolated instances of action/behaviour. John Dewey, The Public 
and Its Problems (Denver: Alan Swallow, 1957), 22-26.
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agent for the ‘thickening’ of multiple resistances that can form political agency, 
codified through everyday life practices.
  Sumud may perhaps be viewed as a repository for the potential of a liberat-
ed state. Recalling Johansson and Vinthagen’s definition of everyday resistance, it 
constitutes an off-stage activity related to other organised, political forms of resis-
tance, enacted in parallel with more dramatic events. Yet the off-stage activity is 
not necessarily hidden, recognisable in its collective invocation of resistance and 
the practice of freedom as a common cause in everyday life.
 From one bleak perspective, sumud is the last resort; the only remaining 
possibility for the refusal of domination. From another more optimistic view, it is 
a preparation or rehearsal for liberation.
Spatial Resistance
Intersections of spatial practice and resistance in a Palestinian context have been 
explored by many working in the fields of art and architecture in recent years. 
From these explorations, a discourse on the spatial ramifications of — and poten-
tial for — resistance has arisen, prominent, for instance, on the collective platform 
Arena of Speculation.81 
 For contributors to Arena of Speculation, activist practices, denoted as ‘spa-
tial resistance’, have emerged as efforts to challenge the spatial implications of 
Israel’s occupation. Further, contributors conceptualise four modes of spatial 
resistance that frame their perspectives.82 These include ‘spatial analysis’, which 
involves research on the mechanisms of domination; ‘advocacy’, which compris-
es legal and political campaigns to create awareness; ‘critical speculation’, which 
creatively combines factual knowledge with alternative narratives; and ‘physical 
intervention’, which seeks to challenge spatial power structures through build-
ing. This framing of spatial resistance — with various emphases in the different 
modes — is common to many actors from the fields of art and architecture associ-
ated with the Israel-Palestine conflict, such as the West Bank-based architecture 
studio Decolonizing Architecture,83 Building Sumud84 in Hebron, and architect and 
writer Léopold Lambert’s blog and magazine The Funambulist,85 among others. 
As Arena of Speculation has it, reframing and subverting established conceptions 
81  The term ‘arena of speculation’ is adopted from the architecture collective Decolonizing Architecture. 
See Arena of Speculation,  http://arenaofspeculation.org. Last access 24.8.2017
82  Ahamad Barclay and Dena Qaddumi, “On Strategies of Spatial Appropriation and Resistance in Pales-
tine,” arenaofspeculation.org, 2013.
83  Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency,  http://www.decolonizing.ps/site/. Last access 24.8.2017
84  Building Sumud Project,  http://buildingsumud.tumblr.com. Last access 24.8.2017
85  The Funambulist,  https://thefunambulist.net. Last access 24.8.2017
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of hegemonic power structures becomes a means of “exploring the potentials of 
practices centred on individual and collective agency.”86 
 There is a clear resemblance between situational spatial practices that rely 
on various forms of tactics, as described in this chapter, and ideas of ‘speculation’ 
and ‘physical intervention’ offered from within the fields of activist art and archi-
tecture. What I find particularly characteristic in the framing of spatial resistance 
described above is the endeavour to formulate alternative imaginaries of the fu-
ture as an ‘arena of speculation’. Like speculative imaginaries, situational spatial 
practices are attempts to subvert existing situations, to try to ‘act otherwise’ in 
order to address dominant power structures. In this view, resistance is not only a 
practice that takes place through action, but a practice of the mind through imag-
inative or speculative thinking. Similarly, Yazid Anani suggests that resistance 
should go beyond opposition to the dynamism of occupation and concern itself 
with subjects that are not determined by the occupation as such. Anani points to 
the need for thinking resistance as an activity that puts one’s own needs and wish-
es at centre stage. Resistance could thus also be seen as an activity that focuses 
on formulating one’s own desires and ideas as a first step towards liberation and 
self-determination. According to Anani, resistance:
…is not restricted to a binary mode of ‘action’ and ‘reaction’ against colonial perpetra-
tions and mechanisms of control. It is concerned with things that we forget in our daily 
struggle for liberation. It is the necessity of maintaining an alert and free mind that is in-
terested in its own surroundings beyond the history of conflict and colonialism.87
What Anani calls for, therefore, echoes a Foucauldian practice of freedom: the for-
mation of a politics of one’s own, outside of the space predefined by the occupa-
tion; a mind and an imagination not already colonised, but instead able to conceive 
a space of one’s own. 
Territorialisation
My use of the notion of spatial practice should be considered a category that gath-
ers various forms of space shaping as transformative action in a field of forces. It 
covers a spectrum of practices serving to generate space, and is to be understood 
in the dual sense of both material and performative practices, whereby object and 
praxis stand in dialectic relation to one another. In a concrete sense, this means 
that the building itself cannot be detached from the act of building. The aim of this 
86  Arena of Speculation. http://arenaofspeculation.org/intro/
87  Yazid Anani, interview by Hanan Toukan, 2014, Arab Studies Journal XXII, 1.
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chapter has been to understand how spatial practices can be a tool against adverse 
forces, and therefore to observe how these spatial practices occur in relation to a 
power structure. My focus has been on the definition of certain properties of spa-
tial practices antagonistic to Israel’s occupation that may be characterised as sit-
uational rather than purely proactive/reactive, and the reason that a discussion of 
the relation of these practices to power and resistance has been central.
 However, the notion of spatial practice is invoked not only in order to grasp 
a specific feature of Palestinian struggle against occupation. My principal aim is to 
capture how space is configured through an instrumentalisation of architecture, 
availed by both occupier and occupied; put succinctly, to ‘decode the panorama’ 
of tactical tools, as set out in the introduction. Clarification of this statement re-
quires a conceptual ‘step back’: firstly, to explain what is meant by architecture 
and why spatial practices concern architecture at all, and secondly, to explain how 
the dual sense of spatial practice as object/praxis can be apprehended as a process 
of territorialisation that contributes to an understanding of how architecture can 
be deployed as an act of war.
 As a general reflection on architecture, spatial practice is here taken as an 
expansion of the field of architecture. Architecture is commonly distinguished 
from buildings, as denoting the discipline and profession of the architect or the 
basis of a judgement on the aesthetic qualities of a particular building. While such 
definitions are of course valid, they are not particularly relevant to the present 
discussion. Here, therefore, the term ‘architecture’ is used to indicate that what is 
addressed is an object within the realm of organisation and inhabitation of shared 
space. Thus considered, architecture traverses disciplinary categories, and is the 
material articulation of shared space. Within this realm, the notion of spatial prac-
tice is used to capture more precisely the dual and reflexive relation between the 
emergence of a built object (its praxis-dimension), and the object itself (its spatial 
dimension). Praxis and built object are thus heterogeneous but connected phe-
nomena.
 An architectural discourse concerned with the political instrumentality of 
architecture — investigating it as a manifestation of power and resistance, and a 
medium for politics and war – must necessarily include a concept of its doing. For 
this reason, the question of who and what are the practicing agents for the pro-
duction of space is central. Contemporary architectural academic discourses that 
invoke the term ‘spatial practice’ typically emphasise the agency of professionals 
in space-forming practices; however, they have simultaneously and significantly 
broadened the scope of whom this agent is and what role the agent has — in addi-
tion to the obvious architect; the artist, activist, academic, urban planner, lawyer, 
politician or scientist, for instance — as well as broadening the scope of what an 
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‘architectural’ practice might encompass — in addition to the obvious practice 
of planning and drawing space; academic or creative writing and performance, 
demonstration, research, legal work, public discussion, for instance.88 Moreover, 
the built object has also been included in the political configuration of space as an 
agent in itself, and is thus not merely seen as a container for political enactment. 
Built objects are ‘agents’ in themselves; they act and have effects.89
 Investigating architecture as a spatial practice thus requires an inquiry into 
the procedures that are availed in order to create a built object and, through this 
approach, to focus on the forces that come together when a building is assembled 
or disassembled. Equally, investigating architecture as a spatial practice is also 
a matter of decoding or examining the finite built object in order to identify the 
material and spatial instrumentality of architecture. If architecture performs and 
has effects, it makes sense that it may be used as a weapon in a conflict.
 However, the notion of ‘spatial practice’ has different meanings within dif-
88  The notion of ‘critical spatial practice’ is an example of the foregrounding of the professional as the 
‘spatial practitioner’. The art and architecture theorist Jane Rendell, building on Lefebvre and de Cer-
teau’s space/praxis theories, first coined the term ‘critical spatial practice’ to describe interdisciplinary 
processes operating between art and architecture that seek to resist or subvert dominant social orders. 
Rendell proposes “to draw connections between de Certeau’s strategies and Lefebvre’s representations 
of space on the one hand, and de Certeau’s tactics and Lefebvre’s spaces of representation on the oth-
er, and suggest a distinction between those practices (strategies) that operate to maintain and reinforce 
existing social and spatial orders, and those practices (tactics) that seek to critique and question them.” 
See additional notes below on de Certeau and Lefebvre’s concepts. ‘Critical spatial practice’ was taken up, 
inter alia, by Eyal Weizman et al. as a notion encompassing the methodology of the research conducted 
at Centre for Research Architecture at Goldsmith’s University in London, as well as Nikolaus Hirsch and 
Markus Miessen’s book series Critical Spatial Practice. For Hirsch and Miessen Critical Spatial Practice is 
a project that embarks on the construction of a discursive foundation for space as a political medium for 
action. Hirsch asks how the discipline of architecture “construct a relationship with its cultural, political, 
and social contexts?” and continues by stating that “the relevance of the question of spatial practice lies 
in the question of architecture acts in such an expanded field.” In a similar sense as that of Rendell and 
Research Architecture, the professional is the critical enabler of action that takes on the political form: 
the professional thus enters into the position and figure of the socially and politically engaged scholarly 
activist. Another variant, closely related to the discipline of architecture combined with activism is found 
in the notion of spatial agency. The project Spatial Agency, carried out at Sheffield University, ventures a 
socially minded approach to architecture. Core concerns are how architects, artists, and urban planners 
produce alternative strategies, such as appropriation of property, subversion of policies and dissemina-
tion of knowledge for bringing about spatial and social change. See Jane Rendell, “A Place Between Art, 
Architecture and Critical Theory” (paper presented at the Place and Location, Tallin, Estonia, 2003).; Art 
and Architecture: A Place Between (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006).; “Critical Spatial Practice,” in Art Incorporat-
ed, ed. Sabine  Nielsen and Christine  Buhl Andersen (Denmark: Kunstmuseet Køge Skitsesamling, 2008).; 
Nikolaus Hirsch and Markus Miessen, What is Critical Spatial Practice?, Critical Spatial Practice (Berlin: 
Sternberg Press, 2012).; Florian Kossak et al., Agency: Working With Uncertain Architectures (London: Rout-
ledge, 2010).; Nishat Awan, Tatjana Schneider, and Jeremy Till, Spatial Agency: Other Ways of Doing Archi-
tecture (London: Routledge, 2011).
89  Notably, the research agency Forensic Architecture based at Goldsmith’s University is concerned 
with material agency and its ability to ‘speak’. See their website Forensic Architecture,  http://www.foren-
sic-architecture.org. Last access 11.7.2017
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ferent disciplines and discourses. Its various applications show that ‘spatial prac-
tice’ it is not a strictly defined concept, but rather a category that groups together a 
number of activities that happen in space.90 Heavily influenced by Henri Lefebvre 
and Michel de Certeau, the fields of sociology and anthropology have employed 
spatial practice as a notion to describe the ways in which people act in the space of 
the everyday. In The Production of Space (1974) Lefebvre conceptualises how space 
is always multivalent and layered through a triad of analytical characterisations, 
within which spatial practice is one layer.91 In The Practice of Everyday Life (1984) de 
Certeau emphasises the praxeology of space as ‘ways of operating’ strategically or 
tactically. Accordingly, space is something that we do, in time.92 
 The theories of Lefebvre and de Certeau do not deal with the double-ness 
of spatial practice that I aim to pursue. They are, instead, markers for the dual 
components of spatial practice as both material object and performative practice. 
Aligned with Lefebvre and de Certeau, two spatio-temporal aspects are taken as 
distinctive for the dialectic of spatial practice: from Lefebvre, the formulation of 
the object of space as always complex and layered, and from de Certeau, the idea 
that practices are contingent. In regard to the first aspect, praxis continually 
leaves behind spatial structure; it textures space in symbolic, imaginary and con-
crete ways, thereby weaving complexity and layers into space. As for the second as-
pect, praxis never commences autonomously. Any praxis is inescapably related to 
its context and, as a result, contingent to it. Therefore, with regard to architecture 
as a weapon in conflict, if we are to understand the house as an act of war, we must 
90  See, for instance, Nurhan Abujidi: “Israeli military spatial practice”; John Collins: “repressive spatial 
practices”; James Clifford’s notion of fieldwork as “a special kind of ethnography, a spatial practice of in-
tensive, interactive research,” to mention just a few examples of its use.
91  Lefebvre’s theory of space in The Production of Space focuses on how space is produced through the 
triad of spatial practice (perceived space), representations of space (conceived space) and representational spaces 
(lived space). In Lefebvre’s theorisation, spatial practice is the material base (physical space), which can 
be observed, and within which production and reproduction of life takes place. It is a social practice that 
creates space through its use. Space is not an empty container for things that happen within it, but is or-
dered and thus produced by social activities in space. Representations of space (conceived space) are the 
influential codes that structure space, tied to abstract forms of spatial knowledge, such as the spaces dealt 
with by the disciplines of planning and science. Representational space (lived space) is space as it is ex-
perienced and imagined by the user; lived space changes codes over time, and is where resistance and 
transformation are to be found. For Lefebvre, therefore, space is a political, ideological and social con-
struct whose relations are both space-forming and space contingent. The conceptual triad is dealt with 
throughout the book, though summarised on p.33. See Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Cambrig-
de; Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
92  For de Certeau, spatial practices are “ways of operating” whose “operational combination composes 
a ‘culture’.” De Certeau distinguishes between strategies and tactics as practices that form space. Whereas 
strategy assumes power and discipline, a tactic is a re-appropriation of space enacted through procedures 
that manipulate discipline. See Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (University of California 
Press, 1984).
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look at how the house produces effects as an inscription in layered space, and how 
contingencies shape the practices that lead a house to become an act of war.
 Architecture is a product of co-producing forces, and can thus be seen as 
the crystallisation of those forces into a built object. However, in the context of 
Israel and Palestine, such crystallisations are in rapid flux, unfixed and in constant 
movement. This leads me to the second stage in a conceptual clarification of how 
space is (re)configured through spatial practice: I suggest that the duality of spa-
tial practices — as inscriptions of object and praxis — can be apprehended as a 
continuous process of territorialisation.
 The concept of territorialisation frames the modes and methods with which 
a territory is made as acts that organise a territory assembled from heterogeneous 
parts. In ‘Of the Refrain’ from A Thousand Plateaus (1984), Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari offer a zoological illustration of territorialisation in the example of the 
bird that marks its place through singing, thus organising its territory from in-
side through its sounds.93 Like the bird’s singing, building also has an immanent 
relation to life forms and their emergent infrastructures. To illustrate, when Is-
rael builds a separation wall, it is a territorialisation that deterritorialises Pales-
tinian space, which is reterritorialised once more through the engenderment of 
new practices; of climbing over the wall, or crawling under it, finding cracks in it, 
or in other attempts to bypass those forces that physically, administratively and 
militarily regulate the permeability of the wall. The separation wall thus forms 
new patterns of inhabitation by being matter on the ground, as well as creating 
new procedures for disciplinary refusal at the checkpoints, which in turn feeds 
into changes in the military operation of the checkpoints, and so on. Similarly, the 
checkpoint app previously mentioned is also an act of reterritorialisation in the 
sense that it may generate a modified strategy of moving between spaces. Deleuze 
and Guattari’s figure of continuous processes of reterritorialisation is conceptu-
ally reminiscent of Foucault’s model of power and resistance as an agonistic rela-
tionship of reciprocal incitation and struggle. The agonistic and productive rela-
tion between an apparatus of power and its opposing resistance serves to form the 
Palestinian landscape; mentally, socially, physically and politically.
 From a material perspective, the territorial conflict between Israel and Pal-
estine is a conflict concerned with capturing earth and seizing land. Since the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, when the Zionist dream of inventing Eretz Israel 
93  See ‘Of the Refrain’: “The role of the refrain has often been emphasized: it is territorial, a territorial 
assemblage. Bird songs: the bird sings to mark its territory... The little tune, the bird refrain, has changed: 
it is no longer the beginning of a world but draws a territorial assemblage upon the earth.” Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 312, 39.
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in historical Palestine began to become a reality, the conflict has been anchored in 
specific places, in the ground and its resources.94 However, as Deleuze and Guat-
tari have it, “the earth is certainly not the same thing as the territory.”95 The ter-
ritory is a distribution of something performed, and hence territory cannot be 
defined by delimiting its boundaries, but rather by the processes that constantly 
create it. Israeli and Palestinian spatial practices are intertwined in territorialis-
ing processes that answer each other’s moves. My interest lies in how the two par-
ties in the conflict operate, moving into, or aspiring to cling onto an area through 
the making of a territory. In other words: the ways in which a territory is organised 
through territorialising acts. These acts are captured in the duality of spatial prac-
tices, enabling us to see both the co-evolution of material and human agencies in 
the processes of territorialisation, and the spatial inscription such practices leave 
behind. 
 Spatial practices alter both space and praxis, meaning that territorialisation 
is a constant modification of the territory; of life inside it, spatial distribution and 
modes of inhabitation. Territorialising processes create layers of multiple inscrip-
tions, but these are not processes that merely delete and overwrite older forms. 
Space is stratified with multiple practices and objects, creating ever new relations. 
Following the example above, when the separation wall deterritorialises Palestin-
ian space, it simultaneously creates deviations in practices that reterritorialise 
Palestinian modes of inhabitation. Yet reterritorialisation also builds upon a con-
frontation with previous inscriptions. Another example could be Israel’s policy 
and practice of house demolition; rather than causing a total obliteration of modes 
of living, new forms of habitat arise from the ruins, as new practices of inhabita-
tion emerge.
 All of these movements and objects leave inscriptions behind. To under-
stand these inscriptions in a very concrete sense — which I encourage — they es-
tablish the ways in which the landscape is inhabited and utilised, and create to-
pographies. Space is inscribed; not written as text, but as texture and patterns. 
94  The earth-bound aspects of the conflict are apparent even in the colours of the landscape seen when 
travelling around Israel and OPT; the fast-growing cedar and pine forests and agricultural fields of Israel 
and its settlements are lush and green, while Palestinian areas are discernibly more barren. The political 
strategy of planting forests is grounded in both symbolic and military reasoning. As for the difference be-
tween Israeli and Palestinian agriculture, it is not only a question of agricultural skill or technology; fore-
most are the politics of water distribution. Israel controls the main underground aquifers and irrigates 
abundantly, while Palestinians are obliged to buy water for a high price. This results, amongst other things, 
in different varieties and scales of crops. See e.g. Shaul Ephraim Cohen, The Politics of Planting: Israeli-Pal-
estinian Competition for Control of Land in the Jerusalem Periphery (Chicago; London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993).
95  Deleuze and Guattari, 338.
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Through stratification, the heterogeneous phenomena of object and praxis oper-
ate contingently in a shared space. They are in motion, affecting each other and 
extrapolating emerging inscriptions. Objects can be assigned different practices, 
while practices can be applied to different objects, drift apart and be appropriated 
into ever new constellations.
 The situational spatial practices captured within the folding of agential and 
adaptive modalities of practice focus on one specific characteristic of such terri-
torialising mechanisms of the Israel-Palestine conflict. While Israel has powerful 
means for controlling land and population in the occupied territories, Palestinian 
practices that seek to resist their own deterritorialisation — spatially, politically, 
culturally or economically — are to a great extent forced to operate in the moment. 
The architectures of such practices and their relation to Israel’s powerful means 
will be inquired in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER II
 
MUGHRABI BRIDGE1
During the winter of 2004, a minor earthquake followed by heavy snowfall result-
ed in the partial collapse of the old stone ramp leading up to the Mughrabi Gate in 
the Old City of Jerusalem. The gate is one of eleven entrances to the upper level of 
Haram al-Sharif, or Har haBáyit; for those neither Muslim nor Jew, the very same 
place.2 As a temporary solution, a wooden footbridge was constructed by Israeli 
authorities while plans for a permanent ascent to the mount were on the drawing 
board.
1   The case of Mughrabi Bridge and the proposition of seeing the bridge as an unintentional monument 
is presented in short form in Runa Johannessen, “Unintentional Monuments: The Mughrabi Bridge in 
Jerusalem,” Another Space, http://anotherspace.dk/runa-johannessen-unintentional-monuments/. Last 
access 12.7.2017. 
2  Haram al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary) in Arabic, and Har haBáyit (Temple Mount) in Hebrew, are two 
names for the same geographic place, each holding great religious significance for Muslims and Jews, re-
spectively (as well as Christians). I use both names when naming the entire complex (or simply ‘mount’ 
or ‘compound’ as more neutral, topographical terms), and one or the other in instances where expression 
of a specific entitlement is clear.
Fig. 6: Mughrabi Bridge leading to Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit. View over the Western Plaza (2011).
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 The natural forces that caused the ramp to collapse unleashed far more than 
a cascade of earth and stone, triggering yet another political crisis between Israeli 
and Palestinian factions, played out in the subsequent events. The locus of this cri-
sis was found in the temporary footbridge, Mughrabi Bridge, from which unfolded 
a series of disagreements regarding the architectural layout of this ascent to Ha-
ram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit. Intrinsic to these disagreements were questions of ter-
ritorial control by architectural means. The at first sight unremarkable Mughrabi 
Bridge stands as an emblematic illustration of one of the ways in which the broader 
political conflict is shaped by, and itself shapes, spatial structures.
 In the following, Mughrabi Bridge will be explored as an example of a spa-
tial practice where co-producing forces crystallise within a built structure provid-
ed as a temporary answer to a present need. Seen from a pragmatic perspective, 
the bridge was built by Israel as an efficient solution for safe access between two 
geographical points of interest. However straightforward this task might have 
seemed, linking these two particular geographical points of interest is far from a 
politically neutral act. When probing the historical and political processes that in-
form its actualisation, as well as the material and spatial performance of the built 
structure, the bridge appears as an inscription of territorialising processes within 
which Israeli and Palestinian forces collide and struggle against one another.
 However, whether the bridge is a weapon of territorialisation, and an act of 
war — to reiterate my phrasing from the previous chapter — is one of the primary 
matters in question. From the perspective of Israeli authorities it is not; from the 
perspective of Palestinian and Muslim interests it most definitely is. In order to 
understand both these perspectives, it is necessary to consider how the bridge, as 
an inscription in layered space, produces effects and how contingencies shape the 
practices that caused the bridge to create such a groundswell of ardent disagree-
ment.
 In this particular case, the object of study was built by Israel. Characteris-
tic to the praxis-dimension of its construction was the swift adaption to a change 
in circumstances. Characteristic to its object-dimension was its expansion of a 
territory. The undertaking here is to show how this praxis/object was formed by a 
stratified Israeli-Palestinian territory. Palestinian opposition to the development 
of a scheme that would increase the territorialising potential of the bridge resulted 
neither in a tolerable and collectively agreed upon solution, nor in Israel’s unilater-
al overruling of objections, but rather in a perpetuation of the temporary bridge.
 The aim of the first part of the chapter is to capture Mughrabi Bridge as the 
product of a historically, politically and spatially situated conflict. The chapter 
will open with a historical account of disputes over access to Haram al-Sharif/Har 
haBáyit, followed by a description of the political crisis unleashed by the collapse 
53
of the ramp and subsequent construction of Mughrabi Bridge. The task is thus to 
explicate how a seemingly insignificant built structure could become the centre 
of ferocious debate. This part of the chapter builds primarily upon reports from 
news media, nongovernmental organisations, and authorities involved in the dis-
pute. Additionally, an account of my own first encounter with the bridge offers a 
description of its physical appearance and an experience of territorial confusion. 
 The aim of the second part of the chapter is to reflect upon how spatial 
practices may become historically and politically visible. In terms of its symbolic 
value, the bridge is subordinate to the historical monuments that it serves. These 
self-evident monuments fuel and narrate much of the Israel-Palestine conflict, 
going some way toward explaining why the built infrastructure that both binds 
them together and holds them apart so divided sentiments through its design. Yet, 
countering the self-evident political immediacy of architectural monuments, the 
‘epic’ of the Mughrabi Bridge controversy and the curious subsequent case of Pal-
estinian monumentalisation of the bridge lead me to suggest that new monuments 
are unintentionally created. Considering the bridge as an unintentional monu-
ment allows us to read history through the spatial inscriptions made by the con-
flict: the objects and practices with which the conflict is moulded. This last part 
of the chapter is thus also a methodological reflection on how inscriptions of spa-
tial practices might be read; a reflection on the affordance of unintentional monu-
ments as transmitters of historical events.
Securing Unimpeded Access
Central to the Israel-Palestine conflict are rival claims for territorial sovereignty 
over the region historically known as Palestine: its outer boundaries, its internal 
frontiers, the depth of its soil, its airspace and its structures on the ground. On this 
tiny piece of land, every transformation of the built environment can become a po-
tent fuse for conflict, and especially so in Jerusalem, where Haram al-Sharif/Har 
haBáyit has the dubious merit of being one of the most contested sites on earth. 
The stacked layers of stone of the compound — monumental in size and signifi-
cance — contain three thousand years of history: vertically, from the base of the 
mount, undisturbed by archaeological excavation and site of the supposed rem-
nants of Judaism’s First and Second Temple, and its Western Wall at the perime-
ter, through the mass of its multiple archaeological strata of shifting religious and 
political periods, to the upper level of today’s Islamic holy sites of Al-Aqsa Mosque 
and Dome of the Rock.
 Situated at the symbolic and geographic heart of the conflict, Haram 
al-Sharif/Har haBáyit merges religious, ideological, archaeological, political, and 
military concerns and claims. Disputes over entitlement to the site have frequently 
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stirred tensions and violent clashes on or adjacent to the compound. The Mughrabi 
Bridge controversy is thus only one in a series of recurrent crises related to Haram 
al-Sharif/Har haBáyit. Though these disputes inarguably have roots preceding the 
occupation, the recent controversy about the Mughrabi Bridge as an access point 
to Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit will here only be traced back to the aftermath of 
the Arab-Israeli War in June 1967.3
 As a consequence of the war, East Jerusalem, including the walled Old City, 
was annexed. Everything below and above the ground — including airspace — 
came under full Israeli control, with one exception: the surface of Haram al-Shar-
if/Har haBáyit remained in the hands of the Jordanian Islamic Waqf Administra-
tion, which retains religious control over the site to this day.4
3  By dating the controversy to 1967, and not further back, I refer specifically to disputes over the particular 
ascent leading to the Mughrabi Gate. This is not to ignore that the history of conflict between Jews and 
Arabs (Muslims/Christians) in the Old City predates the 1967 war. Prior to the declaration of the State of 
Israel in 1948, when Palestine was a British Mandate area, tensions between Jews and Arabs were already 
growing. This led to clashes between the two groups, for instance in the anti-Jewish riots, also called the 
1920 Nebi Musa riots, in Jerusalem in April 1920, and the Buraq/Wailing Wall riots of August 1929. Under 
Jordanian rule of the Old City, the Jewish Quarter was partly demolished and generally neglected. Jews 
were expelled and denied entry to the Jordanian part of Jerusalem. Post 1967, under Israeli control, it is 
— conversely — the Palestinian parts of the city that have been subject to demolition, confiscation and 
expulsion of residents in favour of Jewish/Israeli presence.
4  Waqf (‘pious foundation’ or ‘religious endowment’), is an Islamic religious trust holding properties in 
perpetuity.
Fig. 7: Razing of the Mughrabi Quarter to give way for the Western Plaza (June 1967). Image: David Rubinger / 
Corbis via www.palestinesquare.com.
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 Within days of the end of the war in 1967, the Mughrabi Quarter on the West-
ern side of Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit was erased by Israeli forces. This Arab 
neighbourhood, dating back to the 12th century and named after its inhabitants 
of Moroccan decent, was levelled and its residents expelled in order to extend the 
Jewish Quarter of the Old City, thereby making space for what would subsequently 
become the Western Plaza in front of the Western Wall.5 With the exception of a 
few houses and a stone ramp — the Mughrabi Gate ascent — the whole area was 
cleared. As shall be seen, the ramp’s preservation was of strategic military interest 
for Israel, yet in combination with other concerns for the nascent state, became 
the object of fierce controversy within Israeli society.
 The Western Wall (Hakotel Hama’aravi in Hebrew), believed to be a rem-
nant of the retaining wall of the Jewish Second Temple, stands as an incorporat-
ed side wall of Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit. For Muslims, it is known as al-Buraq, 
believed to be the site where the prophet Muhammad tied his steed Buraq on his 
night journey to Jerusalem. The Western Wall has been a place of prayer for Jews 
to mourn the destruction of the Temple for at least five hundred years, and is thus 
also known as the Wailing Wall. In the period 1948-67, when East Jerusalem was 
under Jordanian rule, Jews were banned from the city and thus effectively denied 
permission to pray at the Western Wall. The capture of the Old City by Israel was 
therefore a significant national and religious victory: the Western Wall was ‘liber-
ated’ and Jews were finally able to make their devotions there once again.
 In Jerusalem, the Torn City (1976), Meron Benvenisti — Israeli political sci-
entist and Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem from 1971-78 — offers a detailed account 
of the architectural and socio-political rearrangement of Jerusalem’s Old City in 
the aftermath of the war.6 According to Benvenisti, questions about the genuine 
definition of the Western Wall were quickly raised amongst the public, as well as 
within official Israeli ranks: was it exclusively a religious place, or also a secular na-
tional historic relic? The dilemma over the proper bounds of sanctity of the West-
ern Wall led to severe conflict around how to differentiate between — and manage 
spatially — religious and secular visitors. Archaeologists pushed for excavating 
the entire area surrounding the wall, while religious stakeholders demanded the 
whole length of the wall be made available for worship. The Mughrabi ramp be-
came a buffer zone between the parties when the ramp and the last standing adja-
cent Arab houses were declared a ‘no-man’s land’ dividing the holy from the secu-
5  Around 100 families from the Mughrabi Quarter were expelled. For the history of the levelling of the 
quarter, see Nadia Abu El-Haj, Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning 
in Israeli Society (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2001)., Tom Abowd, “The Moroccan 
Quarter: A History of the Present,” Jerusalem Quarterly File Winter, no. 7 (2000).
6  Meron Benvenisti, Jerusalem, the Torn City (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976), 305-19.
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lar section of the Western Wall.7
 By April 1968 the dispute accelerated once more when a demolition order for 
the few remaining Arab houses was issued following Israeli expropriation of the 
buildings. Both religious and secular parties wished to profit from this liberation 
of space in order to extend their respective areas. Meanwhile, plans for demoli-
tion were postponed due to disagreement as to whether the ramp should also be 
taken down. However, by 25 June 1969, all houses below the Mughrabi Gate had 
been demolished leaving only the ramp. The ‘no-man’s land’ became the centre of 
a conflict that culminated two days later in violent clashes between religious Jews 
and archaeologists, each seeking control over the ramp and the newly cleared area. 
Finally, the Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan intervened. Dayan declared that he 
considered unimpeded access to Mughrabi Gate to be vital: the ramp was the only 
Israeli-controlled gate leading to the upper level of Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit, 
entailing that the ramp should be preserved for strategic military reasons. Dayan’s 
intervention concluded the internal Israeli conflict, setting in place an agreement 
as to the boundaries of religious and secular parts of the Western Well through the 
appointment of Mughrabi Gate and the ramp as a dividing buffer.8 Until the ramp 
collapsed in 2004, this buffer was sustained as a stable physical division.
 The Western Wall was, in other words, of immense importance not only for 
religious Jews, but for the Israeli nation as a whole. In Reinventing Jerusalem: Isra-
el’s Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter after 1967 (2007), architect and Middle East 
scholar Simone Ricca argues that the spatial organisation of the Western Wall area 
settled in 1969 synthesised the Israeli national project:
By this arrangement, the three main pillars of the Israeli state – the religious, the secular/
Zionist and the military – were now represented and controlled portions of the Wailing 
Wall area. It might therefore be affirmed that this site symbolizes the State of Israel in all 
its complexity and representative components.9
After two years of internal controversy, each of these representative components 
controlled portions of the minuscule Western Wall area. However, what lacks 
from Ricca’s observation is a fourth component within this complex arrangement: 
the presence of Palestinians and their ‘share’ of the area as a consequence of occu-
pation and annexation. Without this component, an Israeli military intervention 
to secure unimpeded access through Mughrabi Gate would have been redundant. 
7  Ibid., 315.
8  Ibid., 319. See also Simone Ricca, Reinventing Jerusalem: Israel’s Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter After 
1967 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 113-14.
9  Ricca, 114.
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Though Palestinian society is considered neither a ‘pillar’ of the Israeli state, nor a 
representative component in the state’s construction, the occupation and annex-
ation of Palestinian territory — and the population subsumed within it — cannot 
be removed from the equation. It is not a foreign body extraneous to the Israeli 
state, but a component inextricably linked to its ideological, religious, military and 
spatial reality, in this case in the form of a stone ramp. In the following, closer at-
tention will be paid to the ‘complexity of components’ present at Haram al-Sharif/
Har haBáyit.
Access Denied and Trespassed
There are eleven gates that give access to Haram al-Sharif’s upper level, where 
Al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock is situated. Ten of these gates are restricted to 
use by Muslims only, with access guarded by Israeli police and Waqf custodians. 
The eleventh gate — Mughrabi Gate — is for short and often irregular hours open 
for non-Muslims, as well as serving as the main point of entry for the Israeli De-
fence Forces (IDF) and police when disturbances erupt. As Dayan declared in 1969, 
the Mughrabi Gate and its ascent are still vital for Israel to have swift access to the 
top of the compound from the Western Plaza. Yet Jewish access is conditional: en-
shrined in both Jewish religious and Israeli political prohibitions since 1967, Jews 
are not allowed to pray at Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit. The religious prohibition 
is a rabbinical declaration, reflective of the risk of treading upon the Holy of Ho-
lies — the sanctuary of the Tabernacle, God’s dwelling — that is believed to exist 
somewhere in the depth of the mount. Secured by Israeli police, the religious ban 
is ratified from the Israeli political side in order to avoid clashes between Jews and 
Muslims. While the rabbinical prohibition calls for religious sensitivity toward Ju-
daism amongst its own faithful, the politically motivated restriction reflects reli-
gious sensitivity towards Muslims — and Palestinians in general — in order to rein 
in unrest. This arrangement of restricted access to Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit 
has — in principle — been respected politically as the status quo by Israel and the 
Jordanian Islamic Waqf since 1967.10 
 The status quo was disturbed by the earthquake in 2004, the collapse of the 
old ramp and subsequent construction of a temporary footbridge. This alteration 
of a piece of seemingly mundane infrastructure ignited fear and accusations from 
the Muslim side that the ability for both the IDF, Israeli police and Jewish worship-
ers to access Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit would increase. According to this per-
10  The status quo of praying arrangements, where Jews pray at the Western Wall and Muslims at Al-Aqsa, 
has roots in the Ottoman era. When I refer to the status quo here, it is the combination of religious and po-
litical agreements set in place in 1967 and ratified by the Supreme Court. For an overview of the status quo 
and changes to it, see Ir Amim, “Dangerous Liaison: The Dynamics of the Rise of the Temple Movements 
and their Implications,” (Jerusalem2013).
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spective, increased access constituted a threat to the bilateral agreement through 
which the Waqf retained control over the top of the compound, and suspicions 
about a devious Jewish takeover of the Muslim shrine flourished. Paranoid as this 
may seem, it must be viewed in the context of previous moves toward changing the 
status quo.11
 At the Camp David negotiations in July 2000, only a few years prior to the 
collapse of the Mughrabi ramp, a rather imaginative spatial proposal for solving 
conflicts about control over Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit had been refused. In 
Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (2007), Eyal Weizman offers the 
story of this proposal, which sounds like either jest or travesty today.12 The com-
pound had a special focus under the Camp David negotiations, and was caught in 
the crossfire when U.S. President Bill Clinton suggested that the issue of sover-
eignty over Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit within the framework of a bilateral two-
state solution could be resolved through the outline of an architectural proposal.13 
The original proposal, presented previously by the Israeli architect and amateur 
archaeologist Tuvia Sagiv, and based on his own radical archaeological method-
ology, was to make a vertical division of the mount in order to meet the religious 
demands of both Muslims and Jews.14 According to Clinton’s architecturally in-
spired vision of how to justly divide the masses of holy stone, Palestinians would 
have ‘sovereign custodianship’ over the surface of the platform of Haram al-Shar-
if, while Israeli sovereignty would comprise the depth of Har haBáyit all the way 
down to the centre of the earth. In between, below the paving of Haram al-Sharif, 
would be a UN zone of one and a half metres dividing the two parties. Prime Min-
ister Ehud Barak embraced the proposal, further suggesting a pedestrian bridge or 
tunnel that would connect the Palestinian areas east of the Old City with Haram 
al-Sharif. The proposals were promptly rejected by the Palestinians.15 The Pales-
tinian negotiator Nabil Shaath commented dryly on the proposals: “You would 
need a GPS navigational system in your shoes to negotiate Barak’s Jerusalem.”16 
11  The Palestinian historian Nazmi Jubeh argues that Israel has not only recently, but recurrently, violated 
the status quo at Haram al-Sharif. Jubeh provides an overview of the last fifty years of interventions at the 
site as a comment on the “new status quo” of the present. Jubeh adds that it is “the crucible of the much 
broader struggle” against occupation — not merely about control over religious and historic treasures. 
Nazmi Jubeh, “Jerusalem’s Haram al-Sharif: Crucible of Conflict and Control,” The Institute for Palestine 
Studies 45, no. 2 (2015).
12  Eyal Weizman, Hollow land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London; New York: Verso, 2007), 13-14, 
54-55.
13  Ibid., 54.
14  Nadav Shragai, “Temple Mount - not listed in the Land Registry,” Haaretz, 05.06.2006.
15  For an account of the negotiations, see Akram Hanieh, “The Camp David Papers,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies 30, no. 2 (2001). See also Clayton E. Swisher, The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About 
the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Nation Books, 2004).
16  Swisher, 328.
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The division of sovereignty over a mass of stone and an according distribution 
of ethnic and religious access to its different zones in a three-dimensional maze 
would probably, as Shaath commented, be extremely confusing both to negotiate 
and to navigate: that said, the scenario is not far from the spatial reality found to-
day.
 Three months after the Camp David negotiations ended, the Second Intifa-
da, also referred to as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, erupted in the wake of Ariel Sharon’s 
infamous visit to Haram al-Sharif and Al-Aqsa on 28 September 2000. Sharon, 
then leader of the Israeli right wing party Likud, was accompanied by a Likud del-
egation and one thousand Israeli riot police. Their visit to the mount was taken as 
a profound provocation by Palestinians, and violent riots occurred immediately 
after Sharon and his company left the mount.17 The underlying reasons for the out-
break of the Second Intifada must be understood in relation to the failure of the 
Oslo II agreements from 1995 — which stipulated that a Palestinian state should 
be established by May 1999 — and not in isolation as a sudden eruption in response 
to Sharon’s visit. However, Sharon’s presence at Haram al-Sharif nevertheless 
transgressed a spatial and political boundary at an especially heated moment in 
time and had a tremendous symbolic impact.
 Apprehending the symbolic meaning of Haram al-Sharif, not only in Mus-
lim-religious but also Palestinian-nationalistic terms, is decisive in order to un-
derstand why the status quo of restricted access represented by the Mughrabi 
Gate is so important. The temporary bridge, and previously the ramp, serves as 
the concrete connection between Israeli and Palestinian controlled space. It en-
ables physical, and thus also symbolic, trespass of the threshold between the con-
flicting parties. While tourists have historically been welcome at Haram al-Sharif, 
religious Jews and Israeli security forces are unwanted visitors.
 Although entrance to the top of the compound is restricted and Jews are 
prohibited from praying on Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit, the Mughrabi Gate also 
serves as the access point for controversial visits by Jewish religious extremists 
attempting to pray there. According to the Israeli NGO Ir Amim’s report ‘Danger-
ous Liaison: The Dynamics of the Rise of the Temple Movements and their Im-
plications’ (2013), such visits have gradually increased in frequency over the last 
decades, not merely as a result of multiplied instances of individual visits but as 
an organised movement, supported by government bodies and a public political 
lobby that actively seeks to change the status quo.18 While the expression of views 
designed to alter the status quo were previously considered a matter of extremism, 
17  S. Demirel et al., “Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee [Mitchell Report],” Middle 
East Policy 8, no. 3 (2001).
18  Ir Amim,  5,8, 33-73.
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the Temple movements are now widely accepted.19 The goal of the Temple move-
ments, Ir Amim claims, is to “promote an ideology that places the Temple at its 
center — not as a symbol or distant goal but as a real object of political, religious 
and cultural actions to force a fundamental change of the existing arrangements 
on the Mount.”20 The increase of Temple movement activities have contributed 
to a concern among Palestinians that Haram al-Sharif will be forcibly divided 
between Jewish and Muslim worshippers, or even more radically, that the Jew-
ish Third Temple will be constructed directly on the platform. In each case, the 
implication is that the Islamic Waqf would lose control over the site. Heightened 
tensions accompanied by mutual suspicion and accusations around the sensitive 
issue of access to, and sovereignty over, Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit have led to 
several incidents of violence on or adjacent to the compound.21
Controversial Design
These tensions flared up in the wake of the collapse of the old stone ramp lead-
ing to Mughrabi Gate in 2005. After the collapse, the Israeli Antiquities Authority 
(IAA) constructed a temporary bridge while plans for a permanent replacement 
were prepared. In 2007, Ehud Olmert, Israeli Prime Minister at the time, approved 
a proposal by nationally renowned Israeli architect Ada Karmi-Melamede.
 Based upon email correspondence with Karmi-Melamede and the architect 
Eli Elan, who subsequently took over the project, I have recorded the following 
version of the course of events pertaining to the design of the bridge.
 According to Karmi-Melamede’s account, she submitted a preliminary pro-
posal in 2006 but resigned from the project after refusing to comply with demands 
for alterations from authorities involved in the planning process. Karmi-Mela-
mede’s idea was to create a light industrial structure in glass and steel, and she cites 
this as the reason for refraining from adding a continuous pergola and massive 
parapets along the bridge in her second proposal, as requested. Karmi-Melamede’s 
first design from 2006 was issued a building permit, which was subsequently can-
celled. According to the account of architect Eli Elan, the cancellation was based 
on the requirement for a new Town Plan for the proposed Mughrabi Gate, because 
the first proposal did not follow the original route of the collapsed ramp. Elan sub-
19  Likud’s Miri Regev is one of the most outspoken politicians on the issue of allowing Jews to pray at 
Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit, and bringing it under Israeli control. For instance, in response to a 2016 UN-
ESCO resolution on the status of Jerusalem, Regev proposed the establishment of a state funded Temple 
Mount Heritage Foundation, calling for a Jewish ‘liberation’ of the site. UNESCO, “Occupied Palestine 
Resolution,” (2016). Raoul Wootliff, “Ministers Push for State-Funded Temple Mount Foundation,” Times 
of Israel, 13.3.2017.
20  Ir Amim,  9, 24.
21  Ibid., 9.
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mitted a new Town Plan in 2010, based on Karmi-Melamede’s second proposal, 
which followed the ramp’s original footprint. This became the basis for Eli Elan’s 
proposal, which obtained a building permit in 2011. Since then, IAA excavations 
have significantly altered the terrain, the reason for which, according to Elan, a 
redesign of the ascent is required in the eventuality of a decision to proceed and 
build the project.22
 A report by Israeli attorney Daniel Seidemann for Ir Amim, entitled ‘The 
Mughrabi Gate Crisis’ (2007), notes that the approved proposal differed consider-
ably from both the original earth ramp and the temporary wooden bridge.23 While 
the old ramp was seventy-five meters long, extending from the base of the mount 
within the Western Plaza area, the proposed bridge — two hundred meters long, 
three meters wide, and supported by seven pillars — extended all the way from the 
Southern Wall to close to the Dung Gate outside of the Western Plaza area. More-
over, the load-bearing capacity of the proposed bridge was increased significantly, 
calculated to hold the weight of three hundred armed policemen.
 The 2007 proposal was met with objections from several sides.24 For in-
22  Based on email-correspondence with Ada Karmi-Melamede and Eli Elan, July 2015. Both were willing 
to share their drawings for the design proposals from 2006 and 2011, respectively, and agreed permission 
for reprint in this thesis.
23  Daniel Seidemann, “The Mughrabi Gate Crisis - Background and Analysis,” PeaceNow.org, http://ar-
chive.peacenow.org/entries/archive3420. Last access 30.06.2014
24  For a timeline of the events up until 2007, see e.g. Ibid. Israeli Antiquities Authority, “The Mughra-
bi Gate Access Restoration Project,”  http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/jerusalem/pages/
the%20mughrabi%20gate%20access%20restoration%20project%20-%20feb%202007.aspx. Last access 
Fig. 8: Ada Karmi-Melamede Architects’ preliminary proposal for Mughrabi Bridge (2006). 
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stance, Israeli archaeologists were concerned about possible damage to the ar-
chaeological park at the foot of the mount due to the layout of the proposed con-
struction, while legal requests to stop the plans due to its questionable process of 
approval were filed by Ir Amim and Jerusalem City Councillor Pepe Alalu.25 At the 
same time, Israeli ‘preventive excavations’ began; a precondition for obtaining a 
proper building permit. These excavations, in turn, upset the Jordanian Islam-
ic Waqf, who took issue with the possible danger of materially damaging Haram 
al-Sharif as a consequence of the Israeli archaeologists’ work. Protest marches in 
Jordan and violent riots took place in Wadi Joz and other parts of the so-called 
‘Holy Basin’ in Jerusalem.26 Rumours of a Third Intifada were in the air.27 Eventu-
ally, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UN-
ESCO) became involved in monitoring the plans and excavations to ensure that 
they were conducted in an orderly fashion.28 UNESCO concluded in their ‘Report 
of the Technical Mission to the Old City of Jerusalem’ (2007) that Israel’s excava-
tions were not at risk of damaging any historical and religious sites, yet added the 
unambiguous statement that a new ramp should not be designed as a security tool 
for Israel, but rather as a means to restore the status quo ante.29
 Restoring the status quo ante effectively required a solution for the archi-
tectural design of the bridge that would provide the same level of access to Haram 
al-Sharif as prior to the collapse of the ramp. The status quo was thus architec-
turally dependant. In 2011, after almost four years of planning procedures and 
negotiations about the design between Israeli authorities and Jordan’s Waqf ad-
ministration, a diplomatic crisis broke out. First, in December 2011 Israel ordered 
the bridge be dismantled due to concerns about structural security, and closed the 
30.06.2014. See also Meron Rapoport, “A Bridge Too Far,” Haaretz, 15.02.2007.
25  Seidemann. “Mughrabi Gate Crisis.”
26  The term ‘Holy Basin’ is a disputed term for the geographical area that comprises of the Old City and 
the surrounding area with its concentration of holy and historical sites. The concept of Jerusalem contain-
ing the ‘Holy Basin’ has become important to Israel for political and planning purposes, but is contested 
for its alleged Judaic bias. For background, see Wendy Pullan and Maximilian Sternberg, “The making of 
Jerusalem’s ‘Holy Basin’,” Planning Perspectives 27, no. 2 (2012).; and, Ruth Lapidot, The Historic Basin of 
Jerusalem: Problems and Possible Solutions, ed. Ramon Amnon, vol. 408, The JIIS Studies Series (Jerusalem: 
Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2010).
27  Sheikh Raed Salah, head of the Islamic Movement, called for an ‘intifada to rescue the Al-Aqsa Mosque’ 
during Friday prayer in Wadi Joz, February 2007, and accused Israel of attempting to build the Third Tem-
ple on the Temple Mount. Salah was sentenced to jail for incitement to violence in 2013. Jonathan Lis, 
“Salah calls for ‘intifada’ against Temple Mount excavation,” Haaretz, 16.02.2007.; Middle East Monitor, 
“Sheikh Raed Salah sentenced to 8 months in jail,” Middle East Monitor, 05.03.2014.
28  For analysis of UNESCO’s role, see Wendy Pullan et al., The Struggle for Jerusalem’s Holy Places (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2013), 137-40.; Michael Dumper and Craig Larkin, “The Politics of Heritage and the Limita-
tions of International Agency in Contested Cities: A Study of the Role of UNESCO in Jerusalem’s Old City,” 
Review of International Studies 38, no. 1 (2012).
29  UNESCO, “Report of the Technical Mission to the Old City of Jerusalem (27 February - 2 March 
2007),” (2007).
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Fig. 9: Drawings from Eli Elan Architects’ proposal for a new town plan and Mughrabi Bridge (2011).
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bridge for several days. This was followed by announcements that a permanent 
bridge would be built, despite the alleged illegality of the plans.30 Jordan withdrew 
from the bilateral planning of a new bridge, and Hamas condemned Israel’s intend-
ed actions. According to several Israeli newspapers, Hamas spokesperson Fawzi 
Barhum stated in an interview with Agency France Press following the closure of 
the bridge, that it was “a violent act that amounts to a declaration of religious war 
on the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem.”31 Subsequently, Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu ordered a stop to the demolition of the temporary bridge. 
The proposal to rebuild the ascent along the path of the old ascent — Eli Elan’s 
design — was presented in the aftermath of these events.
 Significant for the perpetuity of the controversy is that new disputes con-
tinue to arise. In September 2014 it was revealed that in mid-August 2014, the 
IAA had begun to build a new temporary wooden ramp below the ‘old’ temporary 
bridge. The new construction thus rose from the archaeological excavations being 
carried out at the site. According to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, the IAA’s inten-
tion was “to replace the older structure until the diplomatic and security situation 
permitted the construction of a permanent bridge.”32 As previously, Jordan made 
official complaints and Prime Minister Netanyahu ordered the removal of the un-
authorised pathway, while Mughrabi Bridge was left standing.
 In short, all actions emanating from the Israeli side were met with suspicion 
from the Muslim side that Israel would physically undermine Haram al-Sharif with 
its archaeological excavations, thus damaging the compound. From the Israeli 
side, this suspicion was refused as nonsense and instead presented as a fear from 
the Muslim side that the excavations would unearth Judaic history, thus prov-
ing Jewish historical connections and entitlement to Har haBáyit. As previously 
seen, UNESCO’s report on the excavations concluded that they did not constitute 
a risk of structural damage to Al-Aqsa: the digging took place ten meters outside 
of the Western Wall, not under the compound. However, the “existential Muslim 
fear over the safety of Al-Aqsa”, that urban theorist Wendy Pullan identifies in The 
Struggle for Jerusalem’s Holy Places, cannot be fully understood without taking into 
consideration the extensive archaeological projects that Israel has carried out ad-
jacent to the compound, beneath the Muslim Quarter of the Old City, and in the 
30  The question of the plans’ illegality is a matter of legal and political interpretation. According to senior 
researcher Nadav Shragai at Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs (JCPA), neither the plans for demolition 
nor for construction of a new bridge were illegal. Shragai gives an overview of the Mughrabi Gate affair in 
JCPA’s section ‘Jerusalem Viewpoints.’ Nadav Shragai, “The Mughrabi Gate to the Temple Mount in Jeru-
salem: The Urgent Need for a Permanent Access Bridge,” (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs2011).
31  Several newspapers, e.g. ynetnews, Jerusalem Post, and Haaretz, cite this statement. I have not been 
able to obtain the original source.
32  Nir Hasson and Barak Ravid, “PM Orders Removal of Wooden Ramp at Temple Mount, Following 
Pressure from Jordan,” Haaretz, 03.09.2014.
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‘Holy Basin’.33 Since 1969 Israel has conducted archaeological tunnelling — with 
more or less secrecy — in the area. In some instances, as in the Palestinian neigh-
bourhood of Silwan, these excavations hollowed out the ground to the extent that 
they caused cracks in roads and houses.34 The fear of being physically undermined, 
as well as overruled, is thus not completely unsubstantiated and adheres to a very 
present reality of Israeli archaeological practice. 
Seeking Access
I was unaware of the history of the bridge the first time I visited Jerusalem in 2010, 
but several diffuse questions about this strange structure hanging from the West-
ern Wall presented themselves, simply through the experience of trying to make 
practical use of it. In contrast to the ever-present bright Jerusalem Stone surfac-
es of the Old City and the spacious Western Plaza — crowded with religious Jews 
making their devotions at the Western Wall, swarms of tourists, and the occasion-
al gathering of IDF soldiers — the footbridge climbing up to the Mughrabi Gate 
struck me as rather anomalous to its location. It had the appearance of a construc-
tion site, and was aesthetically awkward compared to the grandiose surroundings, 
though I found it visually compelling in its own right.
 It was hard to find the infrastructural logic to the system without prior 
knowledge about the security arrangements at the Western Plaza. Why was there 
a covered footbridge winding to the top? From where within the highly securitised 
Western Plaza could I enter it? When trying to find the path from the numerous 
secured entrances at ground level, I repeatedly found myself re-emerging on the 
Plaza. After some time searching, I found the opening: a discretely signposted gate 
beside the women’s entrance to Western Plaza. The sign states, in English and He-
brew: “Announcement and Warning: According to Torah Law, entering the Tem-
ple Mount area is strictly forbidden due to the holiness of the site. The Chief Rab-
binate of Israel.” At the Israeli security control point, stationed in a metal container, 
passports and belongings were checked. Once through security, a narrow fifty me-
tre path, fenced and covered with plastic sheets led to the entrance of the wooden 
structure: approximately seventy-five meters long, one meter wide, climbing some 
sixteen meters up to Mughrabi Gate. Scattered Israeli flags decorated the interior, 
a plastic chair was left in a corner, and further up the bridge a neat stack of riot 
shields were stored. The Bridge is simply constructed from timber panels laid with 
gaps between that enable a view from the inside, while the movement of people 
33  Pullan et al., 108.
34  Orly Noy, “Israel’s very own tunnels of dread in Jerusalem,” +972 Magazine, 6.9.2014. Emek Shaveh, 
“From Territorial Contiguity to Historical Continuity: Asserting Israeli Control through National Parks in 
East Jerusalem,” (2014).
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Fig. 10: Military parade at the Western Plaza (April 2010).
Fig. 11: Hedged entrance path to the wooden bridge (April 2010). 
67
Fig. 12: Ascent upward through Mughrabi Bridge. Path downward to the women’s area of the Western Wall 
(April 2010).
Fig. 13: A stack of riot shields inside the bridge (April 2010). 
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Fig. 14: Mughrabi Bridge and Al-Aqsa (August 2011). 
Fig. 15: The bridge and supportive scaffolding structure (August 2011). 
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Fig. 16: Lookout position inside the bridge, located in the corner towards the Western Plaza. Israeli police sitting 
guard (August 2011). 
Fig. 17: Western Plaza. Partial replacement of the scaffolding structure discernible under the bridge 
(March 2012).    
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Fig. 18: Mughrabi Bridge (January 2014). The scaffolding structure is replaced by fewer and stronger steel co-
lumns. The remains of the former stone ramp have been removed, thus expanding the prayer area for women in 
front of the Western Wall.
Fig. 19: Mughrabi Bridge (October 2014). View from the Jewish Quarter over the Western Plaza and Haram 
al-Sharif/Har haBáyit. The golden cupola of Dome of the Rock on top of the complex.
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along the bridge is perceptible from the outside. A tilted roof covers the passage. 
At the end of the bridge a small landing is shaded by blue cotton veils, and the en-
trance to Haram al-Sharif through Mughrabi Gate is guarded by a Waqf custodian. 
 At the time of writing, the temporary bridge remains standing, though has 
been slightly modified since its construction more than a decade ago. The white 
plastic coverings have been removed and the original scaffold structure support-
ing the bridge, similar to the iron bars used as a provisional support on construc-
tion sites, has been replaced by fewer, more robust columns. The removal of the 
rickety scaffolding, as well as the progress of archaeological excavations, has en-
abled an expansion of the women’s prayer area at the Western Wall beneath the 
bridge. The sun-shading veils have been substituted by a more solid metal roof. On 
my last visit in 2014, the stack of riot shields had grown.
 The controversy over Mughrabi Bridge appears to have frozen into archi-
tectural form, a physical indication of a perpetual conflict. Perhaps it is also the 
crude expression of the bridge that makes the odd winding structure appear as a 
paradigmatic political signifier of the Israel-Palestine conflict, as though its struc-
tural and infrastructural distortion were blue-printed from the files of the conflict 
itself.
Permanent Temporariness 
Beyond the historical-religious rhetoric, reasoning and ‘politics of blame’ concern-
ing the present Mughrabi Bridge controversy can be found a dispute whose point 
of contention is a simple architectural structure: a bridge that serves as a link be-
tween Israeli and Palestinian spaces. Signs of alteration of the status quo arrange-
ment sparked fear of a devious Israeli take-over of the whole compound. Israeli 
archaeological excavations, suggestions for how to divide Haram al-Sharif/Har 
haBáyit, and symbolic and provocative visits by Sharon and others, had previously 
raised Muslim and Palestinian suspicions of what even slight changes to the sta-
tus quo might lead to. Plans for changes to the infrastructure leading to Mughrabi 
Gate were thus no less alarming. Both the design and the practice of regulating 
access via the bridge are indicative of how this particular space is conceived as a 
space of competing forces. Moreover, the question of who has the capacity to alter 
the spatially complex reality on the ground — even whilst this physical alteration 
might seem negligible — is, in the end, a reflection of the overall power balance in 
the political conflict.
 Mughrabi Bridge appears as a piece of infrastructure without any grand 
symbolic cultural or religious significance. In contrast to the surrounding monu-
ments, the bridge is neither desired nor appreciated, devoid as it is of aesthetic and 
historical value. The bridge was built as a temporary response to the unforeseen 
72
events of the earthquake and snowstorm that caused the old ramp to collapse. But 
well into its second decade, while the wait continues for a permanent plan that 
both parties can agree upon, the bridge still stands as a non-solution and tempo-
rary structure. Similarly to the primary contested spatial arrangements of the 
conflict, such as the ‘temporary’ Palestinian refugee camps, the ‘temporary’ Israe-
li settlements, or the ‘temporary’ separation barrier between Israel and the OPT, 
the provisional has become indefinitely temporary, and permanently unsettled. 
Pushed and shaped by political forces, the Mughrabi Bridge is a materialisation of 
perpetuated politics, instrumental as a tool for increasing and/or decreasing terri-
torial control, shaping the way in which movement and access is regulated and ne-
gotiated. Despite its character as a mundane and pragmatic structure, questions 
relating to its very existence — how it is built, whether it should be demolished or 
replaced, what the limits for its load bearing capacity should be, and so on — none-
theless operate as highly inflammatory transversals of the political field. 
 The Mughrabi Bridge is far from being an exclusive example of an architec-
ture that embodies conflict, controversy and violence. The controversies connect-
ed to Mughrabi Bridge reflect the greater conflict in several ways, characteristic of 
repeated failures of negotiation; a propensity for temporary solutions that decel-
erate into permanence; an extreme sensitivity to spatial change; and, a constant 
quest for sovereignty over territory. Can the bridge, therefore, be seen as a weapon 
and an act of war? Or is it the proposed but as yet unbuilt bridge that represents the 
weapon? Is the bridge a fuse, an excuse for declaring holy war, or an opportunity to 
expand archaeological and religious territory under the guise of security? Inten-
tions are difficult to prove. Yet, in my reading of the spatial inscriptions and con-
tingent practices recorded by the bridge, what is most instrumental is its capacity 
to alter territorial organisation over time while the parties continue to fight. 
Unintentional Monuments
In 2012, a stamp collection was issued by the Hamas’ Ministry of Telecom & Infor-
mation Technology in Gaza under the title ‘Mughrabi Gate Bridge’.35 The collec-
tion contained four stamp sheets, each depicting one of the twelve entrance gates 
to Haram al-Sharif, as well as a larger and more expensive block stamp showing 
the Mughrabi Gate Bridge with Al-Aqsa mosque visible in the background. In a 
press release, Gaza’s Minister of Culture, Mohammed Madhoun, stated:
35  Information about the Mughrabi Gate Bridge stamp collection was retrieved from philatelist Tobias 
Zywietz’ website section ‘A Short Introduction to the Stamps of Palestine’. Zobbel, “A Short Introduction 
To The Philately Of Palestine - The Stamps of Palestine 2012,”  http://www.zobbel.de/stamp/pna_2012.
htm. Last access 5.6.2017
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The postage stamp of the Mughrabi Gate of Jerusalem points on the tried obliteration the 
monuments and Judaization of the Islamic and Christian monuments in the Holy City, 
and exposes this to all. [Sic] 36
Stamps are often used to illustrate historic and cultural monuments, so the selec-
tion of the gates to Haram al-Sharif for an annual stamp collection are an obvi-
ous choice for an Islamic government. However, in the postage stamp collection 
‘Mughrabi Gate Bridge’, the representation chosen emphasises not the mosque 
— unmistakably regarded as sacred and valuable — but rather the disputed gate 
and bridge. Minister Madhoun’s statement makes clear an intention to highlight 
the dangers faced by Haram al-Sharif, and to “expose this to all.” According to the 
Hamas Ministry’s choice of portrayal, Mughrabi Bridge is a threat to the real mon-
ument, Haram al-Sharif.
 Although nothing more than an insignificant appendix to the impressive 
monument it hinges upon, the bridge appears to have attained the status of a mon-
ument in itself: signified on a small piece of printed paper to be distributed via 
postcards and letters, as well as appearing on the philatelic website from which 
the image of the stamp was retrieved. The postage stamp’s curious juxtaposition 
and conflation of monument and bridge provides an opportunity to reflect on two 
aspects of such a monumentalisation.
 Etymologically the word ‘monument’ is derived from the Latin monere (to 
remind, recall or admonish). Buildings, statues, structures, or sites made to com-
memorate a person or event, are those that most commonly attain the status of 
36  Madhoun’s statement is cross referenced from the Gaza Ministry of Communications and Informa-
tion Technology. See ibid.
Fig. 20: Mughrabi Gate Bridge stamps, 2012. Image retrieved from (Zobbel).
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monument, or are appointed as such due to historical importance or interest. Typ-
ically, an object’s monumentality is recognised through its physical size, symbol-
ism and form. A monument is a carrier of collective memory through a standalone 
object, by convention usually conceived as an object for collective memory by po-
litical, religious, or cultural authorities.
 However, the appointment of an object as a representation of collective his-
torical time need not by necessity be conceived as such consensually. Monumen-
talising traces of history — the representation of historical time in an object — in 
my view, can also be a matter of the particular way in which the relation of our 
surroundings to past and present processes and events is read.
 The American landscape artist Robert Smithson provides this type of read-
ing in the photo-illustrated essay ‘The Monuments of Passaic’ (1967),37 a travel-
ogue of a one-day journey made to his birthplace in Passaic, New Jersey. Smithson 
describes Passaic as a landscape scattered with monuments: a bridge, water pipes, 
concrete abutments, a parking lot, a sand box. In the essay, it appears as a given 
that what Smithson observes are monuments. The first monument — a bridge — 
is introduced, in the common-sense fashion: “The bus passed over the first mon-
ument.”38 The monuments are for the most part named with functional descrip-
tions: The Great Pipes Monument; The Sand Box Monument; Monument with 
Pontoons; The Bridge Monument (or Monument of Dislocated Directions) and so 
on. They are negligible and celebrate as little about the past as they promise about 
the future:
But the suburbs exist without a rational past and without the ‘big events’ of history. Oh, 
maybe there are a few statues, a legend, and a couple of curios, but no past – just what 
passes for a future… Passaic seems full of ‘holes’ compared to New York City, which seems 
tightly packed and solid, and those holes in a sense are the monumental vacancies that 
define, without trying, the memory-traces of an abandoned set of futures. […] There was 
nothing interesting or even strange about that flat [parking lot] monument, yet it echoed 
a kind of cliché idea of infinity; perhaps the ‘secrets of the universe’ are just as pedestrian 
— not to say dreary.39
To label a place as filled with ‘monumental vacancies’ is clearly a means to say that 
it is incredibly empty, boring and tedious. The ‘monumental vacancies’ Smithson 
discovers are the inconspicuous components of suburban North America — mun-
dane and quotidian traces of industrialisation and modernity; objects not usually 
37  Robert Smithson, “The Monuments of Passaic,” Artforum, VI, 4, 1967.
38  Ibid., 52.
39  Ibid., 55, 56.
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depicted as grand, important or commemorative. The Passaic monuments have 
not accrued any evident value over time. However, in Smithson’s reverse reading, 
these components are not abject, even if they define the traces of a future that has 
been deserted: they are monumentalised through his gaze, and the substance and 
meaning he confers to what he sees. Smithson’s gaze rearranges an ordinary per-
spective on how spatial elements are situated in time and how they can be read and 
evaluated on a temporal scale. 
 Such ‘reading of time in space’ — to draw on the title of the historian Karl 
Schlögel’s book Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit (2003) — requires a sensitivity toward 
the specific locations, places and objects where events take place.40 Schlögel notes 
that, however obvious and banal it may seem, historical process are rooted and un-
fold in space: history takes place, quite literally.41 Smithson offers us a perspective 
that is attuned to what meanings a landscape or an object might hold, besides the 
conventional and apparent, by working up monuments from parking lots, sand-
boxes and water pipes. The monument-gazing travelogue of Smithson positions 
these seemingly mundane objects in relief in order to question the abundant con-
nections and breaks immanent to the place observed, as well as evoking historical 
time in spatially condensed form. 
 Although Smithson’s reading of Passaic appears to conclude that both the 
past and future are abandoned, I would argue that it is precisely his rendering of 
time within a spatial specificity that enables the reader to recognise historical 
processes of modernity in the structures — the monuments — elicited from the 
journey. By assigning a sandbox, water pipes and other objects monumental val-
ue, their relation to the spatial stratification of history becomes recognisable. ‘The 
Monuments of Passaic’ is thus interesting as a point of departure for the reading of 
historical processes in objects and landscapes.
 However, Smithson’s reading is an imposition of monumentality, while the 
monuments themselves were clearly not intentionally designed as such. From 
the perspective of their original conception, the monumentalisation of Passaic’s 
suburban landscape positions Smithson’s monuments in the category of ‘uninten-
40  Karl Schlögel, Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit: Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik (München: Carl 
Hanser, 2003).
41  In Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit: Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik and the essay ‘History Takes 
Place’, Schlögel discusses the classical philosophical relation between space and time with the intent of 
developing a narrative of simultaneity of time and space in historiographical practice. Usually, history is 
concerned with time, represented as chronological sequences of events, and privileges time over space. 
But as Schlögel points out, any political or historical process or event is rooted in space and place. By ‘read-
ing time in space’, Schlögel seeks to connect historical and spatial specificity by “spacing history in histo-
riographical practice”, and to consider history as chronotopes rather than chronicles. Ibid. “’History takes 
place‘ - Problems of a Topographically Sensitive Historiography” (paper presented at the Why People Live 
in Cities, The Hague, Netherlands, 2009).
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tional monuments’ as described by art historian Alois Riegl in The Modern Cult of 
Monuments: Its Essence and Development (1903).42 Unintentional monuments are 
those not deliberately made as such, but considered so in posterity as a result of the 
value they have accrued over time.43 We might disagree with Smithson’s subjective 
and non-consensual designation, yet in principle the ‘Monuments of Passaic’ hold 
to Riegl’s category of unintentional monuments.
 In contrast to Smithson’s Passaic, Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit — the place 
where Mughrabi Bridge is situated — is a monument generally agreed to be of im-
mense historical and religious value and has occupied a central position in a pe-
rennial conflict for precisely this reason. In An Aesthetic Occupation: The Immediacy 
of Architecture and the Palestine Conflict (2002), the architect and historian Daniel 
Bertrand Monk indicates the ways in which architectural monuments have been 
instrumental to claims made in the Israel-Palestine conflict. According to Monk, 
the utilitarian politicisation of architectural monuments in both sides’ quest for 
land is “a recurring and dangerous fetishism that actually confirms architecture 
as a symbolic weapon.”44 Monk contests the political immediacy accorded to ar-
chitecture in the struggle, where monuments and their link to violence appear to 
be self-evident.45 Monuments can even, in Monk’s words, be “a fuse with which 
one can ignite a human bomb.”46 Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit has indeed been a 
42  Alois Riegl, “The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Essence and Development,” in Historical and Phil-
osophical Issues in the Conservation of Cultural Heritage, ed. Nicholas Stanley Price, Mansfield Kirby Talley, 
and Alessandra Melucco Vaccaro (Los Angeles: Getty Conservation Institute, 1996), 69.
43  Riegl makes a distinction between ‘deliberate’ and ‘unintentional’ monuments. According to Riegl, 
the original sense of a monument is “a work of man erected for the specific purpose of keeping particular 
human deeds or destinies (or a complex accumulation thereof ) alive and present in the consciousness of 
future generations.” Such monuments are deliberately made as monuments. Unintentional monuments, 
by contrast, are those historical and artistic monuments that accrue value over time or through artistic 
volition, and are considered monuments not due to the original intention of the maker but rather through 
the importance accorded by others. A historical monument gains its value through the passing of time and 
is conditioned by what has historically preceded it, grounded in a particular point in the past to which it 
refers, thereby gaining commemorative value. An artistic monument, on the contrary, is not dictated by 
commemorative value, but by the contemporary value ascribed to it. Whether ascribed for historical or 
artistic reasons, the value of unintentional monuments are defined by ‘ourselves’, not the maker. The ‘our-
selves’ Riegl refers to, is the ‘ourselves’ of the present, understood as a ‘collective self ’: what we agree upon 
and make consensus for when ascribing an object importance as a monument. Ibid.
44  Daniel Bertrand Monk, An Aesthetic Occupation: The Immediacy of Architecture and the Palestine Conflict 
(Durham, N.C.; London: Duke University Press, 2002), 7.
45  Ibid., 28.
46  The following passage from Monk’s description of the archaeological tunnel crisis in Jerusalem in 
1996 could quite well have been a description of the Mughrabi Bridge controversy: “For violence to pass 
into self-evidence, several axioms have to be shared by friends and enemies alike. First, everyone has to 
participate in the intuition of something ‘immediate’: namely, the presumption that in architecture a po-
litical reality presents itself to view directly and without mediation. Convinced of this immediacy, no one, 
here, disputes the fact that the same construction ‘demanded by sovereignty’ — the tunnel — also occa-
sions the ‘explosion of Arab anger.’ They only disagree on the trigger, in the process disclosing the second 
point of tacit agreement between them: for the tunnel to be subsumed within a familiar history of such cri-
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fuse for explosions of violence and conflict, and the Mughrabi Bridge controver-
sy builds upon this short circuit within which monuments become self-explana-
tory ends in themselves, yet also serve as political instruments. This exploitation 
of architecture’s symbolical power for political ends obfuscates those ends that 
are not immediately and reflexively oriented toward the monument itself. Imbued 
with historical and religious significance, monuments such as Haram al-Sharif/
Har haBáyit become eruptive sites that enable escalation rather than resolution 
of conflicts, and obscure rather than clarify what the conflict is actually about, be-
yond self-explanatory categories of sacred value adhering to architecture.
 When the Hamas government chose to promulgate “the tried obliteration 
of monuments […] in the Holy City”, and to “expose this to all” through the depic-
tion and distribution of the perceived threat on a postage stamp, it was not with 
the intent of celebrating Mughrabi Bridge as a valuable monument, but rather the 
opposite. The logic of political immediacy accorded to monuments that Monk cau-
tions against has informed the way the controversy over the bridge has developed, 
repeating an old formula of blame and accusation. The postage stamp is a device 
in this exchange of blows. Paradoxically, even if Minister Madhoun does not go so 
far as to designate the bridge a monument — in which hypothetical case he might 
have named it The Monument to Obliteration — fragments of the conflict can be 
perceived in the postage stamp, the press release, and even the epic of the dispute 
itself, which taken together begin to suggest monumental signification. Twisting 
Riegl’s category of unintentional monuments, it might be said that Hamas and 
Minister Madhoun assigned Mughrabi Bridge monumental value unintentionally, 
in the sense of not really being aware that this is what was happening through its 
placement on a stamp.
 However, to return to Mughrabi Bridge and the postage stamp with Smith-
son’s perspective on monuments in mind, an apprehension of something other 
than structures fetishised and naturalised as monuments is possible. If, as with 
the postage stamp, focus is placed upon the bridge and it is read as an unintention-
al monument, it may be activated as a historical process rooted and unfolded in 
space.
 Mughrabi Bridge captures a historical conflict in a built structure. Political 
forces are condensed within it, and it has accrued substantial importance beyond 
its origins as a temporary structure in response to the intervention of natural 
forces. Its charged state is underpinned not only by its location — attached to one 
of the greatest and most contested monuments imaginable — but also because 
the charged status of this ‘temporary’ structure represents patterns intrinsic to 
ses, the interpreters of the conflict have to concur that this is an immediacy confirmed by use, or in other 
words, that the monument is a fuse with which one can ignite a human bomb.” Ibid., 2-3.
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the territorial conflict between Israel and Palestine. If I were to assign Mughra-
bi Bridge monumental value — in which case I might name it simply The Bridge 
Monument, or Monument of Dislocated Access, with a nod to Smithson — it would 
be on the basis of its ability to act as a point of convergence for the clash of forces 
representing the two conflicting parties in one single object. Moreover, in my view, 
the bridge does not attain the status of monument on the basis of a condensation 
of historical value accumulated through a time already passed, as is the case with 
Riegl’s unintentional monuments. Rather, its monumentality is accrued through 
its condensation of the present unfolding in time of this particular historical con-
flict, providing an insight into how history is actually taking place here and now.
 The postage stamp of Mughrabi Bridge was recovered after some time spent 
researching the subject and, admittedly, the sublimation of the bridge in this way 
was extremely arresting. However, to compensate for my own fetishisation of the 
bridge, I close this reading of Mughrabi Bridge as an unintentional monument with 
two observations. Firstly, I recognise the dangers of a utilitarian politicisation of 
the architectural monument and its symbolic value, as Monk warn against, and 
which Hamas’ postage stamp displays obliquely. Secondly however, Smithson and 
Schlögel remind us that historical and political processes are rooted in space and 
place, providing an invitation to sharpen the attention paid to a spatialised read-
ing of history. The case of the Mughrabi Bridge affords both of these perspectives 
on the bridge as a transmitter of historical events.
Fig. 21: Mughrabi Gate Bridge block stamp, 2012 – the large block stamp. Image retrieved from (Zobbel)
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That the Israel-Palestine conflict is saturated by violence, is a contention few 
would consider necessary to contradict; most people are familiar with media re-
ports on Palestinian terrorism and Israeli military retaliation in frequent cycles of 
war and atrocity. The violent clashes in relation to disputes over access and enti-
tlement to Haram al-Sharif/Har haBaýit, as seen in the previous chapter, also fall 
within the common visual field of cycles of violence between occupier and occu-
pied, concerning a site so potent that the first blow of the Second Intifada (Al-Aqsa 
Intifada, 2000-2005) was struck there.
 With the fuse thus ignited at Haram al-Sharif/Har haBaýit, the media over-
flowed once more with images that affirmed the violence of the ongoing war: dead 
bodies, mourning faces, combat soldiers, bomb sites in the wake of Palestinian 
suicide attacks, the almost iconic images of Palestinians throwing stones, burn-
ing tyres, smoking teargas canisters and clashes in the streets. While such events 
and depictions undoubtedly fire up the intensity of the conflict, they are nonethe-
less only the most visible sides to the violence that fuels it. In an essay that reflects 
upon a journey across the West Bank and Gaza in the early years of the Intifada, 
the author Christian Salmon elucidates a less mediated form of violence:
What is most striking in Palestine now is the violence wrought against the land, the ter-
rain. Nothing but construction sites as far as the eye can see, gutted hills, deforestation. 
Ruined landscapes. Rendered illegible by what seems to be concerted violence…. The bull-
dozer one runs across at every roadside seems as much part of the strategy in the ongoing 
war as the tank. Never has such an inoffensive machine struck me as being more of a har-
binger of silent violence.1
The Second Intifada brought the armoured bulldozer, designed for combat, to the 
front line of the war as a forceful weapon of urban warfare.2 With the massive raz-
1  The notebook letter was published online by Autodafe, the anti-censorship Journal of International 
Parliament of Writers. Christian Salmon, “Palestine Notebook # 6: Sabreen, or Patience...” Autodafe Jour-
nal, http://www.mafhoum.com/press3/92Ca61.htm. Last access 21.2.2016; and in a different version in Le 
Monde Diplomatique, see “The Bulldozer War,” Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2002.
2  On urban warfare in Palestine, see for instance Robert Bevan, The Destruction of Memory: Architecture 
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ing of civilian built space, aimed at curbing terrorism and stifling the Palestinian 
uprising, the bulldozer became, for Salmon, an instrument for brutal landscaping 
of the Palestinian territories.3
 While the bulldozer rarely inflicts wounds directly on the human body, it is 
a signifier of a war for territory enacted through the destruction and degradation 
of lived space.4 What Salmon observed, beyond the violence of open war between 
fighting bodies, was the spatial violence of a war that targeted the lived space of 
willing and unwilling combatants alike. The bulldozer heralded the “concerted” 
and “silent” violence of the battlefield, managed by an apparatus that spans mili-
tary and civic domains. By reducing civil infrastructure and homes to rubble, the 
bulldozer erodes the organisational and material foundation of life.
 The undermining of Palestinian lived space was, however, not a new phe-
nomenon exclusive to the Second Intifada, and the bulldozer is only one mani-
festation of an array of instruments of spatial violence used in the conflict. In a 
territorial conflict that has lasted decades, characterised by Israel’s desire for 
possession of ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’, the built, lived 
environment has been utilised as both weapon and target in a number of ways.5 
Furthermore, the spatial violence deployed in the quest for territorial and demo-
graphic control over the West Bank has to a large degree taken place on a relative-
ly gradual temporal scale in the form of incremental attrition and dispossession 
rather than immediate and total obliteration: integral to the dynamism of the oc-
cupation and, correspondingly, resistance to it.
 To understand the spatial violence of the Israel/Palestine conflict, recogni-
tion must be given not only to violent events — those most visible and familiar 
at War (London: Reaktion, 2006).; Stephen Graham, Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geo-
politics, Studies in Urban and Social Change (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).; Eyal Weizman, 
“Walking Through Walls: Soldiers as Architects in the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict” (paper presented at the 
Arxipelago of Exception. Sovereignties of Extraterritoriality, Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barce-
lona, 2005).
3  Close to 5,000 structures were destroyed in the years 2000-2004. See fig. 25 and 26 for statistics.
4  A year after Salmon’s essay was published, the “silent violence” heralded by the bulldozer became 
audible for a larger international audience when American activist Rachel Corrie was killed in Rafah by 
an armoured bulldozer as she attempted to protect Palestinian homes from demolition. In this instance, 
violence against the built environment and violence against the human body converged and became rec-
ognisable in a single moment.
5  The slogan ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’ has disputed origins, yet is presumed 
to have originated in Christian Restorationism of the mid-19th century. Irrespective of the controversy 
surrounding its origin, and whether it was used by Zionists to describe the land as empty in order to pro-
mote Jewish immigration, or contrarily by anti-Zionists to illustrate the deceit of Zionist reports on the 
inhabitants of the geographical area of Palestine in the early days of Jewish aliah, it is nevertheless evident 
that Israel has sought to clear the land of its Palestinian inhabitants in order to gain territorial control. The 
phrase displays its actuality as political fact, regardless of its disputed origin; demographic manipulation 
has been central facet of Israeli rule since the war of 1947-49.
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manifestations of violence, such as craters after suicide bombings or aerial raids 
— but equally to the fact that the systemic functioning of the regime of occupa-
tion, in itself is an order that has violent effects. The antagonistic spatial practices 
described in the first chapter are born out of this regime. As such, the spatial prac-
tices discussed in this thesis are unable to transcend the order of violence, but are 
immanent to it: violence is a condition of possibility for these spatial practices, be-
cause the structural frame of a violent order also structures the spatial practices 
that are developed within it.
 The task of this chapter is thus to capture characteristic mechanisms of the 
violent order within which spatial practices are formed. These mechanisms are 
instruments for the organisation of space. I employ the term ‘unplanning’ to de-
scribe Israel’s violent spatial organisation of the Palestinian built environment. 
Unplanning discriminates and dismounts: it is a destructive, depleting territo-
rial practice, and constitutes a form of spatial violence that targets the built and 
lived environment rather than human bodies. Unplanning is thus a territorialising 
mechanism that gradually expands Israel’s territory and erodes and degrades liv-
ing conditions for the Palestinian population.
 This gradual erosion is conceptualised using various terms and emphasis by 
scholars within different fields. The political economist Sara Roy offers the term 
‘de-development’, which she suggests can be understood in relation to underdevel-
opment:
Both processes describe a structural relationship between a stronger (dominant) and 
weaker (subordinate) economy. But while most definitions of underdevelopment allow 
for structural change and reform within the weaker economy (though that change often 
is disarticulated because it is oriented to the needs of the dominant economy) de-devel-
opment not only distorts the development process but undermines it entirely.6
‘De-development’ thus places an emphasis on economic conditions, but can be 
used effectively to describe a structural undermining of development of a subor-
dinate party that makes it applicable within other fields.
 The urban geographer Omar Jabary Salamanca describes the specific form 
of de-development implemented in Gaza following Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 
as ‘infrastructural violence’.7 Here, attention is drawn to the undermining of the 
very basis of a society through the destruction of its networked amenities such as 
6  Sara Roy, “De-development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo,” Journal of Pales-
tine Studies 28, no. 3 (1999): 64-65.
7  Omar Jabary Salamanca, “Unplug and Play: Manufacturing Collapse in Gaza,” Human Geography 4, no. 
1 (2011).
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electricity and water supplies, roads, healthcare facilities and so on.
 In a similar vein, the sociologist Sari Hanafi has coined the term ‘spacio-ci-
de’ to describe the destructive effects of Israel’s occupation: “A peculiar kind of 
bio-politics, not one that is concerned with maximizing the health and wealth of 
the population, but quite the opposite, and one intended to establish a delicate bal-
ance in which the health and wealth of the population, and especially the physical 
terrain on which it exists, are minimized, without effecting a total elimination.”8
 Analogous to this, the term ‘urbicide’ is applied, among others, by geogra-
pher Stephen Graham, political scientist Martin Coward, and architect Nurhan 
Abujidi to denote the wilful destruction of cities.9 Graham invokes the term to de-
scribe Ariel Sharon’s military strategy during the Second Intifada. Coward focus-
es specifically on spatial destruction of cities as a form of political violence, and 
specifically politics of exclusion in Bosnia. Abujidi regards ‘urbicide’ as the process 
and consequence of urban conflict in the West Bank.10
 Lastly, architect Robert Bevan situates the devastating effects of spatial vio-
lence in the Israel-Palestine conflict within architectural discourse as a “destruc-
tion of memory”, outlining how architecture, as a cultural-political artefact, can 
be targeted and destroyed as part of a strategy of warfare in order to erase traces 
of the past.11
Similarly to ‘de-development’, unplanning is a process that undermines the soci-
etal and economic development of a subordinate party, and like ‘infrastructural 
violence’, ‘spacio-cide’, and ‘urbicide’, has materially and spatially devastating 
effects, as well as cultural and political impact when traces of the past are ma-
nipulated or erased. However, the notion of unplanning specifically foregrounds 
mechanisms that compromise spatial conditions by use of planning instruments. 
Unplanning is an instrument for the organisation of space, just as other practices 
of urban and spatial planning, only their negative.
 The chapter precedes with an outline of the historical trajectory of the oc-
cupation’s structure within which unplanning is embedded. Next, unplanning 
8  Sari Hanafi, “Explaining Spacio-Cide in the Palestinian Territory: Colonization, Separation, and State of 
Exception,” Current Sociology 61, no. 2 (2012): 196.
9  The term ‘urbicide’ was first coined by the author Michael Moorcock in 1963, later used by the philoso-
pher Marshall Bermann to describe the destruction of the Bronx as a result of urban restructuring, and by 
various commentators on urban destruction in the civil wars in Yugoslavia.
10  Stephen Graham, “Bulldozers and Bombs: The Latest Palestinian-Israeli Conflict as Asymmetric Ur-
bicide,” Antipode 34, no. 4 (2002).; Martin Coward, “Against Anthropocentrism: The Destruction of the 
Built Environment as a Distinct Form of Political Violence,” Review of International Studies 32 (2006).; 
Nurhan Abujidi, Urbicide in Palestine: Spaces of Oppression and Resilience (London and New York: Routledge 
2014).
11  Bevan, Destruction of Memory.
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will be described as a practice composed of judicial means and physical interven-
tions. At a judicial level, the administration of unplanning is based upon the polit-
ical instrumentalisation of a patchwork of laws pertaining to land ownership and 
use that has supported continual appropriation of Palestinian land by the Israeli 
state. At the level of physical intervention, construction of Israel’s settlement in-
frastructure and the destruction of Palestinian houses constitute the tangible ex-
ecution of unplanning that, through altering the physicality of the landscape, also 
alters the political reality of the territories.
Structural Conditions for Unplanning
In the wake of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 — also known in Palestinian discourse 
as the Naksa, Arabic for ‘setback’ — the West Bank, Gaza, Golan, and Sinai were im-
mediately placed under military governance and a range of mechanisms of control 
quickly effectuated.12 With the exception of East Jerusalem which was annexed, 
Israel endeavoured to maintain a sharp distinction between occupied subjects and 
its own people — an overarching logic that informs the occupation to this day — 
principally through its refusal to offer citizenship to the Palestinian population. 
The Palestinians were not to be included in Israeli society, but rather managed as a 
security matter under military rule, while Israel sought simultaneously to expro-
priate occupied land without annexing it.13 To this end, extensive legal gymnastics 
were performed.
 Israel rejected the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, but accepted the 1907 
Hague Convention stipulating that the occupying power must recognise the laws 
that were in effect prior to occupation.14 The form of governance and legal ar-
rangements for the territories were declared by Proclamation Two of 7 June 1967, 
resulting in the installation of a legal system composed of a complex patchwork of 
12  The swiftness with which Israel installed its military rule was not coincidental for three reasons, ac-
cording to Neve Gordon. First; Israel reactivated certain institutions and practices employed previously 
by Egypt and Jordan. Second; contingency plans for military administration of the West Bank and Gaza 
were prepared several years before the war. Third; the military learned from its experience of managing 
the Palestinian population within Israel, as several apparatuses and practices used during the internal mil-
itary government (1948-66), including the application of the Defence Emergency Regulations, were repro-
duced in the OPT as a prototype. Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occupation (Berkeley, Calif.; London: University of 
California Press, 2008), 10.
13  Ibid., 6.
14  The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is an 
important instrument of international humanitarian law pertaining to occupation of territories and their 
civilian population. It was rejected by Israel in August 1967 on the contention that the territories were not 
‘occupied’ in the definition the Convention reflects. For a summary of its articles and evaluation of legal 
applicability, as well as a historical review of the legal complex, see COHRE and BADIL, “Ruling Palestine: 
A History of the Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land and Housing in Palestine,” ed. Souad R. 
Dajani (Geneva2005).
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Ottoman, British Mandate, Egyptian — in the case of Gaza— and Jordanian — in 
the case of the West Bank — laws, and numerous additional Israeli orders by de-
cree issued by the military commander.15
 The British Mandate’s Defence Emergency Regulations (DER) of 1945 have 
played a crucial role in legislation in particular. Israeli domestic legislation put 
into force after the inception of the state in 1948 was itself built upon a melange 
of laws, including the DER, that have been renewed every year since, meaning that 
the state of Israel — and later the OPT — has been under a constant state of emer-
gency. However, it is in the  OPT that the application of DER has been most com-
prehensively practiced, affecting issues as diverse as indefinite administrative de-
tention, censorship, address restrictions, deportation, the use of extensive powers 
of search and seizure, the sealing-off of territories, the imposition of curfews and 
closures, and house demolitions. 
 Furthermore, the General Security Service (GSS, also known as Shin Bet or 
Shabak) played a central role as a “legal spectre” outside of Israeli law, influencing 
decisions on a range of issues that overlap with the above mentioned DER regula-
tions.16 Operating in the shadows, the GSS thus represented an omnipresent ex-
ception to the law by suspending rather than implementing it when needed. Hence, 
as Israeli political scientist Neve Gordon notes in Israel’s Occupation (2008), Israel 
had a “selective approach” to laws; accepting and maintaining laws that advanced 
their political objectives, while refusing, changing or cancelling those that were 
seen as obstacles.17 The legal system that was set up created a self-sanctioned im-
age of the occupation’s legality, legitimacy, and morality. Although the structure 
and particular mechanisms of the occupation have changed over the years, the 
military rule included, the legal system is still of major importance for legitimising 
the occupation itself, including continued expropriation of Palestinian land in the 
West Bank.
 The core concern for Gordon in Israel’s Occupation is to understand how Is-
rael’s occupation “ticks”; through which practices the OPT has been managed, and 
how these practices have altered over the years.18 Gordon’s genealogy of changes 
in the regime of occupation shows convincingly how Israel has shifted from a prin-
ciple of colonisation to a principle of separation: from the administration of lives, 
‘normalisation’ of the occupation and exploitation of natural and human resourc-
es; to the abandonment of the administration of lives, combined with continued 
15  Gordon, 26-29.
16  Ibid., 31.
17  Ibid., 27-28.
18  Ibid., xxi.
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exploitation of nonhuman resources.19 As Gordon argues, rather than responding 
to a plan laid out in advance, many changes in the OPT are products of the daily 
practices that have characterised life under occupation, and significantly it is the 
interactions, excesses and contradictions produced by Israel’s means of control 
that have most heavily informed these changes.20 By means of control, Gordon in-
tends not only “the coercive mechanisms used to prohibit, exclude, and repress 
people, but rather the entire array of institutions, legal devices, bureaucratic appa-
ratuses, social practices, and physical edifices that operate both on the individual 
and the population in order to produce new modes of behaviour, habits, interests, 
tastes, and aspirations.”21
 Further, there have been shifts in emphasis on different modes of power over 
the years, in the Foucauldian sense of different forms of governance as practices 
that shape the conduct of conduct. As a general development, while the first years 
of occupation placed an emphasis on disciplinary power and bio-power, guiding 
the conduct of individuals and populations, the later years show an emphasis on 
sovereign power through control over territory and disinterest for inhabitants’ 
lives. These modes of control have been of key importance for moulding the con-
flict both in terms of Israeli policy and Palestinian resistance. To follow Gordon, 
this has not been a thought-out strategy, but rather the result of interactions, ex-
cesses and contradictions within the apparatuses and practices of control.
 According to Gordon’s periodisation of the occupation, distinguished by 
different modes of power and control, the transformation of the occupation tra-
verses five distinct periods: the Military Government from 1967-1980; the Civil 
Administration from 1981-1987; the First Intifada from 1988-1993; the Oslo years 
from 1994-2000; and, the Second Intifada from 2001-2005. The subsequent peri-
od from 2005 to the present, not covered by Gordon can, I suggest, be character-
ised by a strengthening of a ‘necropolitical’ order that reduces, to a great extent, 
Palestinian organised resistance to zero. I will come back to this point in the sec-
tion in the following chapter on ‘necropolitics’.22 Important to note here is that the 
2005 withdrawal of Israeli civilian presence from within Gaza, and the subsequent 
hermetic sealing of its borders, entails that Gaza and the West Bank are treated 
as two radically different entities. Both face physical and administrative separa-
tion reinforced through the construction of walls, yet while Gaza is encapsulated 
and controlled from the outside, the West Bank is fragmented and controlled from 
19  Ibid., xix.
20  Ibid., 3-4, 15-16.
21  Ibid., 3.
22  ‘Necropolitics’ is Achille Mbembe’s inversion of the Foucauldian concept of biopolitics. See Achille 
Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture, Duke University Press 15, no. 1 (2003).
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within.23 As a consequence of this split in ruling methods and territorial engage-
ment, Palestinian resistance and spatial practices in Gaza and the West Bank are 
dissimilar.
 Israel’s rule in the West Bank is nonetheless formally the same as it has been 
since the 1980s, with the Civil Administration a governing body that falls beneath 
the larger umbrella entity Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories 
(COGAT), whose legal structure and laws have not changed significantly. What 
is usually considered the paramount change in governance — the introduction of 
the Palestinian Authority (PA) — following the Oslo Agreements merely created a 
Palestinian quasi-government. Commentators have conceptualised this redistri-
bution of power in different ways, for instance as an “outsourcing” of the occupa-
tion, an “occupation by remote control” or as the inception of a “fragmented sover-
eignty.”24 At one level, the PA’s role as a quasi-government pertains to the transfer 
of responsibility for civilian matters and obligations toward the Palestinian in-
habitants. ‘Government’ and ‘responsibility’ is at best misleading, given that the 
West Bank is heavily reliant upon international aid and NGOs to run a wide range 
of vital institutions often regarded as the state’s responsibility to provide, such as 
education, health services and so on.25 At another level, the fact that the PA’s se-
curity control and policing within their area of ‘jurisdiction’ is dictated by Israel, 
entails that the PA polices political opposition to the occupation by suppressing 
23  The differences in Israel’s use of force and violence relative to the territories of Gaza and the West 
Bank have similarities with the differences between Lebanon and the OPT in the 1980-90s. According to 
the sociologist and political scientist James Ron, while Lebanon was an object of war with high levels of 
violence, the OPT was an object of policing and therefore held lower levels of violence. Ron further argues 
that this has a territorial explanation: Lebanon was treated as a frontier to Israel, while the OPT was treated 
as a ghetto. James Ron, Frontiers and Ghettos (Berkely, US: University of California Press, 2003).
24  According to Gordon, the complex of security cooperation and diversion of civil responsibility is the 
result of an ingenious plan of ‘outsourcing’ the occupation to the Palestinians themselves. Other com-
mentators, e.g. Meron Benvinisti, Amira Hass, Edward Saïd and Graham Usher use similar concepts. Gor-
don, 20, 169-96. (n. 62, p. 20 for cross-references) and “Outsourcing Violations: The Israeli Case,” Journal 
of Human Rights 1, no. 3 (2002). See also Nir Gazit, “Social Agency, Spatial Practices, and Power: The Mi-
cro-Foundations of Fragmented Sovereignty in the Occupied Territories,” International Journal of Politics, 
Culture, and Society 22, no. 1 (2009).
25  Palestinian civil society has undergone a process of ‘ngo-isation’ in the wake of the Oslo Agreements: 
NGOs have been depoliticised, take care of vital functions of the state, and the thousands of organisa-
tions have also become a career market for international workers. See for instance Sari Hanafi and Linda 
Tabar, The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite: Donors, International Organizations and Local NGOs 
(Ramallah: Institute of Jerusalem Studies and Muwatin, the Palestinian Institute for the Study of De-
mocracy, 2005).; Tariq Dana, “The Structural Transformation fo Palestinian Civil Society: Key Paradigm 
Shifts,” Middle East Critique 24, no. 2 (2015).; Mandy Turner, “The Political Economy of Western Aid in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory Since 1993,” in Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development 
and Beyond, ed. Mandy Turner and Omar Shweiki (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014).; Joseph DeVoir 
and Alaa Tartir, “Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non Governmental Organizations in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip 1999-2008,” (Jerusalem: Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) 
and NGO Development Center (NDC), 2009).
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and monitoring political activity, clamping down on demonstrations, imprisoning 
political leaders, etc. In consequence, the PA contributes to the perpetuation of 
the occupation by undermining both strategic and tactical resistance.
 Mechanisms of unplanning are a part of Israel’s mode of control through the 
array of institutions, legal devices, practices, and so on, that the occupation rests 
upon. Unplanning does not appear in isolation, but is part of the ever-changing 
structure of the occupation as a whole. Recalling Gordon, what makes the occu-
pation ‘tick’ is not a prefigured plan, but rather interactions, excesses, and con-
tradictions. There has never been a plan for how the occupation should unfold, no 
totalising vision that was set out at some point in the past; policies have remained 
nebulous and territorial objectives have not always been clear and coherent.
 Eyal Weizman’s characterisation of the first decades of the settlement proj-
ect underpins this obliqueness. Instead of laying out a clear policy on the conten-
tious issue of settlements, the Israeli government relied partly on allowing events 
to take their course:
The geography of the occupation did not emerge out of clear government decisions and 
planning guidelines, but mostly evolved out of confused interaction between different, 
mostly inconsistent, and often opposing political agents and ideological interests. In 
fact (…), the colonization of the occupied territories did not grow out of any masterplan; 
rather, it evolved as a ‘strategy without a strategist.’ Because the settlement project was 
founded through ad hoc improvisation, opportunist actions and conflicts between dif-
ferent politicians, its imprint on the ground cannot be read as the material embodiment 
of a single coherent ideology. Despite there being countless government masterplans for 
settlements, in its early years the project deliberately fostered an ‘anti-planning’ ethos. 
‘Operators’ on the ground, and the facts they managed to establish, rather than the mas-
ter-planners, dictated the larger political priorities and agendas, intentionally limiting 
some political options of the government, and opening others.26
None of the numerous plans for colonisation prepared — the partition plans — 
have been officially adopted by the Israeli government; neither the Allon Plan, the 
Ra’anan Weitz Plan, the Dayan Plan, the Sharon-Wachman Plan, nor the Drobles 
Plan.27 However, in retrospect it is clear that these plans have served as guidelines 
for de facto policies.28 The development on the ground and impact of increasingly 
radical partition plans, as well as masterplans made by settlement representatives 
26  Eyal Weizman, Hollow land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London; New York: Verso, 2007), 92-93.
27  See Gordon, Israel’s Occupation, 117. For an outline of the plans, see COHRE and BADIL,  71-77.
28  Ibid., 71-77.
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themselves, have been formative for the expansion of the settlements, besides 
their function as a beneficial chaos for the government to ‘hide’ within.29 Indeed, 
an official plan would actually have been to the disadvantage of a state whose colo-
nial ambition would then have been exposed. Gordon writes that:
…a publicly authorized plan would have undercut the occupation’s ostensible temporar-
iness and exposed Israel’s territorial aspirations as being permanent. An approved plan 
would have rendered it easier to resist the settlement project, because the arbitrary pro-
cess by which settlements were established—namely, the establishment of one settle-
ment here and another there according to political circumstance and opportunity—as 
well as the lack of information about the construction of settlements created a structural 
difficulty that served to hinder the mobilization of a forceful opposition. It is, after all, 
much easier to resist an official plan. Thus, it was politically beneficial to portray the oc-
cupation as temporary and the establishment of settlements as arbitrary.30
Yet despite — or perhaps because of — the fact that none of these plans were of-
ficially adopted or coherently strategised, and no extensive long-term plans have 
ever been presented for the future expansion of the Israeli settlements, nor de-/
development of the Palestinian areas for that matter, I consider the notion of un-
planning appropriate for describing the transformation of Palestinian geography 
under Israeli rule. Crucially in this regard, unplanning denotes more than a stock-
take of shrinking Palestinian areas. Despite the absence of a predefined plan with 
which to align reality, there is the gradual appearance of a pattern that overlaps 
many of the spatial plans that have been produced but never officially adopted. 
Unplanning is not thus not so much a coherent and consistent strategy tied to a 
precisely drawn cartographic objective, as the tactical dispersal of measures that 
consistently have the opposite effect of what is usually considered the objective 
of planning: the well-being and safety of both individuals and the population as a 
whole, not only the state as a territorial sovereign. Unplanning, contrary to plan-
ning, indicates a strategy of dispossession.
 In the following, some of the most elemental mechanisms of unplanning 
29  Weizman writes: “Most settlement masterplans, drawn up by people either within or outside the gov-
ernment, were also partition plans: planners placed settlements in the areas they wanted the government 
to annex. The logic of partition of the Occupied Territories has always swung between selective presence 
and absence, addressing two contradictory Israeli strategies: territorial (attempting to annex as much 
empty land as possible); and demographic (attempting to exclude the areas most heavily populated by 
Palestinians… None of the plans provided the basis for a coherent settlement policy, and none was offi-
cially adopted by the government, although certain elements of each of the different plans were followed 
on the construction of settlements. Governments gradually learned to benefit from the settlement chaos; 
indeed, they sometimes even promoted or even agitated it…” Weizman, Hollow Land, 94.
30  Gordon, Israel’s Occupation, 117-18.
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are outlined. This outline is restricted to mechanisms that are directly related to 
spatial (dis)organisation, and delimited to the West Bank; a more extensive histor-
ical record of the full array of possible means of control is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, and can be examined elsewhere in the rich literature on the Israel-Pal-
estine conflict. As previously noted, Israel’s rule in the OPT rests on an intricate 
web of laws that functions to ensure a certain level of legality. The first subsection 
therefore provides the background for important elements of land law and prac-
tice used to sanction confiscation of land. The two following subsections outline 
ways in which the execution of unplanning leaves a direct physical imprint on the 
land, either in the form of construction or destruction. 
Judicial Unplanning
Within the dynamism of Israeli territorialisation, land laws and planning instru-
ments play a pivotal role, not only for appropriation of land for settlement purpos-
es, but equally for restricting Palestinian growth and development. The practice 
of curbing Palestinian development by means of the shrewd application of laws 
has, as noted above, a history that predates the occupation itself.31 British Mandate 
planning laws from 1936, followed by Jordanian laws from 1955 and 1966, did not 
ensure viable development of the West Bank. The British and subsequent Jorda-
nian master plans drew tight boundaries around Palestinian built-up areas, some-
times even omitting houses located at their fringes.
 When Israel issued military Order No. 418 (Decree Concerning the Organ-
isation of Towns, Villages and Buildings in the West Bank) in 1971 — one of many 
orders, yet perhaps the most important for creating a basis for the Israeli author-
ity’s planning regulations in the OPT — these old master plans were not revised 
and thus, inter alia, did not take into account population growth. As a conse-
quence, large swathes of Palestinian built-up areas were — and remain — outside 
of planned zones and are thus deemed illegal. With the adoption of order No. 418, 
planning regulations became a powerful device for restricting Palestinian urban 
growth, rejecting building permits, legitimising house demolition, effectively im-
peding economic growth, and re-zoning land, as well as regulating infrastructure 
31  Israel’s appropriation of Palestinian land and property by means of Ottoman law can be traced as a 
continuation of a practice established prior to the occupation in 1967, consisting of processes that took 
place inside Israel’s sovereign territory following independence in 1948. Seizure of land was grounded in 
laws pertaining to land use and land rights, with successive reclassification from ‘abandoned land’, to ‘ab-
sentee land’ to ‘Israel Lands’. Other laws, but using the same mechanism, have been used for appropria-
tion of land in the OPT. See e.g. Geremy Forman and Alexandre  Kedar, “From Arab Land to ‘Israel Lands’: 
The Legal Disposession of the Palestinians displaced by Israel in the Wake of 1948,” Environment and Plan-
ning: Society and Space 22 (2004).
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such as water, roads and electricity.32
 An overview of historically divergent juridical-cultural practices of land 
deed determination reveals how land legislation has functioned as an instrument 
for transferring land to Israel. Historically, Israeli and Palestinian paradigms con-
cerning land ownership have been radically different, reflecting conflicting stan-
dards of evaluation in the classification of land. By imposing Israeli requirements 
for how to validate the ownership of land upon Palestinians, Israel has been able to 
exploit a legal vacuum, why traditional Palestinian practices for validating own-
ership has been forced to change. The Israeli land paradigm, in continuity with 
British Mandate centralisation of land laws and cadastre maps as the basis for land 
ownership, reflects a Western legalistic tradition, with rigorous application of land 
regulation.33 Generally, Israel considers all land to be the property of the state un-
less it can be proven otherwise, with the burden of proof on the civilian claimant. 
This can be seen as a reversal of the utilisation of the principles of property related 
to nation building and territorial sovereignty, whereby as part of the first aliyah 
(‘ascent’), referring to Jewish immigration to the Land of Israel at the end of the 
19th century, Jews bought up land in Palestine, which supported a claim for a Jewish 
state. As soon as the Israeli state was established, nationalisation of land became a 
key aspect of the national socialist-Zionist enterprise. Today, over ninety percent 
of all land in Israel is state owned. 
 The Palestinian land paradigm historically held an informal, needs-based 
approach to evaluating ownership, often resting within collective planning in the 
form of musha`  (‘communal land’), a land-equalising system managed by the fel-
lahin (‘peasants’), who usually did not own land themselves.34 Decisions on enti-
tlement to the use of land were made through verbal agreement, the signature of 
the village mukhtar (the chosen head of the village) and neighbours. Borders were 
often defined on the basis of landscape features. Maps were not used as legal doc-
uments for proving entitlement to land but rather hujja (‘proof’), a land transfer 
agreement on paper with the boundaries described by natural landmarks under-
stood by those living in the area.35 Mapmaking was thus not regularly practiced in 
Palestine before Israel made it obligatory to prove ownership with documentation 
produced to Israeli standards.
32  Ali Abdelhamid, “Urban Development and Planning in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Impacts 
on Urban Form,” in Nordic and International Urban Morphology: Distinctive and Common Themes (Stock-
holm2006).
33  Linda Quiquivix, “When the Carob Tree was the Border: On Autonomy and Palestinian Practices of 
Figuring it Out,” Capitalism Nature Socialism 24, no. 3 (2013).
34  Ibid.
35  Ibid.
94
 The Ottoman Land Code of 1858, part of the empire’s tanzimat (‘reorgani-
sation’) period of reform, initiated a modernisation of land use and ownership by 
ascribing and registering rights of individuals to specific plots. The purpose was to 
reform the method of taxation, especially with regard to the Palestinian fellahin, 
and thereby create greater revenue for the seat of the empire in Istanbul, in addi-
tion to stimulating trade with Europe.36 The increased tax burden on the fellahin 
lead to a tendency to underreport land to the Ottoman administration in order to 
keep ‘off the books’, which later became detrimental to Palestinian claims to land 
entitlement.37 During the Jordanian administrative period (1948-67), the Jordani-
an authorities made an attempt to organise landholding (tabu) in the West Bank, 
but this remained incomplete.38 Only one third of the land was registered, the rea-
son for which much land remained in a state of limbo with regard to ownership, 
and was therefore subject to dispute when the occupation began.39
 Although the intent of the Ottoman Land Code was to modernise landhold-
ing, elements of musha`  planning were integrated into it, stipulating a range of cat-
egories for land use through the application of a principle of land custodianship 
tied to subsistence.40 Presence was the determinant factor for control over land, 
meaning that the law prescribed usufruct of land based upon evidence of inhabita-
tion and agricultural cultivation.41 The following typology of land tenure refers to 
Ottoman land designations:42
Mulk: Privately owned land over which the owner exercised full rights. This form of land 
tenure was not very common in Palestine and was limited mainly to the major towns. 
Miri: The most common type of land tenure. Individual landholders were given full pos-
session-and user-rights over fields and agricultural lands, pastures, woodlands and other 
land surrounding villages, but ultimate ownership was retained by the State. 
Mewat: This category covered most ‘dead’ – that is, uncultivated and/or uninhabited – 
lands. These were lands not held by title deed, but farmers and cultivators could establish 
36  Ibid.
37  Shaul Ephraim Cohen, The Politics of Planting: Israeli-Palestinian Competition for Control of Land in the 
Jerusalem Periphery (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 32.
38  Tabu, or tapu, from Ottoman Turkish, indicates the permanent lease of state-owned arable land. The 
real-estate development company Union Construction and Investment (UCI) reintroduced tabu under 
the auspices of TABO in 2010. TABO sells registered land for residential use, thus providing title deed reg-
istration that aims to protect the land against Israeli annexation. This applies only for Area A and B of the 
West Bank, since Area C is under Israel’s Civil Administration. See http://tabo.ps
39  COHRE and BADIL,  71.
40  Quiquivix, “When the Carob Tree Was the Border.”
41  Cohen, 3.
42  Cited from COHRE and BADIL,  13. For a close description of the Land Code, see also Cohen, 32.
95
claims to such lands with State permission. 
Matruka: This category comprised communal lands that could be allocated by the State 
for communal or public purposes (for example, roads). 
Waq f: This category comprised the property holdings of the Islamic charitable endow-
ment (the Waq f ).
When new legislation was created by the British Mandate for Palestine, many sec-
tions were replaced with those from English and colonial law, yet several compo-
nents from the Ottoman legal system were retained. It was notably those laws per-
taining to land that were passed over, and later preserved within the Israeli legal 
system with extensive consequences, within Israel during the state’s formative 
years, and later in the OPT.43
 The flexibility of the Land Code has proved to be an asset for Israeli legis-
lation. In particular, the categories of mewat (‘dead land’) and miri (‘agricultural 
land’) have become instrumental for the creative appropriation of land under the 
occupation. The mewat or ‘dead land’ doctrine, originating in the Ottoman Land 
Code and adopted by the British Mandate, continued post-1948 as an important 
and judicially cunning component of Israel’s land laws and subsequent expropri-
ation of Palestinian land.44 Mewat land could — in its original designation — be 
domesticated through cultivation, with the right to do so granted by the authority 
of the state. Such a grant was conditioned on continuous cultivation, usually three 
consecutive years. When the requirements were met, the mewat land was reclassi-
fied as miri.  The designation of miri land was, in the same manner, instrumental 
for exploitation of the flexibility provided by a zoning category that fell between 
private use and state ownership. In correspondence with mewat, the Land Code 
stipulated that miri land not worked for three consecutive years would revert to 
the state for the purpose of re-leasing it for cultivation by someone else.
 The emphasis on presence and active use of the land in the Ottoman Land 
Code legally supported transfer of land and the subsequent creation of settlements 
as incontrovertible ‘facts on the ground’. One of the most consequential military 
orders regulating such transfer of land by legal measures was Military Order No. 
59 of July 1967 (Order Concerning State Property), through which all unregistered 
land was considered ‘state property’. Since only around thirteen percent of West 
Bank land was officially registered as state land under Jordanian rule, the deploy-
43  Ron Harris et al., “Israeli Legal History: Past and Present,” in The History of Law in a Multicultural Soci-
ety: Israel 1917-1967 (Darthmouth: Ashgate, 2002), 6.; Forman and Kedar.
44  The Dead Land doctrine has not only been used to confiscate land for settlement purposes, but also 
for afforestation. The strategic planting of forests has been deployed as a territorialising practice equiva-
lent to the building of houses. See Cohen. Politics of Planting
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ment of the Land Code proved effective for the confiscation of large swathes of 
land. Land registration was suspended, and all mewat land was declared the prop-
erty of the Israeli state. Miri land that could not be proved to have been cultivated 
for a period of 15 years by the Palestinian tenant was defined as abandoned and 
subsequently confiscated. By 1979, more than 2,000 square kilometres were ap-
propriated in this way; for scale, the entire West Bank area measures approximate-
ly 5,600 square kilometres. After 1980, the order was amended and new methods 
put to use.45 As Gordon notes, confiscation followed a dual movement, combining 
the legal mechanisms of the seizure of land as state property and the establish-
ment of a settlement infrastructure that could “translate de jure confiscation into 
de facto annexation”, or vice versa, as shall be explicated in the subsection ‘Un-
planning by Construction’.46
 As a result of the Oslo Agreements in the 1990s, a new layer of land zoning 
was applied in line with the reorganisation of Israeli power in the OPT. The delin-
eations of zones — denominated unremarkably ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ — designated the 
extent of Palestinian and Israeli control in each area and — officially — gave the 
newly established Palestinian interim authorities partial control over approxi-
mately forty percent of the West Bank (Areas A and B), leaving Israel with full con-
trol over almost sixty percent (Area C) and partial control over the rest.47
 The zoning of Areas A and B followed — to a greater or lesser extent — land 
designations according to Palestinian urban and rural density. The result is that 
the administrative zones of the West Bank reflect the size of the built-up areas as 
they were over two decades ago, and that Palestinian areas are dispersed as an ar-
chipelago of small islands in a sea of Israeli control.48 Though intended to be pro-
visional, the zoning remains in effect and has supported a spatial development of 
45  COHRE and BADIL,  90.
46  Gordon, Israel’s Occupation, 119.
47  As a result of the stipulations in the Oslo Accords in 1993-95, with amendments at the Wye River Mem-
orandum (1998) and Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum (1999), Israeli power in the OPT was reorganized. The 
Palestinian areas in the West Bank were divided into zones that gave partial self-rule to a quasi-autono-
mous Palestinian authority, while the major part of the territory came under Israeli control. The restruc-
turing of space designated the following areas in the West Bank, according to distribution of powers: 11 
clusters of urban cores (17.2%) were zoned as Area A under Palestinian administrative and security con-
trol, 120 village clusters and rural areas encompassing the urban cores (23.8%) were zoned as Area B under 
Palestinian administrative and Israeli military control, and contiguous land surrounding A and B (59%) 
was zoned as Area C under full Israeli administrative and military control. Additionally, Hebron was divid-
ed into areas H1 and H2. 70 % of Area C is zoned as settlement municipality, while less than 1% is zoned for 
Palestinian development. The intended establishment of a Palestinian state and the full transfer of control 
to the PA was supposed to take place no later May 1999, but was never realised. For a full account of divi-
sions, see for instance Gordon, ibid., 177.
48  The archipelago-metaphor stems from cartographer Julien Boussac’s visually powerful map ‘État-
archipel de Palestine’ from 2008. See http://obgeographiques.blogspot.dk/search/label/Palestine
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fragmentation and segregation.
 Before the Oslo Agreements, planning in the entire OPT fell under the re-
sponsibility of Israel’s Civil Administration. As mentioned above, the PA has be-
come a quasi-government with civil responsibility within the core Palestinian ar-
eas. This holds for planning functions: following Oslo, responsibility for planning 
in Areas A and B was transferred to the PA, while planning in Area C remained in 
the hands of Israel’s military apparatus. The PA is ‘hands-off’ when it comes to in-
terference with Israeli practices and policies in Area C, thus effectively ignoring 
its Palestinian population. Area C has become almost exclusively Israeli land, with 
seventy percent retained as settlement municipality and the majority of the re-
mainder as military firing zones or nature reserves. While an estimated 300,000 
Palestinians live in Area C, in addition to over 340,000 Israeli settlers, less than 
one percent of Area C has been zoned for Palestinian development.49 Reminiscent 
of the effect of unrevised master plans that date back to the pre-occupation period, 
the A-B-C zoning thus constrains growth of Palestinian localities on the basis of 
tight borders drawn on a map. Legal determination of land ownership is therefore 
further complicated by an intricate layer of administrative borders. These borders 
sometimes cut plots in half, rendering one part of a plot eligible for building rights 
while the other is not, for example. In some cases, the actual position of the border 
is contested as a result of the thickness of the line as it is drawn on the map, which 
due to the inaccuracy entailed by the scalar transfer of a drawn line to the actual 
terrain, creates a contested zone in itself.50 
 After coming up short when confronted with a legalistic framework that 
requires the submission of official documents produced according to Israeli stan-
dards, many Palestinians have fallen back on the basic claim that all land, whether 
private or collective is Palestinian land, a claim considered illegitimate by Israel 
insofar as there is no Palestinian national state to which land may adhere.51 The Is-
raeli land paradigm emphasises territorial sovereignty through state ownership of 
49  UN OCHA oPt, “Area C of the West Bank: Key Humanitarian Concerns,” (2014).
50  The topic of multiple, contested borders and map/terrain relation is further explored in the chapter 
‘Probing the Terrain’.
51  The ‘security’ for Palestinian land owners provided by private property rights has been the subject of 
further recent infringement: in an exceptional move, even by Israeli standards, Israel’s parliament passed 
the so-called ‘Regularisation Law’ at the beginning of 2017 — following the election of Donald Trump as 
president of the United States — which allows the state to retroactively expropriate privately owned Pales-
tinian land in the West Bank on which Israeli settlements and outposts have been built. The law is, accord-
ing to the newspaper Haaretz, made to “regulate settlement in Judea and Samaria and allow its continued 
establishment and development.” In other words, the law legalises around 50 settlements and outposts 
that were thus far considered illegal according to Israeli legislation. The law received considerable news 
coverage when passed. For the Haaretz article, see Allison Kaplan Sommer, “Explained: Israel’s New Pal-
estinian Land-grab Law and Why It Matters,” Haaretz, 07.02. 2017.
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land rather than private property. Israeli citizens and companies do not own land, 
but lease it for 49 or 99 years. Against this, Palestinians are forced to pursue a land 
paradigm of private ownership in order to avoid Israeli appropriation of land.52 Yet 
given that Israel has laid claim to sixty percent of the West Bank, the endeavour of 
Palestinian registration and privatisation is confined to the fragmented remain-
ing forty percent.
Unplanning by Construction 
Backed by judicial means, the constant expansion of Israeli controlled territory in 
the OPT has been aided architecturally by physical interventions of construction 
and destruction. The construction of military and civilian infrastructure, civil-
ian settlements, outposts, as well as military facilities supports Israeli presence, 
while the destruction of Palestinian civilian infrastructure, homes and farmland 
instigates Palestinian displacement. While both practices, when conducted as ci-
vilian affairs, are generally considered illegal according to international law, they 
are buttressed by Israel’s own legal apparatus, creating a sphere of legality for the 
mechanisms of unplanning in Palestinian areas.53 Whether an act of construction 
or destruction is considered legal or illegal is thus a matter of legal — and political 
— perspective.
 Israel’s combined use of civilian and military architecture for territorial 
control has a precursor prior to Israel’s establishment as a state. Following the Is-
raeli architect Sharon Rotbard, there is a historical “mold of Israeli architecture” 
to be found in a very particular architectural typology, the Homa Umigdal (‘Wall 
and Tower’), built as a form of settlement-outpost merging military and civilian 
objectives.54 The system was designed in 1936 to seize control over disputed land 
purchased by Kakal (Karen Kayemet LeIsrael, later Israel’s Land Administra-
tion).55 The first Homa Umigdal was implemented as protection against Bedouins, 
52  For an analysis of territorial narratives related to sovereignty, see Samer Alatout, “Towards a Bio-terri-
torial Conception of Power: Territory, Population, and Environmental Narratives in Palestine and Israel,” 
Political Geography 25 (2006).
53  Settlements in the OPT are illegal according to international law, violating Article 49 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention which states that “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own 
civilian population into the territory it occupies.” However, as has been demonstrated, Israel rejects the 
application of the Fourth Geneva Convention, meaning that settlements are legal from the perspective of 
Israeli law.
54  See Sharon Rotbard, “Wall and Tower (Homa Umigdal): The Mold of Israeli Architecture,” in A Civil-
ian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architecture, ed. Rafi Segal, Eyal Weizman, and David Tartakover (Tel 
Aviv: Babel ; London : VERSO, 2003).; “Wall and Tower: The Mold of Israeli Adrikhalut,” in Territories: Is-
lands, Camps and Other States of Utopia, ed. Anselm Franke and Kunst-Werke Berlin. (Berlin, Köln: KW, 
Verlag der Buchhandlung Walther König, 2003).
55  The Homa Umigdal was designed by kibbutz-member Shlomo Gur and developed by architect Yohan-
an Rather. The first was built close to Kibbutz Beth Alpha.
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on whose lands a kibbutz was built. The system was tactically designed with pre-
fabricated wooden walls filled with gravel, enclosing 35 by 35 meters, to which was 
added a wooden tower and four shacks, all planned for over-night construction. 
Between 1936 and 1939, during the Arab revolt against the British Mandate admin-
istration, 57 such settlement-outposts were erected. For reasons of security, Homa 
Umigdal ‘fortresses’ were set up within visual distance of other settlements and 
were accessible by motor vehicle. According to Rotbard, the strategic value of posi-
tion was of primordial importance:
As a strategy, Homa Umigdal realised the impulse for expansion through territorial con-
quests by establishing new ‘settlement points’, a term that in itself hints at the fact that 
the ‘point’ on the map was more important than the ‘settlement’ itself. The location of 
the settlement as part of a greater strategic plan was of greater importance than its actu-
al existence, and the location was determined according to optimal vantage points: the 
Homa Umigdal network was spread out in such a way that every outpost had eye contact 
with another, enabling the towers to transmit messages by Morse code using flashlights at 
night and mirrors during day.56
It is easy to recognise the reiteration of the typology of walls and towers in the 
separation wall and the numerous watchtowers dispersed throughout the OPT, 
signalling an architecture of separation and control. Yet it is not only the built ele-
ments themselves that embed the fortress-like Homa Umigdal in later military-ci-
vilian architecture; as Rotbard notes, their strategic position was crucial, also evi-
dent in the strategic positioning of settlements on occupied land. 
 The building of Israeli settlements began immediately after the war in 1967. 
Although not a coherent strategy, as previously noted, political and military objec-
tives for territorial expansion have clearly been interchangeable. This was evident 
in the proposed 1967 Allon Plan for the division of the territories. The plan, based 
on the precept of sovereignty over the occupied territories for defensive reasons, 
was not implemented but informed de facto development on the ground, where its 
principles of military control by civil means were adopted as practice. 
 Settlements were built on hilltops overlooking Palestinian villages, thus 
reminiscent of fortresses in their combination of a geographical vantage point 
for visual surveillance with a closed outer perimeter. Further, an extensive infra-
structure of bypass roads ‘seamlessly’ connects the settlements without interfer-
ing with Palestinian roads, consequently separating them from Palestinian areas. 
Weizman, with his habitual linguistic clarity, cogently dubs the geographical re-
56  Rotbard, “Civilian Occupation,” 48.
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ality of a layered landscape that arose with the settlement enterprise a ‘politics of 
verticality’:
A territorial ecosystem of externally alienated, internally homogenised enclaves located 
next to, within, above or below each other. A new understanding of territory had to be 
developed to govern the West Bank. The Occupied Territories were no longer seen as a 
two-dimensional surface, but as a large three-dimensional volume, layered with strate-
gic, religious and political strata.57
In the superimposition of two ethnically divided spaces, laws, rules, and even 
names are different. For instance, while ‘West Bank’ is a translation of the Ara-
bic term ad-Diffah I-Garbiyyah, designating the area under Jordanian control from 
1948-67, Israel refers to this same area using the biblical names Judea and Samaria. 
 Contrary to the implied intention of progress toward Palestinian self-deter-
mination, settlement construction surged after the Oslo Agreements and contin-
ues with unabated speed into the present. At the time of writing, around 600,000 
settlers live in 125 settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, with over one 
hundred additional military outposts. In addition, settlement activity takes place 
in Palestinian urban areas, where settlers move into Palestinian houses and flats. 
The most notorious cases are in Hebron and East Jerusalem, where intimidation 
and segregation, backed by military protection, is created at the scale of a single 
house.58
 Although the settlement enterprise has been a double edged sword for the 
Israeli state, the diffusion of an Israeli population as a frontier within the OPT has 
been indisputably successful in terms of territorial expansion, by now a fait ac-
compli that undermines any claim to honest political negotiations from the Israeli 
side.59 Ideological, political, and military objectives cross one another in a complex 
57  Politics of Verticality first appeared as a series of articles on the media platform openDemocracy in 
2002. The same argument and its concepts later put forth in Weizman’s critically acclaimed book Hollow 
Land. The quote is from Eyal Weizman, “Introduction to The Politics of Verticality,” openDemocracy 2002., 
see also Hollow Land.
58  Several tactics are used for Israeli urban settlement; individual squatting, private purchase of houses 
under cover of Palestinian middle-men, expropriation for archaeological excavation purposes, and the 
sealing of Palestinian houses that are subject to a demolition order in order to ‘spare’ the house for Israeli 
takeover or for punitive reasons. For more on settler activity in East Jerusalem, see Meir Margalit, Seizing 
Control of Space in East Jerusalem (Tel Aviv: Sifrei Aliat Gag, 2010). The case of Hebron is described by Rob-
ert Bevan as “a microcosm of the processes of shifting borders and occupation.” See Bevan, 152.
59  The settlements have been problematic for Israel not least because of the strong religious foundation 
of many settlements, as opposed to the secularity of the state, and because of the ‘lawlessness’ on which 
settlements are built, at times proving to be difficult to manage politically. Yet the Israeli government’s 
implicit backing of Gush Emunim, the ideological settlement movement organisation, and the 1979 legal 
case of the settlement of Elon Moreh, which legalised takeover of ‘state land’ despite absence of military 
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interplay when the Israeli state backs settlements with legal means for political 
purposes, and simultaneously exceeds those same laws by, with wilful blindness, 
accepting ‘outlandish’ settler practices that in turn affect and amend law-making 
and ruling in themselves.
 The fait accompli of the settlements entails that architecture does indeed 
change political reality. The Israeli geographer Ariel Handel and sociologist Erez 
Maggor claim that, over the course of the last fifty years, there has been a gradual 
normalisation of settlements, an effect of Israeli government policies that increas-
ingly provide economic as opposed to ideological incentives to move to the West 
Bank.60 According to Handel and Maggor, studies of settlers and settlements tend 
need, are important cases in point for observing how policies have changed according to excess and con-
tradiction within an apparatus of control that was informed by de facto changes on the ground. The case 
of Elon Moreh is thoroughly described in numerous sources, for instance Gordon, Israel’s Occupation, 129-
30.; Cohen, 103.; Weizman, Hollow Land, 105-08.; BIMKOM - Planner for Planning Rights, “The Prohibited 
Zone: Israeli Planning Policy in the Palestinian Villages in Area C,” ed. Nir Shalev and Alon Cohen-Lifshitz 
(2008), 25-27.
60  See Ariel Handel and Erez Maggor, “Preface: The Settlements in the West Bank: New Perspectives,” 
Fig. 23: Segregated roads. Palestinian road towards Beit Jala and Bethlehem passing under the main sett-
lement highway, Road 60, crossing the West Bank. The sign, mounted by Israeli authorities, reads: “This Road 
Leads To Area ’A’ Under The Palestinian Authority. The Entrance For Israeli Citizens Is Forbidden, Dangerous 
To Your Lives And Is Against The Israeli Law.” Road 60, passing over the tunnel, is restricted to non-Palesti-
nian vehicles (2014). Structurally and discursively, the roads and their signposts manufacture Palestinians as 
dangerous enemies. See chapter IV, ‘Unliveability’, for an exploration of the figure of the enemy.
102
to overlook the structural mechanisms behind the settlement enterprise. Further, 
as an effect of the seamless infrastructure and political backing of the settlements, 
the Green Line (the 1948 armistice line, marking the cease-fire between Israel and 
the Arab states involved in the war) is constantly blurred.
 The settlements are extra-territorial spaces that have been incorporated 
into the normal functioning of Israeli society. On the level of the everyday, the 
settlement towns and road network are, for many Israelis, not considered as be-
ing outside of Israel because phenomenologically, as an experience of movement 
in space, they are equated with Israel in many respects. The settlements are for the 
most part divided from Palestinian localities by the separation barrier; the road 
network, as mentioned, is segregated and bypasses Palestinian roads; and, subse-
quently, travel across the Green Line for non-Palestinians is unhindered. The set-
tlements are thus not an anomaly, but rather an integral part of Israeli society, and 
have been so since 1967 at the inevitable expense, it should be added, of Palestinian 
territory and society.
Unplanning by Destruction
While the construction of a territory of Israeli control through civilian and military 
architecture is a form of unplanning by physical intervention at the expense of Pal-
estinian territory, an opposite strategy is represented by the bulldozer. Recalling 
Salmon’s “harbinger of silent violence”, the bulldozer is a weapon for unplanning 
by destructive de-construction. The widespread Israeli practice of house demoli-
tions unplans through a simple destruction of the built fabric. Destruction of the 
most basic civil architectural structure, the shelter of the home, is a straightfor-
ward means of inciting people to leave.
 Similarly to the application of land laws and the strategic building of an Is-
raeli extra-territorial space outside sovereign borders, destruction of the lived 
environment is a practice that has roots in pre-occupation times. The practice of 
house demolition in Palestine can be traced back to the British Mandate era, intro-
duced in 1945 by regulation 119 of the Defence Emergency Regulation (DER 119) as 
a legitimised punitive and pre-emptive measure against riots. Prior to the expira-
tion of the Mandate, DER 119 was repealed, but this fact was not published in the 
Theory and Criticsim 47 (2016). Normalisation is by Handel and Maggor considered from the viewpoint of 
Israel’s settler-colonial project, and is not in opposition to the failure of normalisation of the occupation 
as a regime that controls Palestinian lives, in the sense that Gordon explains it. It is worth noticing that a 
central goal of Palestinian resistance is precisely to avoid normalisation of the occupation (normalisation 
understood as ‘acceptance’). The late consequences of Israel’s failure of normalisation, cf. Gordon, has of 
course not been the goal: rather, resistance to normalisation concerns the everyday attention to the dehu-
manising structure and effect of occupation, which is required for a continued resistance to be possible. 
The struggle against normalisation is a therefore still an important part of a critical Palestinian discourse 
of resistance.
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local newspaper, The Palestine Gazette. Publication of military orders in the Ga-
zette was the correct procedure for orders to take legal effect, meaning that even if 
the law was de facto implemented it was legally void as it had not been made explic-
it in the Gazette. Furthermore, no action to ratify the repeal was undertaken by ei-
ther Jordan or Egypt during their respective rules of the West Bank and Gaza. For 
these reasons, backed by Israeli courts, DER 119 is still in force, since laws that pre-
ceded the occupation were retained unless explicitly repealed.61 For several years 
after the Second Intifada, punitive demolitions were effectively repealed when an 
Israeli Army commission concluded that punitive demolition was not an effective 
means to combat terrorism. However, the practice resumed in 2009 after a period 
of increased Palestinian violence.62
 As a strategy of war, Israeli forces levelled 418 Palestinian villages, towns 
and tribal settlements during the 1947-48 wars within territory that is now part of 
Israel, and approximately 7,000 further homes during the 1967 war.63 During the 
interwar period, when the Palestinian areas formed the frontiers of Israel, houses 
61  Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, “The Legality of House Demolitions 
Under International Humanitarian Law,” (Harvard University, 2004).
62  Avi Kober, Israel’s Wars of Attrition: Attrition Challenges to Democratic States, Middle Eastern Military 
Studies (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 131.
63  Figures on destroyed localities vary: the one cited here is the moderate figure given by Walid Khalidi, 
which lands in-between other often cited sources such as Benny Morris (369) and Salman Abu Sitta (531). 
See Walid Khalidi, All that remains: the Palestinian villages occupied and depopulated by Israel in 1948 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992).
Fig. 24: Ma’ale Adumim settlement, overlooking roads and valleys (2011).
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were destroyed based upon military rationale.64 Yet justifications for house dem-
olition exceed those of military strategic purposes and collateral damage legiti-
mised through war. House demolitions were — and still are — legitimised on puni-
tive, military, or administrative grounds, citing successively a rhetoric of terrorist 
deterrence and pre-emption, security, or illegality due to a lack of Israel-granted 
building permit or another technical or administrative reasoning. Between 1967 
and 2014, including during periods of war, Israel demolished more than 48,000 
houses in the West Bank and Gaza, with an increased rate over the later years. 
Although demolitions are afforded different frames of legitimisation, in practice 
they are carried out by the same military apparatus and share a historical objective 
as a means for territorial control.
 The category of punitive demolition covers the destruction of the house of 
a person — and their relatives — suspected of supporting or taking part in crim-
inal or guerrilla activity. Its exercise creates a peculiar spatial transformation in 
cases where the suspect lives in a shared housing block: the targeted apartment is 
demolished, leaving a gaping crater in the façade of the building, while the other 
dwellings remain intact to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the severity of 
the structural damage caused by the building’s partial demolition.65 However, it is 
rarely the suspect that is punished, but rather relatives that live in the house. Puni-
tive demolitions in the wake of a terrorist attack are intended to function as a de-
terrent to further attacks, or the pre-emption of an attack expected to take place. 
The intended effect is that a person will not become involved in attacks against 
Israel, or that relatives will turn-in a family member they suspect to be involved in 
criminal activity. Demolition is thus a collective punishment and a means of pres-
sure, signalling Israeli non-tolerance to terrorism, and applied regardless of IDF 
reports stating its non-utility and converse fuelling of hatred.66
 Demolition for military purposes denotes both collateral or strategic dam-
age to buildings during wartime, or demolitions that are enacted according to mil-
itary and security reasoning in periods of relative peace, such as in the creation of 
firing zones. These zones, besides the hazard posed of being shot or incidentally 
triggering a land mine if one is to stray inside, are in constant danger of expropri-
ation. The Bedouins of the Jordan Valley, in particular, have faced eviction due to 
64  Ron, Frontiers and Ghettos, 144-6.
65  Ariella Azoulay shows in the exhibition ‘Architecture of Destruction’, as well as in later photo-essays, 
sequences of typical figures of destruction, such as ‘The Targeted Destruction of Housing Units in an In-
habited Residential Building’. Originally exhibited by Zochrot, Tel Aviv (2008) and reproduced, among 
other publications, in Ariella Azoulay, Civil Imagination: A Political Ontology of Photography (London ; New 
York: Verso, 2012), 160.
66  Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures fo Israeli Counterterrorism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 167.
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military firing zone regulations in recent years. Collateral and strategic damage 
to buildings in wartime is, as already mentioned in relation to the term urbicide, a 
part of urban warfare.67 A considerable number of houses were destroyed as a con-
sequence of urban warfare during the Second Intifada, with the razing of Jenin in 
2002 serving as a stark example. In addition to the armed bulldozer, other prac-
tices, such as the destruction of internal walls to create pathways for the move-
ment of Israeli soldiers through Palestinian urban areas, described by Abujidi as 
‘forced routes’, and Weizman as ‘walking through walls’, were introduced during 
this period,68
 Administrative justifications for demolition were introduced in 1987, ac-
counting for almost 8,000 demolitions up to 2014, and have been used with in-
creased frequency. In the last decade alone, around 500 houses were demolished 
annually.69 As of 2016, 12,000 demolition orders, targeting 17,000 structures, re-
main pending for houses in the West Bank.70 Administrative house demolitions are 
used to target the homes of Palestinians in Area C and East Jerusalem in particu-
lar, and since 2010 Israeli authorities have begun to issue demolition orders to all 
Palestinian families living in Area C.71 Building permits are rarely granted to Pal-
estinians in this area, with the result that many Palestinians build unauthorised 
structures that are often subsequently demolished.72 Civic planning regulations 
are thus utilised as a legal support for demolition in order to obstruct Palestinian 
67  The situation in Gaza is not an object for the present discussion, but the extreme degradation of the 
built environment during three military ‘operations’ in the last ten years should be mentioned. Here, hous-
es have been used as both weapon and target in a particularly lethal fashion, with the so-called knock on the 
door (warning phone calls to a building to be targeted or air-dropped flyers in a targeted neighbourhood) 
and knock on the roof (low-explosive missiles fired onto the roof in advance of high-explosive bombs). 
These methods aim to warn inhabitants that their house will shortly be destroyed. The Israeli military’s 
logic is to minimise civilian loss in air strikes that target presumed terrorists, counting on those inside to 
leave the house if they consider themselves to be civilians. Whether the inhabitants are terrorists or not, 
the result is fatal, and turns the civilian urban environment into an uninhabitable ruin. Eyal Weizman, The 
Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza (London: Verso, 2011).; “Short Cuts,” 
London Review of Books, 34, 2012.
68  Abujidi, 154-6.; Weizman, “Walking Through Walls: Soldiers as Architects in the Israeli/Palestinian 
Conflict.”
69  Sources: Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, “Statistics on House Demolitions in the Oc-
cupied Territories (1967-2014),” (2014).; UN OCHA oPt, “Under Threat: Demolition Orders in Area C of 
the West Bank,” (2015).
70  Israeli Civil Administration, “Israeli Demolition Orders against Palestinain Structures in Area C, 1988-
2016,” ed. UN OCHA oPt (2016).
71  MA’AN Development Center & Jordan Valley Popular Committees, “Eye on the Jordan Valley,” (Ra-
mallah2010).
72  Palestinian building applications submitted for Area C during 2010-14 resulted in 33 permits issued 
and a rejection rate of 98.5%. See UN OCHA oPt, “Under Threat: Demolition Orders in Area C of the West 
Bank.”
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building in Area C and East Jerusalem.
 The laws within which planning devices are embedded are used to pursue a 
particular political agenda of spatial design: the law itself becomes an architectur-
al tool, drafting the rules for how space is configured. This reality is not, of course, 
restricted to Israel and Palestine, as enterprises of architecture and planning in 
the common interest are usually subject to laws defined by a political body in any 
context. Yet in the case of Israel’s use of planning law in the OPT, the practices 
they support are employed in such a way that planning appears in its negative and 
becomes strictly a means of unplanning.
 The bulldozer, recognised by Salmon as a war machine for destructive land-
scaping, is thus only the most visible weapon of spatial violence. Recalling a state-
ment from the introduction to this thesis, Israel’s spatial violence brings architec-
ture into a violent order in two senses: it comprises of violence done to architecture 
and violence done by architecture. Violence done to architecture is the material 
infliction of wounds on, or total destruction of, the body of the building, and is the 
most visible manifestation of violence, be it for strategic or symbolic reasons. Vi-
olence done by architecture utilises the capacity of architecture to suppress, con-
trol, discriminate or produce otherwise devastating effects for humans via their 
lived environment, whether through disciplinary, carceral, or exclusionary struc-
tures.73 Moreover, both violence to and by architecture are often subsumed under a 
rationale of securitisation, motivated as solutions to Palestinian violence against 
73  A more radical reading of violence by architecture is given by the architect and writer Léopold Lam-
bert, who approaches architecture as a political weapon, based on its ability to organise and control bodies 
in space by establishing exclusionary spatial structures. On this basis, architecture can contribute to struc-
tural racism, for instance. However, according to Lambert, before we can talk about a political instrumen-
talisation of architecture, we must first recognise the basic violent gesture of architecture. In an interview 
with the author for the magazine Arkitekten, Lambert offered the following definition: “Violence, as I start 
approaching it, is here to be understood as a pre-political methodology in the vein of the philosophy of 
Spinoza: violence is what degrades the composition of material assemblages. Another way to explain this 
is with the words of Deleuze. If I take a wave in my face I am going to get hurt, and to some degree the wave 
will also be hurt – so we’re speaking of a reciprocity between me and the wave. But somehow I can com-
pose my body in relation to the wave so that the meeting might be less violent or not violent at all, if that 
is possible. I approach architecture in a similar way. Architecture is a material assemblage that occupies a 
space, and if our bodies try to occupy the space that this material assemblage occupies, then there is going 
to be a shock; a shock of particles. After that, once this definition of violence is established, what I cannot 
help but notice is the fact that no architecture is occupying the space it occupies for no reason. And again, 
in this methodology we are not even yet speaking of whether it is fair, or if it is legal — we are just looking 
at what is happening…. What I call the ethics of design, is when we start looking at how this pre-political 
violence is necessarily instrumentalised into a political setting.” I differ from Lambert’s basic definition 
of violence, yet agree that architecture has the potential to instrumentalise violence due to its ability to 
install mechanisms of exclusion. See Léopold Lambert, interview by Runa Johannessen, 2016, Arkitekten, 
7. (Quote from transcript).
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Israeli targets.74 With the notion of unplanning, it can be observed how both these 
forms operate in concert and are circumscribed by laws that serve to legitimise 
them. Unplanning is thus a tool for the organisation of space that undermines the 
spatial conditions of the Palestinian population.
74  Increased securitisation of architecture is certainly not restricted to Israel and the OPT, yet the var-
ious appearances securitisation takes globally are beyond the scope of this thesis. On the contemporary 
development of architectures of securitisation in a global context, see for instance Deane Simpson, Vibeke 
Jensen, and Anders Rubing, (eds), The City Between Freedom and Security: Contested Public Spaces in the 21st 
Century (Birkhäuser Verlag GmbH, 2017).
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Fig. 25: Total number of administrative demolitions in Area C (not including East Jerusalem) in 
the years 1987-2014. Sources: (Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions 2014) and (UN).
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Fig. 26: Total number of Palestinian structures (Gaza and West Bank) destroyed by Israel between 1967 and 
2014. Figures include destruction on military (61%), punitive (4%), and administrative (20%) grounds, while 
the remainder (15%) is ‘undefined’. The extreme figures for 2014 is the result of Israel’s air strikes in the 2014 
war in Gaza. Houses were targeted and destroyed – inside which many people died. Source: (Israeli Committee 
Against House Demolitions 2014)
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The military strategy of ‘scorched earth’ is well known: since ancient times, war-
ring parties have dispersed fire, poison, bombs, and gas within the territory of the 
adversary. ‘Scorched earth’ entails that destruction of the very environment that 
supports human habitation is made a weapon of control and conquest. Although 
specific tactics have changed over the centuries, its foundational idea remains 
unchanged today. The philosopher Peter Sloterdijk argues in Terror from the Air 
(2009) that modern warfare may be characterised precisely by the targeting of the 
environment rather than the enemy’s body.1 For Sloterdijk, the ‘atmoterrorism’ in-
cepted with the unprecedented horrors of chemical warfare in the First World War 
is the basic scheme for terrorism as a modus operandi:
1  Peter Sloterdijk, Terror from the Air (Los Angeles, Calif.: Semiotext(e), 2009), 14.
CHAPTER IV
UNLIVEABILITY
Fig. 27: Hebron. Sealed entrance to a side-street in the closed off area of the city (2014).
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Terrorism, from an environmental perspective, voids the distinction between violence 
against people and violence against things: it comprises of a form of violence against the 
very human-ambient ‘things’ without which people cannot remain people…Terrorism 
can only be understood when grasped as a form of exploration of the environment from 
the perspective of its destructibility. It exploits the fact that ordinary inhabitants have a 
user relationship to their environment, that they instinctively and exclusively consume it 
as a silent condition of their existence.2
Terrorism instrumentalises the destructibility of an environment and creates 
what Sloterdijk calls “unliveable milieus”.3 While Sloterdijk is specifically con-
cerned with explicit forms of terrorism derived from turning the air itself — our 
breathing space — into a deadly climate, the concern here is not with ‘atmospher-
ic’ lethality. However, what is taken from Sloterdijk is the insight that the creation 
of unliveability is a weapon of warfare that complicates distinctions between vi-
olence against human bodies and violence against the life-world conditions of 
human existence. The creation of unliveable milieus is a form of terror that en-
velops life, induced by a proliferation of often intangible weapons within the lived 
environment. Unliveability, in my conception, covers more broadly the targeting 
of human dependency vis-a-vis the environment in which we live, including its 
immaterial dimensions. Making the enemy’s habitat unliveable is the outcome of 
a complex targeting of the lived environment rather than the direct infliction of 
wounds to the human body.
 The discussion of the notion of unplanning in the previous chapter sought 
to make palpable how certain mechanisms that regulate the Palestinian built en-
vironment constitute a destructive territorial practice, aided by violence to and 
by architecture. Yet, what kind of space — or milieu — arises from unplanning? 
What is it that the spatial violence of unplanning actually eliminates, beyond 
the obvious destruction of Palestinian houses? In the following, I will argue that 
unplanning is a form of violence that creates unliveable spaces. The outcome of 
unplanning is the wrecking of the space that day to day life is conditioned by and 
dependent upon. Differently put, unplanning engenders the destruction of the ‘in-
frastructure’ of lived space; the very organisation of life in its spatial dimension.
 In the article ‘The Technological Unconscious’, literary theorist Frederik 
Tygstrup expands on how infrastructure — beyond its usual definition as the ma-
terial amenities of roads, electricity grids, water pipes, and information networks 
that service the running of a society — constitutes a system of connectivity in 
2  Ibid., 25, 28.
3  Ibid., 16.
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which life unfolds.4 Our mode of inhabitation of the world is ordered by solid and 
fluid infrastructures that enable us to connect, dwell and move. These infrastruc-
tures come alive through the connections and processes, relations and exchanges 
they afford.5 In a similar manner, in ‘The Commons: Infrastructures for Troubling 
Times’ (2016), cultural theorist Lauren Berlant describes infrastructure as the 
mediation of the organisation of life: 
Infrastructure is not identical to system or structure, as we currently see them, because 
infrastructure is defined by the movement or patterning of social form. It is the living 
mediation of what organizes life: the lifeworld of structure. Roads, bridges, schools, food 
chains, finance systems, prisons, families, districts, norms all the systems that link ongo-
ing proximity to being in a world-sustaining relation.6
Rather than a structure, infrastructure is a transitional form. While, according 
to Berlant, structure is “that which organizes transformation”, infrastructure 
is “that which binds us to the world in movement and keeps the world practical-
ly bound to itself.”7 Infrastructure is thus both material and immaterial in so far 
as it is an arrangement that codes and formats life: it produces forms of life, or 
life-worlds, and represents the very condition of possibility for the organisation 
of life.8 Within the machinery of infrastructure, architecture is a component — a 
switch — that makes the life-world of infrastructure operational.
 Destruction of the infrastructure of lived space can be carried out through 
a range of means; by a bulldozer, by obstruction of movement, by restrictions on 
import and export of goods, or even through the calculation of calorie intake for 
a population, which, as noted by Adi Ophir, sustains a situation on the verge of di-
saster through a minute calculation of the threshold between life and death.9 De-
struction of infrastructure by means of unplanning is a disconnection of the co-
hesion necessary for the infrastructure that organises life. In consequence, lived 
space is made unliveable when the inhabitants’ environment is treated on the basis 
of its destructibility.
4  Frederik Tygstrup, “The Technological Unconscious,” in Architecture, Drawing, Topology, ed. Cort Ross 
Dinesen (Bamberg: Spurbuchverlag, Forthcoming).
5  Ibid.
6  Lauren Berlant, “The Commons: Infrastructures for Troubling Times,” Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 34, no. 3 (2016): 393.
7  Ibid., 394. Emphasis in original.
8  Tygstrup.
9  Adi Ophir, “The Politics of Catastrophization: Emergency and Exception,” in Contemporary States of 
Emergency: the Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions, ed. Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi 
(New York, Cambridge, Mass.: Zone Books, 2010).
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 However, unlike the customary portrayal of violence in the Israel-Palestine 
conflict as a matter of Israeli military force versus Palestinian terrorism, unplan-
ning constitutes a form of violence that is difficult to represent as such. Even in 
cases where unplanning is instantaneously destructive, as when a bulldozer de-
molishes a house, it is not necessarily perceived as violence, but rather as an in-
stance of the execution of legal power. Therefore, in order to recognise how un-
planning constitutes a violent practice that has the effect of gradually turning the 
life world of infrastructures into unliveable milieus, this chapter will approach the 
violence of unplanning from three topical discussions. These discussions — from 
the more abstract to the more concrete — do not represent essentialist categories 
but, rather, approximations which are emphasised in order to get a grasp on, re-
spectively, the general phenomena, the particular order, and the characteristic en-
actment of violence to which unplanning adheres, and from which unliveability is 
fostered.
 First, I will outline the interdependent phenomena of manifest and struc-
tural violence, and discuss the problem of visible and invisible violence. Second, I 
will present the view that Israel’s rule over Palestinians belongs to a necropolitical 
order — a politics of death rather than life — whose violence operates simultane-
ously within a legal and an extra legal sphere. Third, I will delineate how Israel’s 
calculation of violence between eruption and restraint is an enactment of poten-
tial violence that controls everyday life. In conclusion, these three approximations 
enable an understanding not only of unplanning as a violent practice that creates 
unliveable spaces, but also of how resistant spatial practices are immanent to vio-
lence as well as to power.
Phenomena of Violence
As seen in chapter I on spatial resistance and in chapter III on mechanisms of un-
planning, the power relationship in the context of Israel and Palestine is asym-
metrical, with Israel as the dominant power. In the words of anthropologist Jeff 
Halper, Israel rules over Palestinians in a matrix of control.10 The structure of this 
10  Jeff Halper dubbed the now frequently used term ‘matrix of control,’ describing it as “an interlocking 
series of mechanisms, only a few of which require physical occupation of territory, that allow Israel to con-
trol every aspect of Palestinian life in the Occupied Territories…For the most part the matrix relies upon 
subtle interventions performed under the guise of ‘proper administration,’ ‘upholding the law,’ ‘keeping 
the public order’ and, of course, ‘security.’ These interventions, largely bureaucratic and legal, are never-
theless backed by overwhelming military force, which Israel reserves for itself the right to employ.” See Jeff 
Halper, “The 94 Percent Solution: A Matrix of Control,” Middle East Report 30, no. 216 (2000). However, in 
an interview conducted with the author in Jerusalem, 26 December 2013, Halper argued that the matrix of 
control is sustained for one reason: “The occupation for Israel is a laboratory … you cannot explain why 
Israel didn’t give up the occupied territories by way of internal politics; not by ideology, not by security. 
There is no explanation, unless you see the OT as a laboratory. The OT provides Israel the laboratory for 
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matrix has transformed over the years, changing its modes of control and empha-
sising different modes of power. Unplanning comprises part of the matrix as a set 
of mechanisms that reorganise the territory by means that are not necessarily vi-
olent in themselves, as observable in the use of land laws, but whose effect is vio-
lent. In the following, the task is to delineate violence from power, explicate the 
difference between the two phenomena of manifest and structural violence, and 
consider the problem of representation of violence and the dynamic link between 
different phenomena of violence.
 In order to recognise how unplanning can be considered a violent practice, 
and not merely an expression of power, the difference between exertion of pow-
er and the use of violence must be made explicit. Power and violence are two dis-
tinct and mutually exclusive phenomena. According to Foucault, as previously 
discussed, power is the structuring of others’ actions by action, and its exercise 
in itself is not violence.11 Conversely, for sociologist Niklas Luhmann, violence is, 
“the elimination of action by action” or annihilation of the ability or freedom to 
act.12 Violence, hereby understood as an act that eliminates others’ actions, is thus 
not a power relation, but rather the end for a power relationship, or a limit point of 
a force relationship. However, as stated in chapter I, violence can be a subset in the 
exercise of power as an effect of a state of domination. This shall be explicated in 
the following.
 Violence can be used both by the powerless (for instance, the suicide bomb-
er), and by the powerful (for instance, in order to disable an enemy, as in countless 
examples of violence in wars or counterinsurgencies). Yet, how can Israel’s ap-
plication of an Ottoman law regarding land ownership be understood as violent? 
What is violent is not the law in itself, but rather the effects of its application.13 The 
testing both weaponry and also military and security.” The client base for security technologies is, accord-
ing to Halper, global. Palestine became a laboratory for this market in the 1980s, and has made Israel a 
major military and security power. However, Halper argues, “now the program model is out there” and 
“there is no point of having the occupation”, which has become an “Achilles heel … they have become 
caught in [their] own petard.” On a different but related note, the ‘laboratory,’ according to Halper in 2013, 
an inoperative burden, seems to have now found new fields of business application: this time ‘at home’ by 
the creation of anti-terror camps for tourists. Amira Hass writes that “in the Gush Etzion region of the West 
Bank, Caliber 3 is a counterterrorism and security training academy that in recent years has built on its ex-
pertise to create a new line of business: special programs for tourists seeking a taste of the Israeli military 
experience.” See Amira Hass, “Anti-terror Fantasy Camps Are Popping Up Throughout Israel and the West 
Bank - and Tourists Are Eating It Up,” Haaretz, 10.7.2017.
11  Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 789.
12  Luhmann cited in Christoph Menke, “Law and Violence,” Law & Literature 22, no. 1 (2010): 2.
13  The paradox of the relation between law and violence, of violence being a foundation of the law’s le-
gitimation and thus embedding violence within the heart of the law itself, has been discussed by several 
philosophers, such as Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Rancière, Christoph 
Menke and others. Although relevant for understanding the violence of laws in general, this is a question 
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application of a law requires an apparatus that has the power to enforce it. Though 
different from power, violence is thus not devoid of interference with power. A dis-
tinction between manifest and structural violence is useful in order to see how the 
elimination of others’ actions by action takes different forms, and how violence 
can be embedded in a power structure.
 Manifest violence that inflicts visible wounds, thus causing suffering or 
even death, is an act of direct elimination of the action of others. One may certain-
ly disagree with legitimations of the use of violence, or the ways in which violence 
is incited (‘who started the fight?’), but one rarely disputes that instances of such 
violence are, in fact, violent. Though killing, bombing and torture require media-
tion for an outside public to know that they have taken place, they do not need an 
abstraction in order to be represented. Manifest violence embeds its own repre-
sentation because causal relations between action and inflicted harm are recog-
nisable in its result. This is the case irrespective of whether or not one has access to 
knowledge about the actual causal chain that lead to the event, and irrespective of 
one’s view on whether it is justified or not. Manifest violence may be used for polit-
ical reasons by both powerful and powerless, whether to destroy the counterpart’s 
ability to fight, or even to live, but is not an act that works on the premise of power 
as a relation of reciprocally structuring actions.
 Structural violence — a term first applied by sociologist Johan Galtung to 
circumscribe the effects of certain destructive systems or patterns within society 
— is a much more complex term and phenomenon that requires representation 
through analysis and abstraction in order to be recognised as violent.14 There is 
no clear causal relation between action and afflicted harm; subject identification 
of perpetrator and victim is blurred; effects might be dispersed and delayed; and 
categories of just and unjust are obscured when structural violence is inherent to 
societal regulations. Structural violence is embedded in a power structure of dom-
ination and cannot be exerted by the powerless, dominated party, who is unable to 
interact within such a power relation other than through resistance. 
 Structural violence is a fundamental concept for later theorisations of the 
problem of violence, not at least in addressing the quandary of the invisibility of 
certain kinds of violence. With the notion of ‘slow violence’, literary theorist Rob 
Nixon shows how distance in time between cause and effect renders violence in-
visible and difficult to represent.15 By slow violence, Nixon means:
for the philosophy of law that will not be expanded upon here.
14  Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969).
15  Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard 
University Press, 2011).
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…a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that 
is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as 
violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate 
in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational vis-
ibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither 
spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous re-
percussions playing out across a range of temporal scales.16
While Nixon uses it with the specific aim of capturing the temporally delayed ef-
fects of bio-environmental violence, ‘slow violence’ can also be a concept helpful 
to understand more generally how the temporal and phenomenological dispersion 
of singular acts within a power structure — that in themselves seem harmless 
— can have cumulative and incrementally violent effects. This is the case, for in-
stance, with Israel’s movement regime: Israel regularly restricts Palestinian farm 
owners’ access to their land in cases where the land is on the ‘wrong’ side of the 
separation barrier. When access is denied, the land cannot be farmed. If the land is 
not farmed for three consecutive years, the initial denial of permission to be pres-
ent on one’s land opens, in consequence, the possibility of the land’s confiscation. 
If the land is confiscated, the farmer loses his or her property, livelihood and sub-
sistence; a personal catastrophe, but also, in accumulation, a collective concern: 
confiscation of private land leads to the de facto shrinking of Palestinian territory. 
The shrinking of land is reinforced politically by the subsumption of land into an 
exclusionary settlement infrastructure. The various laws and practices deployed 
are, in the above scenario, not directly connected to one another in the legal struc-
ture as such, but rather, in their accumulated injurious effects over time — in this 
case, years — constitute a form of slow violence.
 Slow violence is, according to Nixon, a violence that is detached from its 
cause by the work of time, rendering it invisible. It is attritional and exponential, 
and can proliferate conflicts when conditions for sustaining life are gradually de-
graded.17 As is evident, the erosion of living conditions often leads to displacement 
— whence the figure of the climate refugee — yet Nixon proposes that the ‘dis-
placement’ of living conditions in themselves are taken into account, what he calls 
“displacement without moving.”18 Such displacement refers not to the movement 
of people, but “rather to the loss of the land and resources beneath them, a loss that 
leaves communities stranded in a place stripped of the very characteristics that 
16  Ibid., 2.
17  Ibid., 3.
18  Ibid., 19.
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made it inhabitable.”19 A place that loses its life-sustaining features, yet without 
necessarily — or instantaneously — leading to place-displacement for humans is, 
I would argue, an unliveable space. 
 The problem of the invisibility of violence occurs not only due to its dis-
persal over time, however. According to Slavoj Žižek, a ‘blind spot’ is produced 
through the affective strength of direct, brutal and visible violence. In Violence: 
Six Sideways Reflections (2008), Žižek expounds on the relation between perceived 
violence and those other forms to which we are often ‘blind’. In doing so, he distin-
guishes between three typological forms of violence: ‘subjective violence’, the vis-
ible form of violence, and two forms of ‘objective violence’; the ‘symbolic’ violence 
embodied in language, and the ‘systemic’ violence that is “the often catastrophic 
consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems”:20 
Subjective and objective violence cannot be perceived from the same standpoint: subjec-
tive violence is experienced as such against the background of a non-violent zero level. 
It is seen as a perturbation of the “normal,” peaceful state of things. However, objective 
violence is precisely the violence inherent to this “normal” state of things. Objective vio-
lence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive 
something as subjectively violent. Systemic violence is thus something like the notorious 
“dark matter” of physics, the counterpart to an all-too visible subjective violence. It may 
be invisible, but it has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise 
seem to be “irrational” explosions of subjective violence.21 
Systemic violence, resembling Galtung’s structural violence, is for Žižek masked 
or hidden in its normality. The normality of a power apparatus that regulates land 
laws is, in this sense, the “dark matter” that blurs the cause-effect relation between 
the adoption of an Ottoman land code and the displacement of Palestinians in the 
West Bank or the degradation of their lives. Žižek’s contention is that outbursts of 
subjective violence can only be understood if the violence of the ‘normal’ state of 
things is also recognised, implicitly signalling that these two forms are entwined, 
even whilst the destruction wrought by systemic violence is habitually overlooked.
 The entwinement of violent forms is examined by the philosopher Étienne 
Balibar in Violence and Civility: On the Limits of Political Philosophy (2015). Balibar 
is fundamentally concerned with the interdependence of differentials within the 
19  Ibid.
20  Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Big ideas/small books (New York: Picador, 2008), 2.
21  Ibid.
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phenomenology of (extreme) violence.22 Balibar distinguishes between two het-
erogeneous but inextricably linked forms of violence, denoted as ‘ultraobjective’ 
and ‘ultrasubjective violence’. Ultraobjective violence, which resembles struc-
tural violence, is defined as one whereby people are reduced to masses and often 
treated as ‘human waste’; in extermination camps, through extrajudicial killings, 
or labour exploitation, for instance. Ultrasubjective violence is closely related to a 
psychological phenomenon of the cruelty of hatred that incarnates evil in the Oth-
er, such as in instances of anti-semitism, anti-arabism or other forms of racism. 
Ultraobjective and ultrasubjective forms of violence are topologically connected 
and inform one another; racism produces racist laws, racist laws enforce racism, 
and so forth. A central concern for Balibar is that violence cannot be stopped with 
violence (counter-violence); different forms of violence perpetuate, escalate, and 
magnify violence.
 Escalation and continuous cycles of violence are familiar in the context of 
Israel and Palestine, evident in numerous wars, uprisings, terrorist attacks and 
military ‘operations’ throughout the last century. Yet these are only the most 
tangible expression of how violence incites violence. The logic of violence also in-
forms acts and structures that enforce violent cycles in less self-evident ways. The 
separation barrier serves as one example of such a cycle: initially, terrorism gave 
rise to its legitimisation as a violence-preventing structure; a ‘security barrier’. In 
consequence, Palestinians are treated as one homogeneous group of potentially 
violent humans, with the effect of degrading their living conditions, classifying 
their land as an exploitable resource, and quite literally blocking the horizon for 
political negotiations. Further, the physical separation created enforces the psy-
chological distance between two populations and capacitates further hatred of 
the Other; through a reinforcement of violent encounters at checkpoints, renewed 
cycles of terrorist attacks, the implementation of yet more degrading laws and 
practices, and so on. The separation barrier is, within this optic, an instrument 
of counter-violence, intensifying ever more fierce cycles of ultraobjective and ul-
trasubjective violence. For Balibar, the only option for breaking such cycles of vi-
olence is the politics of civility and anti-violence, which do not operate within a 
logic of violence.
 Although their concepts are not interchangeable — despite a linguistic over-
lap in concepts — a striking similarity between Žižek and Balibar’s typologies is 
the emphasis, firstly, on the need to understand that violence is heterogeneous, 
and secondly, that its various forms are linked interdependently with one another. 
For Žižek, visible explosions of manifest (subjective) violence cannot be under-
22  Étienne Balibar, Violence and Civility: On the Limits of Political Philosophy, Wellek Library Lectures 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).
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stood without reference to the fact that “the ‘normal,’ peaceful state of things” is 
not a non-violent zero-level, despite the invisibility of structural (objective) vio-
lence. For Balibar, there is a topological relation between different forms of vio-
lence, which lead seamlessly from one to another. The topological relation implies 
that, if not disrupted by a logic that is not violent, violence will endlessly reproduce 
itself. Both perspectives thus hold as a central point that violence is processual: 
there is a dynamic relation between different violent phenomena. In this process, 
violent practices are augmented and reproduced. Put slightly differently, different 
forms of violence can interact and work in concert to support each other.
 The various forms of Palestinian manifest violence against Israeli civilian 
and military targets must be understood against the background of Israel’s violent 
occupation. In turn, the various forms of Israel’s violence — including the rhetor-
ical gesture of legitimising violence as a security measure to protect Israel against 
terrorism — are also prompted by Palestinian violence and the specific ways such 
violence is enacted; mostly close-range attacks like suicide bombs in public space, 
ramming of targets with cars, stabbings, but also medium-range rockets from 
Gaza. Different forms of violence build upon each other, violent phenomena in-
teract, and violent practices of both occupier and occupied are formative in the 
shaping of the conflict. However, within this dynamism of violence, it is important 
to recognise that structural violence can only be achieved and managed by those 
in power. This brings us back to the asymmetrical power balance between Israel 
and Palestine and the fact that, as a result, the OPT is ruled by domination. Dom-
ination is a means to almost entirely block the field of action of others, and is that 
which crystallises into a structure with violent effects.
 Structural violence is not only temporally and causally different from man-
ifest violence as a phenomenon. Central to an understanding of how structural 
violence is actually violent is to recognise it as the destructive effect of states of 
domination rather than a singular and specific act in itself. Structural violence is 
thus best understood as the effect of a state of domination. It is often slow, incre-
mental, accumulative, and invisible, reflecting Nixon’s notion of slow violence. Yet 
manifest violence habitually overshadows the harmful effects of structural mech-
anisms in our field of vision, as Žižek makes clear. Finally, and following Balibar, 
heterogeneous phenomena of violence are cyclical, and constitute a logic that rein-
forces violence. When considering unplanning in light of these discussions around 
the phenomena of violence, it appears as a form of structural violence, enabled by 
domination, whose violent outcome is an unliveable milieu subsumed in a cycle of 
ever more detrimental consequences.
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Necropolitical order
In chapter III, a discussion was provided around Neve Gordon’s analysis of struc-
tural changes in the occupation, with the early years’ emphasis on bio and disci-
plinary forms of power giving way to sovereign forms of power. One of Gordon’s 
central contentions is that the most striking shift was a move from a “politics of 
life to a politics of death.”23 Since the beginning of the occupation, there has been 
a significant increase in the number of violent deaths, on both Israeli and Pales-
tinian sides. Although the number of fatalities is relatively low compared to other 
military occupations, Gordon argues that the increase is an indication of changes 
in modes of power that have undermined the principle of administration of lives 
and normalisation of the occupation, substituting a principle of separation that 
abandons the administration of lives. It is this indifference to lives that has led to a 
surge in lethal violence.24 Gordon’s assumption is that there is an:
…inverse correlation between sheer violence, which is used primarily to suppress resis-
tance and to create endemic uncertainty and insecurity, and forms of control that aim to 
normalize military occupations by harnessing and directing the energies of the inhabi-
tants toward activities that coincide with the occupier’s interest. Thus, the increase in 
the number of Palestinians killed is a sign that Israel’s efforts to normalize the occupation 
have failed.25
Though Gordon convincingly shows that normalisation through bio-political and 
disciplinary means have been substituted with sovereign violence and endemic 
uncertainty as modes of control, he does not conceptualise the particular form 
of power inherent in the present ‘politics of death’ beyond an emphasis on sover-
23  Different sources use various criteria for counting fatalities, and it is not always clear who counts as 
civilian and who counts as combatant, both with respect to Palestinians and Israelis. The following figures 
serve as an approximation of the increase in deaths, and the ratio of deaths on the two sides. Drawing on 
various sources, Gordon estimates an annual increase of 32 Palestinian fatalities in the period 1967-1987, 
to an annual average of 674 Palestinian fatalities in the period 2000-2006. See Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occu-
pation (Berkeley, Calif.; London: University of California Press, 2008), xvii.. Extending the period, figures 
from B’Tselem counting fatalities from 2000-2017, show an annual average of 574 Palestinian fatalities 
and 72 Israeli fatalities. See B’Tselem, “Statistics,”  http://www.btselem.org/statistics. Last access 27.4.2017 
or, for ease of readability, the chart summary of B’Tselem’s statistics by If Americans Knew, “Israelis and 
Palestinians Killed in the Current Violence,”  http://ifamericaknew.org/stat/deaths.html. Last access 
27.4.2017. Fatalities dropped significantly after Operation Cast Lead in 2009, yet with Operation Pillars of 
Defence in 2014, the civilian death toll increased dramatically: 2014 saw the highest death toll since 1967, 
with 2,314 Palestinian fatalities and 87 Israeli fatalities, according to an OCHA report: UN OCHA oPt, “Un-
der Threat: Demolition Orders in Area C of the West Bank,” (2015). The annual average in the years after 
the Second Intifada is especially high due to the three wars in Gaza, yet even when subtracting these, fatal-
ities have still increased compared to the first twenty years of occupation.
24  Gordon, xix.
25  Ibid., xvii.
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eign power. The task in this section is to explore the order of the ‘politics of death’, 
within which, I argue, unplanning mechanisms are a part. 
 The philosopher Achille Mbembe’s notion of ‘necropower’, expounded in 
‘Necropolitics’ (2003), offers a frame for understanding the specific formation of 
power — the particular state of domination — at work in contemporary colonial 
occupation. Mbembe himself holds that Israel’s occupation of Palestine represents 
“the most accomplished form of necropower” at present, so this application of his 
concept is not a theoretical novelty.26
 With ‘necropower’, Mbembe draws on Foucault’s concept of bio-power, yet 
in a formulation that negates the objective of power: as opposed to biopolitics, 
necropolitics is fundamentally concerned with power over death rather than life. 
Contrary to political thought that privileges normative theories of democracy in 
which sovereignty is expressed as the production of “general norms by a body (the 
demos) made up of free and equal men and women”, necropolitics concerns “fig-
ures of sovereignty whose central project is not the struggle for autonomy but the 
generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruc-
tion of human bodies and populations.”27 Necropolitics is a politics that creates 
death-worlds where those exposed to necropolitical power are treated as the living 
dead. Historically, we find necropolitical death-worlds in the context of the colo-
nial plantation and the enslavement of humans, in the Nazi death camps and, more 
recently, in regimes such as apartheid South Africa or the Serbian “infrastructur-
al war” in Kosovo that resulted in “shutting down the enemy’s life-support sys-
tem.”28 Mbembe reads this form of politics as a work of death. Formulated with 
the concepts of violence, necropolitics is inherently violent in both the structural 
and the manifest sense: structurally violent by creating death-worlds for the living 
dead — disposable, instrumentalised human bodies — and violently manifest in 
the actual destruction of human life.
  As a historical process, necropolitics is traced back to the European imagi-
nary of the domestication of war and the juridical order (Jus Publicum Europaeum) 
26  Mbembe writes, “The most accomplished form of necropower is the contemporary colonial occupa-
tion of Palestine. Here, the colonial state derives its fundamental claim of sovereignty and legitimacy from 
the authority of its own particular narrative of history and identity. This narrative is itself underpinned by 
the idea that the state has a divine right to exist; the narrative competes with another for the same sacred 
space. Because the two narratives are incompatible and the two populations are inextricably intertwined, 
any demarcation of the territory on the basis of pure identity is quasi-impossible. Violence and sovereign-
ty, in this case, claim a divine foundation: peoplehood itself is forged by the worship of one deity, and na-
tional identity is imagined as an identity against the Other, other deities. History, geography, cartography, 
and archaeology are supposed to back these claims, thereby closely binding identity and topography.” 
Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture, Duke University Press 15, no. 1 (2003): 27.
27  Ibid., 13-14.
28  Ibid., 30-31.
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of the right to wage war. These laws were anchored in the territorialization of the 
sovereign state. However, within the global colonial order, the world was divided 
into those areas where Jus Publicum was valid, and those parts of the globe that 
were considered open for colonisation.29 In colonial occupations, space was the 
raw material of violent sovereignty, where violent power was made manifest as 
inscriptions of new spatial — and thus social — relations based upon differential 
rights.30 
 Such systems based on differential rights can, according to Mbembe, only 
function in a state of exception: in the colony, judicial orders can be suspended at 
will as a means to serve the coloniser’s interests.31 Whether ‘state of exception’ is 
the most accurate term to describe Israel’s occupation will not be discussed here.32 
However, as set out in the chapter ‘Unplanning’, there is a structural instability in 
the ruling apparatus of occupation produced by interactions between, excesses of, 
and contradictions in, the modes of its control. Gordon does not frame this struc-
tural instability as a state of exception per se, but emphasises the centrality of ex-
ceptions to rules and suspensions of laws as integral to the way the occupation has 
developed towards a ‘politics of death’, thus failing to ‘normalise’. Instability — or 
exceptionality — is a structural dynamic of a system which activates violence. 
 The violence of Israel’s necropolitics is therefore not so much objective vio-
lence as the “catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning” of a system, in 
the particular sense that Žižek defines it. Rather, with a slight alteration, I suggest 
that its violence is the catastrophic consequence of the exceptional ‘unsmoothing’ 
function of a system, or to borrow a term from Ophir, it is a system that produces 
a ‘catastrophisation’ of situations in order to legitimise its own violent acts, sub-
sequently preserving its state of catastrophic exception.33 Necropolitics, I would 
therefore argue, is wilful instability. Through law, exceptionality is made the rule, 
so that it operates simultaneously within the law and outside of the law in order to 
legitimise its acts.
29  Ibid., 23.
30  Ibid., 25.
31  Ibid., 24.
32  Judicially, the OPT is in a state of emergency, cf. the annual renewal of Defence Emergency Regula-
tions. Whether understood as a state of exception or not, the order which the spatial violence of unplan-
ning rests upon is spatially and ethnically differential. Ethnic differentiation is administered primarily by 
citizen-status. While Palestinian Arabs/Christian/Druze/Bedouins in Israel — in principle — have civil 
rights in line with Jewish Israeli citizens, Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and annexed East Jerusalem 
(who only have the right of residence in Jerusalem, but not to citizenship of Israel) are stateless and sub-
ject to military rather than civil law. Ethnic differentiation is reflected in the previously described spatial 
organisation of the OPT as judicially and physically layered. Furthermore, ethnic differentiation has lead 
several commentators to conclude that the label of ‘occupation’ is misleading, arguing that Israel’s control 
over Palestinians can be more accurately described as a system of apartheid and should be recognised as 
such.
33  Ophir.
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 Furthermore, Mbembe argues that the state of exception is maintained by 
a narrative of enmity, which serves as a foundation for the right to kill: “Power 
(and not necessarily state power) continuously refers and appeals to exception, 
emergency, and a fictionalized notion of the enemy (…) which it also labors to pro-
duce.”34 A state of exception ensures a flexibility within the ruling apparatus in or-
der to legitimise violent actions, including assassination, by referring to an omni-
present yet abstract threat that can materialise in unpredictable forms and at any 
moment: the threat of terrorism. The threat against the order — an order which by 
its nature is always in flux — is abstract and potential and so is the enemy.35 Hence, 
the refusal of subjugation in whatever form — violent or otherwise, in public or 
in the everyday — can be framed as terrorism rather than a politically legitimate 
struggle against oppression.
 The Israeli political geographer Merav Amir describes how Israel applies the 
figure of enmity within the political realm.36 Amir argues that the official Israeli 
narrative presents any public political expression against occupation not only as 
a figure of enmity to occupation itself, but more fundamentally as an enemy of the 
state of Israel. When Palestinian resistance to occupation is framed as an existen-
tial threat to Israel, the illusion of a symmetrical conflict is retained, as though 
both parties have the required force — and will — to eliminate the other. Delegit-
imisation of opposition to occupation disables not only acts of resistance, but also 
Palestinian politics. This, according to Amir, is a consistent structural pattern, 
which — using another formulation that refers to death — she conceptualises as 
‘politicide’. Politicide is defined by Amir as an attempt to destroy the capacity, not 
only for resistance, but for Palestinian political aims as a whole: “It is not the ac-
tual means of resistance that Palestinians may deploy that is seen as posing the 
existential threat to the Israeli state, but, rather, the political aspirations that they 
encapsulate.”37 Politicide is, fundamentally, an attempt to destroy the capacity to 
34  Mbembe,  16.
35  The necropolitical figure of the potential enemy can be understood further with the logic of preemp-
tion: in an essay reflecting on ‘the war on terror,’ Brian Massumi argues that contemporary politics of war-
fare have moved from a logic of prevention and deterrence, to one of preemption: “Preemption is when 
the futurity of unspecified threat is affectively held in the present in a perpetual state of potential emer-
gence(y) so that a movement of actualization may be triggered that is not only self-propelling but also 
effectively, indefinitely, ontologically productive, because it works from a virtual cause whose potential no 
single actualization exhausts.” With preemption, the uncertainty of a future threat is not only based in a 
lack of knowledge of the threat; the threat has not even emerged, which means that the threat is potential 
and cannot be specified. Herein, the enemy also appears as potentiality. Brian Massumi, “Potential Politics 
and the Primacy of Preemption,” Theory & Event 10, no. 2 (2007).
36  Merav Amir, “Revisiting Politicide: State Annihilation in Israel/Palestine,” Territory, Politics, Gover-
nance  (2016).
37  Ibid., 28.
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produce a legitimate polity on the Palestinian side by means of the figuration of an 
enemy.
 The figure of the enemy is generated by framing political convictions and 
actions as expressions of hatred, thereby denouncing the legitimacy of political 
resistance. The cruelty of hatred, conceptualised by Balibar as ultrasubjective vi-
olence, through the rhetorical gesture of politicide, is posed paradoxically as an 
accusation of hatred on the part of the other in order to preemptively silence oppo-
sition and critique.38 To consider this figure of the enemy in spatial terms, the sep-
aration barrier again serves as a lucid example: in addition to an explicit creation 
of ethnic differentiation by territorial means, the physical barrier differentiates 
implicitly between who is considered friend and foe.
 Unplanning resides within an order that simultaneously adheres to laws, ex-
ceeds the same laws, and produces new laws; be it in support of the intricate prac-
tices through which land is continually confiscated, the judicial foundation for the 
construction of settlements and the ethnic differentiation that this entails, or the 
various justifications offered for destruction of essential Palestinian infrastruc-
ture. Within this legal and extra-legal sphere, the figure of the enemy is necessary 
in order to motivate an ‘alertness’ to changes of rules and regulations. My conten-
tion is that the violence of the necropolitical order is regulated by the exceptional 
‘unsmoothing’ function of an apparatus that constructs life-worlds subject to the 
power of death: necropower produces continual disruptions to the infrastructure 
of life. This world is not abstract, but takes shape as a territory organised by spatial 
demarcations, dissections and differentiations. Necropolitics is therefore the un-
derlying order, or principle, within which mechanisms of unplanning are installed.
Potential Violence
The ‘politics of death’ of which unplanning is a part does not necessarily lead to the 
death of humans. Its main detrimental effect is that of creating unliveable spaces 
by disrupting the infrastructure of life. As we have seen, unplanning is a form of 
structural violence, often slow, invisible and difficult to recognise as violent, but 
interdependently linked with other violent phenomena in dynamic cycles. Under-
standing Israel’s state of domination as a necropolitical order explicates the logic 
of rule through the structural instability and exceptionality of the law, its legiti-
macy aided by the figure of the enemy.
38  In practice, politicide can be seen at work in the way political gatherings, demonstrations etc. are 
cracked down on and banned with the help of the PA, for example. Resistance to subjugation is, therefore – 
with a slight semantic irony – an existential threat to the necropolitical order itself. Rhetorically, politicide 
is evident in Israel’s harsh repercussions against supporters of the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) 
movement. According to Israel, BDS is not a legitimate political tool against occupation, but an expression 
of anti-Israeli or even anti-semitic sentiment.
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 Yet, how is such a rule by violence mediated and enacted? In ‘The Order of 
Violence’ (2009), Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir argue that the very display of re-
straint from enacting (manifest) violence is characteristic of Israel’s control over 
the Palestinian population.39 To bring this argument into a consideration of the 
necropolitical order would entail that an economy of violence calculated upon the 
actual measures deployed to control people is contained within the order itself. 
In other words, there is an intermediary account in the meting out of violence: a 
calculation between eruption and restraint. In an economy of violence, calculat-
ed upon restriction of the use of manifest violence in order to minimise the use 
of brutal force, manifest violence is seemingly reduced by a display of restraint.40 
39  Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir, “The Order of Violence,” in The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: Anatomy of 
Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, ed. Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni, and Sari Hanafi (New York: 
Zone, 2009).
40  Eyal Weizman deals with a similar problematic in his discussion of the principle of ‘the lesser evil’ 
which informs much of modern warfare, via International Humanitarian Law. Weizman argues that the 
moderation of violence, embedded in laws, is part of its very logic. Eyal Weizman, The Least of All Possible 
Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza (London: Verso, 2011).
Fig. 28: An Israeli watchtower overlooking the Palestinian city of Hebron, home to more than 200,000 Pale-
stinians. Hebron is intensely monitored both from above and by Israeli military on the ground, present to ‘pro-
tect’ the five to eight hundred highly religiously motivated Israeli settlers — many of whom are occupying the 
upper floors of Palestinian houses in Hebron’s Old City. The expansions of Israel’s occupation into the living 
rooms of Palestinians is a particularly wretched example of space that has turned unliveable due to the violence 
of occupation (2014).
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While restraint appears initially as a positive ethical obligation, it may also be an 
amplification of violence in itself. The following is a presentation of Azoualy and 
Ophir’s argument, that through the display of restraint, violence is always present 
as potentiality, and as such, it is an enactment of violence that controls everyday 
life. Further to this, and potentially provocatively, it is proposed that the endemic 
uncertainty engendered by restraint is a form of terrorism of the lived environ-
ment, in line with Sloterdijk’s definition of terrorism.
 As previously discussed, acts of violence can be visible or invisible. Howev-
er, the invisibility of violence is not only a question of structural blurring caused 
by delayed effects or blindness to the ‘dark matter’ of the smooth functioning of 
objective violence. According to Azoulay and Ophir, an act of violence can be in-
visible when it is withheld rather than in eruption.41 ‘Invisibility’, in Azoualy and 
Ophir’s understanding of it, thus refers to a non-eruption. The fine calculation be-
tween an actualisation of violence, and its display as something that is withheld, 
means that violence is always present by way of its potentiality. Withheld violence 
is the presence of violent force whose outbreak is imminent, but not yet manifest, 
where gestures of threat and deterrence replace direct contact with the exposed 
body.42
 Potential violence can be displayed as withheld in various ways. It is clearly 
visible through the presence of armed soldiers that monitor and control the dai-
ly conduct of people. Yet, as has been shown, the organisation of the landscape 
in itself attests to violence: the infrastructure of military outposts, settlements, 
watchtowers, the separation wall, bypass roads and checkpoints speak to a territo-
ry subsumed under military force. Even the destruction of Palestinian homes and 
infrastructure belongs to a logic of restraint, in so far as it targets physical struc-
tures rather than people.
 Israel makes great efforts to display restraint from violence and diminish 
the extent of direct violence to humans. While a display of force relies upon phys-
ical appearances, communicating this display as an act of restraint is a discursive 
practice. According to Azoualy and Ophir, a theatre of withheld violence is played 
out through the activation of a language that euphemistically describes check-
points, targeted eliminations, smart bombs, and legal safety nets as mechanisms 
of restraint, subsequently legitimising their violence.43
 In this theatre of violence, scripted to discern between the injurious harm 
inflicted by withheld and eruptive violence, “the force wielded by the occupation 
41  Azoulay and Ophir, 101.
42  Ibid.
43  Ibid., 104.
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might materialize anywhere, like a deus ex machina.”44 Yet, the point is that the 
deus ex machina of withheld violence does not, by necessity, have to enter the stage 
to play an effective role; it is from its potential materialisation that it derives its po-
tency. Notwithstanding that withheld violence is restraint in relation to its erup-
tion, restraint is not the same as unfulfilled potential: the potential of withheld 
violence is, rather, fulfilled by its very non-eruption.45
 While eruptive violence is short-lived and eliminates other’s actions im-
mediately, exposure of the potentiality of violence — present, but withheld — is 
a means of control in everyday life.46 Every individual is treated as a potential 
threat; an enemy. Withheld violence disciplines and regulates people’s everyday 
behaviour: in the waiting lines at checkpoints, in movement between places, when 
building a house, and so on. Simultaneously, volatile rules and regulations — char-
acteristic of a necropolitical order — make it impossible to internalise rules for 
‘proper’ behaviour. The subject of power is a recipient of instructions for conduct 
(actions structured by actions, cf. Foucault), yet the means for disciplining con-
duct through a bio-political, disciplinary apparatus has been rescinded, as also 
seen with Gordon.47 In effect, since the laws imposed by the necropolitical appara-
tus are unstable, the rules for correct conduct are continuously recoded.
 On the one hand, the instability of instructions for conduct goes some way 
to explaining why violent force has become increasingly necessary for Israel’s rule 
in the OPT, given that instability creates unreliable subjects that cannot internal-
ise rules. On the other hand, this same instability is used to reinforce the legiti-
macy of exceptional rules. Echoing Mbembe’s claim that necropolitical orders can 
only function in a state of exception, Azoulay and Ophir write:
The Occupied Territories are not a legal vacuum. The abuse of life at the hands of the rul-
ing power is not due to some withdrawal of the law, but occurs thanks to a savage pro-
liferation of legalities and illegalities and the creation of an extensive judicial patchwork 
that has no lawfulness of its own and that keeps changing the law itself, the regime’s au-
thorities and immunity, and the subject’s own status before the law. Under such condi-
tions, subjects cannot — and are not supposed to — internalize the law. […] Because the 
rules that the subjects are supposed to follow change rapidly, it is impossible to rely on the 
validity of anything that is not accompanied by withheld violence. No order is worth the 
paper it is written on without the actual presence of the force that can implement it. The 
44  Ibid., 105.
45  Ibid., 129.
46  Ibid., 111.
47  The subject of power as a recipient of instructions for conduct is a formulation taken from Louis Al-
thusser. Ibid., 112.
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regime needs the massive presence of withheld violence in order to announce the rules 
and with them direct and dictate the behavior of its subjects. But the subjects, too, need 
this presence in order to be informed of the rules and to know how to calculate their ev-
eryday moves. In order to know which route to take to work, one must know where the 
checkpoint is placed; in order to decide whether even to bother going to work, one must 
know whether or not a curfew has been imposed during the nights — and thus on and on, 
with every activity in every aspects of life.48
Confronted with ever-changing laws and regulations, Palestinians are unable to 
internalise rules of conduct, but rather are guided by the gestures entailed by the 
presence of withheld violence. Recalling the characterisation of Palestinian spa-
tial practices in the first chapter, Azoulay and Ophir’s analysis further clarifies 
why situational manoeuvring can be said to be a pre-condition for the conduct of 
life under occupation, be it quotidian or in resistance. In their words, “it is impos-
sible to formulate as a rule, what appears ad hoc, sporadically, except the rule of 
hopeless arbitrariness itself, of violence that might emerge at any moment, any-
where.”49 
 According to Azoulay and Ophir, withheld violence is legitimised as vio-
lence-preventing violence in the name of security; the answer to the threat of 
Palestinian terrorism ever present in the Israeli imagination.50 This imagination 
is not without basis, however, informed as it is by a historical trajectory of politi-
cally motivated (manifest) instances of Palestinian violence enacted both within 
and exterior to Israel. These violent instances have been felt deeply by the Israeli 
population; from major attacks like the Munich Olympics massacre in 1972, sever-
al airplane hijackings, hostage takings, and the suicide bombings frequent at the 
end of the First Intifada, to rockets from Gaza or ‘lone-wolf’ attacks in the West 
Bank settlements and inside Israel in more recent years. The fact that the victims 
of these attacks are often civilians in crowded, public places, and the attacks do 
not discern between combatant and civilian, and are thus upon Israeli life as a 
whole, contributes to widespread fear of the potentiality of terrorist attacks from 
Palestinian side. This fear has formed Israeli policy, the installation of securitised 
architecture, as well as people’s daily practices in public space.
 Though different from the kind of terrorism conducted by Palestinians (or 
from other terrorist attacks carried out in other parts of the world), the deploy-
ment of potential violence is, I would argue, related to the socio-psychological 
48  Ibid., 114.
49  Ibid., 116.
50  Ibid., 119, 22.
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effects of terrorism, in that it regulates behaviour by engendering endemic inse-
curity. Recalling Sloterdijk’s proposition that terrorism is an “exploration of the 
environment from the perspective of its destructibility” that “exploits the fact 
that ordinary inhabitants have a user relationship to their environment”, potential 
violence is as a form of terrorism of the lived environment. Sanctioned by a state, 
the deus ex machina of Israel’s potential violence, associated with the display of 
restraint, saturates the lived environment through its unpredictability. Differing 
from common understandings of terrorism as instances of manifest violence, po-
tential violence is displayed through restraint rather than eruption, yet the effect 
of presence through omnipresent potentiality is shared by both.
 Potential violence, I contend, should therefore be considered as a form of 
state-sanctioned terrorism.51 To be clear, this is neither an underestimation of, nor 
an excuse for, the cruelty of Palestinian terrorism or the violent discourse of wag-
ing ‘holy war’, so often invoked in relation to Haram al’Sharif, for instance. Rath-
er, I wish to direct attention to the fact that the economy of Israel’s calculations 
and practices of violence contribute to a production of endemic uncertainty in ev-
eryday life through the unpredictability of rules and their enforcement, as well as 
augmenting violence in a dynamic relationship with Palestinian refusal of submis-
sion, whether this refusal is violent or not.
 Through potentiality, violence becomes omnipresent and unpredictable: 
threatened but not necessarily actualised, legitimised by a language of restraint, 
and accompanied by rules and regulations for everyday life that are constantly 
changing. Ever-present potentiality of violence is a characteristic feature of the 
necropower of Israel’s occupation, orchestrated and strategically deployed to con-
trol the lived environment of the enemy. 
Unliveability
The violence of unplanning is a degradation of the conditions of possibility for life 
rather than a total obliteration of life. Space is utilised as a weapon that most of 
all harms humans through the proxy of their lived environment. Herein, the con-
struction of a death-world, to follow Mbembe, configures the space within which 
one is destined to live (or escape), and not necessarily the space of bodily death. 
51  Not all forms of Israeli violence against Palestinians are sanctioned by the state. Settler violence — 
with an increase in incidents over the last decade — is not authorised yet in practice often allowed by way 
of the impunity enjoyed by many settlers during or following attacks against Palestinians and/or Palestin-
ian property. Furthermore, as Israeli citizens, settlers are protected by Israeli soldiers, and the Palestinian 
police is not allowed to interfere in cases of settler violence. Although the topic of settler violence is highly 
relevant for a discussion of its impact on Palestinians’ daily lives, as well as the dynamic between regula-
tions and excess of violence in a state of exception, it will not be elaborated further here. Human rights 
groups like B’Tselem as well as UN OCHA monitor settler violence.
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Azoulay and Ophir evoke the conditions of this weaponised habitat, citing the Is-
raeli journalist Amira Hass:
Most cases of destruction in the Occupied Territories —  the razing and blasting of build-
ings, the digging of trenches, the laying of obstacles, the sealing of wells, everything that 
Amira Hass has called ‘weapons of light construction,’ which have totally changed the 
Palestinian habitat — all of them are not a result of an uncontrolled eruption of direct vio-
lence in response to resistance, but rather an outcome of the calculated use of tools meant 
to damage buildings, objects, and space without directly affecting humans. The harm to 
humans is a byproduct of using these tools, but usually not its direct purpose. The ratio-
nale behind such harm is demographic: separating, assembling, and compressing popula-
tions, which at times includes transferring individuals or relatively small groups in what 
human rights groups have called ‘quiet transfer.’52
The violence of ‘weapons of light construction’ is a constitutive part of the archi-
tecture and geography of Israel and Palestine, writing itself into the landscape and 
built environment. As Azoulay and Ophir assert, the purpose is demographic: a 
quest for control over territory that disregards its inhabitants. Yet clearly, since ‘a 
land without a people’ is evidently a false premise given that Palestinians are pres-
ent, the desire — be it messianic or militarily strategic — for an Israeli controlled 
West Bank without Palestinians can only be fulfilled through the construction of 
a reality in which the premise becomes true. The Naksa of 1967 instigated an on-
going process that simultaneously seeks to control and eviscerate the population 
through the creation of unliveable spaces.53 Sometimes, this results in displace-
ment; at other times the result is ‘displacement without moving’.54
  Unplanning is violent attrition; a wearing out of space. It is a form of struc-
tural violence embedded in the protocols of planning laws and amplified by use of 
52  Azoulay and Ophir, 119.
53  The remaining Palestinian communities in Israel in the aftermath of the 1948 war — in Palestinian 
discourse the Nakba, meaning ‘catastrophe’ — faced similar unplanning processes as those applied to the 
OPT.
54  Commonly accepted estimations of Palestinian displacement count more than 700,000 during the 
first Arab-Israeli War in 1948, and 300,000 as a result of the second war in 1967. Figures for recent displace-
ment are harder to find, however, as no organisations systematically monitor the number of IDP’s in the 
OPT. According to the organisation Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), combining figures 
from UNRWA, Badil, ICAHD, UN OCHA, and B’Tselem, as of 2015 there are more than 260,000 internally 
displaced people in the West Bank and Gaza. The numbers include refugees from 1967, as well as displace-
ment caused by the recent wars in Gaza. Using OCHA figures, IDMC lists 5,775 West Bank and East Jeru-
salem Palestinians as being internally displaced as a consequence of evictions and demolitions between 
2009 and 2015. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Palestine IDP Figures Analysis,”  http://www.
internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/palestine/figures-analysis. Last access 5.8.2017
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force. It is a territorialising practice that creates unliveable spaces, not by making 
the environment toxic or otherwise directly lethal, but through the creation of a 
legal and physical sphere of obstacles: by blocking rights to land, creating struc-
tures hostile to Palestinian development, and eliminating the support for life pro-
vided by — at the most basic level — the shelter of a house.
 Spatial practices that seek to resist unplanning must navigate the violent 
means and effects of the necropolitical order to which they are immanent on a 
daily basis. Within a necropolitical order, lived space is undermined and muted, 
destroying the cohesion required for life to be organised. Unliveable spaces are 
spaces where the continuous disruption of infrastructure renders freedom to live 
and develop, and resistance to subjection almost impossible. The unliveable space 
is an environment recoded continually by the destruction, disruption and discon-
nection of infrastructures, rather than through a strengthening of the infrastruc-
ture of life. This is not a total obliteration, but rather a constant disturbance that 
exhausts conditions of possibility for life to be lived.
Fig. 29: Hebron, Old City. Israeli watchtower on top of a Palestinian house, monitoring the street (2014).
Fig. 30: Hebron, Old City (2014).
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Fig. 31: Al-Shuhada Street used to be a thriving Palestinian commercial street, but is now closed for Pale-
stinian. Hebron’s Old City has become a ’ghost-town’ due to settlers and closures, disrupting life for the city’s 
Palestinian population (2014).
Fig. 32: Al-Shuhada Street (2014). 
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CHAPTER V
TIME MATTERS1
Stagnation, along with such terms as impasse, standstill and deadlock, have be-
come temporal axioms commonly used to express the political intractability of the 
Israel-Palestine conflict. The oft-heard juridical oxymoron ‘indefinite occupation’ 
explicates the illegality of the occupation, while the temporal oxymoron ‘perma-
nent temporariness’ describes a propensity for retention of unresolved matters. 
Time is inevitably of importance in different ways.
 The protracted temporal scope contained in the notion of indefinite occupa-
tion points to the illegality of the occupation. Moreover, as shown in chapters III 
and IV, Defence Emergency Regulations have been continually renewed, thus by 
1  The case of mud brick building in the Jordan Valley was presented in embryonic form in Runa Jo-
hannessen, “Mud Brick Resilience,” Dear…Magazine, 2, 2012. and in  and in a brief version in “At Bygge 
under Besættelse,” Arkitekten, 6, 2016.
Fig. 33: Fasayil village in Jordan Valley, Area C (2011).
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repetition perpetuating a time of constant exceptionality. From a legal perspec-
tive, the perpetuation of the belligerent occupation — the longest in modern his-
tory — represents a problem to Israel. According to the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(GV 4), occupation is only a temporary situation. The provisions provided by Inter-
national Humanitarian Law (IHL)are thus guided by the principle of limiting the 
impact of the occupying power on the occupied territory. However, as explained in 
chapter III, Israel rejects the application of GV 4 and thus, by implication, the term 
‘occupation’ itself, claiming instead that the territories are ‘disputed’, a situation 
which would consequently absolve Israel from its duties as occupying power. From 
another perspective, the protraction of the occupation calls for consideration as 
to whether indeed it still makes sense to classify Israel’s rule over Palestinians as 
‘occupation’, or if a new legal and conceptual vocabulary to describe Israel’s re-
gime of colonisation and ethnic differentiation is required. Nevertheless, GV 4 is 
commonly accepted as applicable, and thus the clearly non-temporary occupation 
can be considered indefinite and unlawful.
 Furthermore, as already demonstrated in chapter II on the Mughrabi Bridge 
controversy, the temporal oxymoron ‘permanent temporariness’ denotes the pro-
pensity of temporary solutions to decelerate into permanence, seen in the per-
petuation of ‘provisional’ arrangements such as the Palestinian refugee camps, 
Israeli settlements, or the separation barrier. However, permanent temporariness 
also denotes the logic of the occupation as a whole. Weizman, citing Azoualy and 
Ophir, writes for instance that “the entire logic of the military rule in the West 
bank and Gaza relies on the principle of ‘temporariness’ … it is the dry definition 
of the ‘temporariness’ of the state of conflict that allows it to continue indefinite-
ly.”2 Similarly, Richard Falk, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
in the OPT, commenting on the temporal paradox in a report in 2010: “After more 
than four decades, it is appropriate to conclude that Israel’s occupation of Pales-
tinian territories has ceased to be temporary, and acknowledge that it has become 
tantamount to permanent.”3 Permanence thus denotes stagnation and blocked 
horizons rather than resolution and confines the Palestinian political project. The 
urban theorist Nasser Abourahme, for instance, argues that the state-building 
project of Palestine bypasses decolonisation: it is “trapped, seemingly perpetual-
ly, between the (endless) colonial present and the (deferred) postcolonial future…. 
Statehood becomes not a vanishing point but a repetitive false threshold.”4 Stag-
2  Eyal Weizman, Hollow land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London; New York: Verso, 2007), 104.
3  Richard Falk, “Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967,” (2010).
4  Nasser Abourahme, “The Productive Ambivalences of Post-Revolutionary Time: Discourse, Aesthet-
ics, and the Political Subject of the Palestinian Present,” in Time, Temporality and Violence in International 
Relations, ed. Anna M. Agathangelou and Kyle D. Killian (Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2016), 151.
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nation, in this view, is indicative not only of an occupation that seems to never end, 
but also an illusion of the state’s becoming.
 Repeated failed negotiations function as reminders of what appear to be a 
blocked horizon, while “time is running out for a two-state solution”, as Yasser 
Arafat stated back in 2004, when it had become painfully clear that the ‘interim’ 
arrangement provided by the Oslo Agreements had solidified and would not lead 
to Palestinian self-determination.5 ‘Running out of time’ is certainly an expres-
sion and warning frequently repeated by political commentators on the conflict, 
observing that the present realities on the ground counteract the realisation of 
a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel. Backstage to political negotiations at 
a standstill, daily practices and decisions on the ground reconfigure the physical 
landscape. While stagnation defines the political management of the conflict, ter-
ritorialisation by means of unplanning redefines present realities and future pros-
pects. Israel has succeeded in a forceful making of history through the constant 
creation of ‘facts on the ground’, the common term referring to Israeli settlements 
built on occupied land in order to obtain permanent footholds. The expansion of 
the settlements eats its way into the West Bank to create new territories. On the 
contrary, unplanning by means of destruction or restriction of Palestinian devel-
opment effects the gradual erosion of Palestinian presence by obstructing Pales-
tinian ‘facts on the ground’, and engenders a fragmented territory of discontin-
uous space/time relations. An ominous sense of effluxion is conjured when the 
shrinkage of Palestinian space and the growth of Israeli space are observed in par-
allel.
 Inevitably, history is in the making and takes place despite the absence of a 
consensus for how and at what cost to make this history. After more than a century 
of conflict and fifty years of occupation, it cannot be overlooked that temporal par-
adoxes have not only occurred, but been exploited through their spatial manifes-
tations. The temporality of the conflict is not only a question of its long duration 
or an impasse in negotiations, but also of the political instrumentalisation of time. 
In their very material presence, built structures demonstrate how ‘time matters’. 
While time advances, material changes on the ground affect political, ideological 
and cultural, as well as judicial conceptions of how to deal with the fundamental 
problem of the conflict: to whom the right to a future in this land should apply. 
 The task of this chapter is to explore time as intrinsic to matter in relation to 
a number of responses to Israel’s unplanning policies in the Jordan Valley, with a 
special focus on cycles of destruction and (re)construction. The chapter presents 
two actors who work to alleviate the exhaustion of Palestinian possibilities for 
5  Arafat’s statement appeared in a newspaper interview, see Seumas Milne, “Too Late for Two States? 
Part II,” The Guardian, 23.1.2004.
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maintaining a presence in the Jordan Valley through building, yet whose respons-
es are distinguished by their approach to the temporality of their interventions. 
The first actor is a humanitarian NGO that provides a pre-ninety days emergen-
cy response to house demolitions by building temporary shelters without a solid 
foundation. In the frequent cycle of destruction and reconstruction, the NGO at-
tempts to buy time within the legal system and extend the intervals between dem-
olitions by tactical relocation of shelters. The second actor is a local grassroots 
organisation, Jordan Valley Solidarity, which has resumed the traditional method 
of building solid houses with mud bricks as a ‘sustainable’ practice. Yet, choosing 
mud bricks as a building material exceeds the conventional understanding of sus-
tainability as a system-preserving endeavour: it is informed by an anticipation of 
the destruction of the house, in which case the rubble cyclically becomes building 
material once again, thereby materially incorporating the building’s potential ‘fu-
ture ruin’ into the building scheme. Although the actors’ spatial practices differ, 
I hold that their situational spatial practices concern not only their institution — 
how they are performed in a praxis-dimension — but demonstrate that the situa-
tional is also a question of material embeddedness. To introduce this idea, I will 
provide a brief overview of the Jordan Valley’s status for Israel, its demography 
and figures on the extent of demolitions. I will then portray the interventions by 
the two actors. Finally, I will resume the topic of ‘time matters’ through a delib-
eration on Judith Butler’s notion of ‘killing time’ as a collapse of temporality, and 
suggest that the struggle against retention seen in the actors’ spatial practices is 
a struggle against ‘the killing of time’ and an attempt to bring time to life through 
matter.
The Jordan Valley
Since the inception of Israeli control over the area in 1967, the Jordan Valley has 
been of vital military importance due to its strategic location on the border with 
Jordan. The geographical area of the Jordan Valley, covering 1,612 square kilome-
tres (28 percent of the West Bank), is situated along the western border of the Jor-
dan River and extends from the Green Line in the north to the southern part of 
the Dead Sea, four hundred metres below sea level. Over the years, Israeli civilian 
and military presence has impounded both the land and its resources, which has 
rendered — through various regulations — 94 percent of the Jordan Valley virtual-
ly inaccessible for Palestinian development. House demolitions in this part of the 
West Bank are particularly extensive.
 When the Arab-Israeli War of 1947-49 forced more than 700,000 people to 
leave the areas that were to become Israel, a large number of those who fled found 
their way to the Jordan Valley where they settled in refugee camps and new com-
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munities of displaced Bedouin tribes.6 The war in 1967 produced a second wave 
of refugees, this time not to, but from the Jordan Valley. The demolition of villag-
es and camps was an effective means to prompt people to flee. For instance, the 
villages of Jiftlik, Agarith and Huseirat were levelled by the Israeli military and 
the refugee camps Aqabat Jaber and Ein as-Sultan were almost entirely emptied.7 
Though it is difficult to obtain precise numbers for the size of the Palestinian pop-
ulation in the valley prior to the occupation (estimates vary between 50,000 and 
320,000), as well as for how many fled, there is little disagreement that the 1967 
War led to considerable displacement of the Valley’s Palestinian residents.8 Today 
6  Figures on how many Palestinians fled from the Israeli captured territory in 1947-49 are contested. Is-
raeli historian Benny Morris’ recounts disputes concerning these numbers, varying between 900,000 and 
520,000. Morris’ estimate is 700,000. See Benny Morris, The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem, 1947-
1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 602-4. Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi estimates 
that 744,000 Palestinians fled during hostilities under the war. See Walid Khalidi, All that remains: the Pal-
estinian villages occupied and depopulated by Israel in 1948 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 
1992).
7  Allan Gerson, Israel, the West Bank and International Law (London; Totowa, N.J.: F. Cass, 1978), 162.
8  For instance, according to a B’Tselem report, between 50,000 and 200,000 refugees from the 1948 War 
fled from Jordan Valley to Jordan in 1967. See Eyal Hareuveni, “Dispossession and Exploitation: Israel’s 
Policy in the Jordan Valley and Northern Dead Sea,” ed. Yael Stein (B’tselem, 2011). Israeli geographer Eli-
sha Efrat gives an estimate of 80,000 Palestinians living in the valley prior to occupation. See Elisha Efrat, 
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Fig. 34: Jordan Valley’s location in the West Bank.
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there are around 60,000 Palestinians living in the Jordan Valley, most of whom 
live in the city of Jericho and its surrounding villages, located in Area A and B, six 
percent of the valley’s area. 15,000 Palestinians, of whom around 8,000 are Bed-
ouins, live in dozens of small communities in Area C.9 
 The Jordan Valley’s climate is warm and dry, water resources are generous, 
and the soil is fertile. During the years under Jordanian rule from 1949-67, the Jor-
dan Valley became an important agricultural area, providing goods for the whole 
West Bank region, yet with the inception of the occupation agricultural industries 
halted. Partially due to its resources, the valley is still considered a strategic Pales-
tinian priority today.10 Likewise, abundant natural resources were a key reason for 
Israel to establish settlements in the area shortly after the territories were occu-
pied. Today there are thirty-seven Israeli settlements in the Valley, most of them 
agricultural settlements, with municipal areas covering a total of 191 square kilo-
metres. The greater part of settlement land is allocated for farming, and the settler 
population amounts to only 9,500, a fairly small number considering the extensive 
area under settlement control.11
 However, the most important reason for the maintenance of Israeli control 
over the Jordan Valley is not the use of its natural resources, but rather the military 
significance of its location. In the early years of the occupation Israel was vulner-
able to terrorist attacks by Palestinian fedayeen (‘freedom fighters’) located on the 
Jordanian side of the valley.12 Only a month after Israel occupied the West Bank, 
the Israeli Minister of Labour, Yigal Allon, submitted his proposal for partition of 
the territories. The Allon Plan marked the Jordan River as the border of the State 
Geography and Politics in Israel Since 1967 (London, England; Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1988), 47. In an EU 
report on Area C, the population is estimated to have been between 100,000 and 320,000 before 1967. See 
EU Representative’s Office Jerusalem, “A2. European Union, Internal Report on Area C and Palestinian 
State Building; Brussels, January 2012 (excerpts),” Journal of Palestine Studies 41, no. 3 (2012).
9  The geographical area of Jordan Valley is smaller than but within the Palestinian Governorates of Tu-
bas and Jericho & Al Aghwar, the two most sparsely populated governorates in the West Bank. For figures, 
see Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Estimated Population in the Palestinian Territory Mid-Year 
by Governorate,1997-2016,” (www.pcbs.gov.ps). For more on the demographic composition of the valley, 
see for instance UN OCHA oPt, “OHCA Humanitarian Atlas,” (Jerusalem2012). and MA’AN Development 
Center & Jordan Valley Popular Committees, “Eye on the Jordan Valley,” (Ramallah2010).
10  PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, “The Jordan Valley: A Microcosm of the Israeli Occupation 
(Factsheet),” (2011).
11  While the size of the Israeli population might be appropriate for the purpose of farming, it is low if con-
sidered a means to make compelling arguments for land claims based on civilian presence. In 2014, know-
ing that this was the case, the Jordan Valley Regional Council for settlements embarked on a campaign to 
triple the settlement population to ensure that the settlements would not be handed over to Palestinians 
in an eventual peace deal with a final solution for two states. Tovah Lazaroff, “Jordan Valley announces 10-
year plan to triple population,” Jerusalem Post, 09.05.2014.
12  Palestinian armed resistance grew on Jordanian soil, finally leading to the 1970-71 conflict between 
Jordanian Armed Forces and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, known as Black September.
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of Israel and stipulated that the whole Jordan Valley be annexed to serve as a buf-
fer zone between Israel and Jordan. According to the Allon Plan, the settlements 
were to be “permanent advance-position lookouts that would avoid having to call 
up military forces and could not only alert the military to a sudden attack by the 
enemy, but also attempt to halt, or at least delay, the enemy’s advance until mili-
tary forces could control the situation.”13 Though the plan was never fully adopted, 
it has been paramount for Israel’s strategic approach to the Jordan Valley, which 
combines military and civilian presence as a means of control. Subsequent Israeli 
governments have continued the same policy, holding the military need for con-
trol over the Jordan Valley as imperative and consequently refusing withdrawal 
from the area14 
 Israel’s military interest in Jordan Valley is reflected in the way the territory 
is zoned and administered in accordance with the Oslo Agreements. Two percent 
is Area A, four percent is Area B, eighty-seven percent is Area C, and the remain-
ing seven percent is allocated as Palestinian Nature Reserve according to the Wye 
River Memorandum from 1998, but remains inaccessible to the Palestinian Au-
thorities. Within Area C, fifty-six percent is declared military and firing areas, and 
the settlements occupy fifteen percent. In total, ninety-four percent of the Jordan 
Valley area is out of reach for Palestinians.15
 Palestinians settled in Area C are herders, semi-nomadic Bedouins or fel-
laheen (farmers) in the majority, yet many work in the Israeli agricultural settle-
ments given that herding and farming are livelihoods difficult to sustain when 
area restrictions make agricultural lands off-limits. Some communities in areas 
now defined as Area C existed prior to the 1967 war, with some established in the 
aftermath of the 1947-49 war as a result of the huge influx of refugees. Communi-
13  Quoted from Hareuveni,  5.
14  Under the 2014 Peace Talks, the strategic relevance of Jordan Valley was thoroughly discussed, and US 
Secretary of State John Kerry and US Security Adviser General John Allen draw up a proposal for Israeli 
withdrawal from the West Bank, including the Jordan Valley. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s re-
sponse to the proposal was that, “there cannot be a situation, under any agreement, in which we relinquish 
security control of the territory west of the Jordan River.” See Times of Israel, “Netanyahu: Gaza Conflict 
proves Israel can’t Relinquish Control of West Bank,” Times of Israel, 11.7.2014. Whether maintaining secu-
rity control by necessity also entails Israeli civilian presence is not clear; however, this view had recently 
been expressed unambiguously by Minister of Defence Moshe Ya’alon in his comment on a bill to annex 
the area, stating that he opposed the dismantling of settlements in Jordan Valley since “a civilian pres-
ence was critical to the viability of maintaining security control.” “Likud MK’s bill would annex the Jor-
dan Valley,” The Times of Israel, 26.12.2013. Opposing views were also reported on the matter: according to 
three former IDF generals, Israel can gradually relinquish control over Jordan Valley as the conventional 
threat of an invading army is no longer present, stating that the Jordan Valley is “an artificial strategic asset” 
for Israel. See Yaakov Lappin, “Israel can risk leaving Jordan Valley, ex-generals tell ‘Post,” Jerusalem Post, 
14.1.2014.
15  UN OCHA oPt, “Humanitarian Fact Sheet on the Jordan Valley and Dead Sea Area,” (2012).
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Fig. 36: Israeli military demolishes a structure in Fasayil in the early morning hours (2013). Image credit: 
Jordan Valley Solidarity.
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ties in Area C struggle to maintain a living, facing the most severe effects of un-
planning. Destruction of houses and infrastructure, poor access to water and elec-
tricity, and restrictions on movement acutely degrade living conditions, creating 
an environment of unliveability. They are caught between violent Israeli practices 
that work to minimise Palestinian presence, and the legal and political inability of 
the Palestinian Authority and NGOs to assist and develop Palestinian localities in 
Area C.16
 Since 2000 there has been a steady increase in house demolitions through-
out the West Bank. According to Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions 
(ICAHD), which monitors demolitions, thirty-two to thirty-six percent of all dem-
olitions in Area C take place in the Jordan Valley.17 Between 2000 and 2016, around 
two thousand structures were demolished and thousands of people have been left 
homeless.18 Beyond actual destruction of houses, most people living in Area C are 
affected by house demolitions by virtue of over 12,000 pending demolition orders 
issued by the Israeli authorities.19
Buying Time: Humanitarian NGO
As a general procedure in the aftermath of house demolitions in the Jordan Val-
ley, a number of humanitarian organisations located in the West Bank are called 
upon to provide assistance to those affected by the demolition. This assistance is 
carried out in two steps: firstly, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) and organisations such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) go to the site to carry out a primary assessment, and will often also 
16  67 outline plans for Palestinian communities in Area C have been prepared by the Palestinian Author-
ity in partnership with affected communities and submitted to the Israeli Civil Administration, yet only 
0.02 percent of Area C has been endorsed by the ICA according to this UN report: “Under Threat: Demo-
lition Orders in Area C of the West Bank,” (2015).
17  Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, “Jordan Valley Matrix of Control: The Path to Annex-
ation - 2011 Fact Sheet,” (ICAHD, 2011).
18  Demolition figures for the period 2000-16 are based on numbers retrieved from MA’AN Develop-
ment Center & Jordan Valley Popular Committees. UN OCHA oPt, “The Humanitarian Monitor,” (2007). 
“Lack of Permit! Demolitions and Resultant Displacement in Area C,” in OCHA Special Focus (2008). “The 
Humanitarian Monitor,” (2009). Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions. UN OCHA oPt, “Occu-
pied Palestinian territory: Israeli demolitions of Palestinian property in Jordan Valley, 2013,” (2014). UN, 
“Demolitions, Displacements in West Bank ‘Must Stop Immediately,’ Urges UN Envoy,” UN NEWS Centre, 
23.1.2015. B’Tselem, “2016 Sees Israel Demolish Record Number of West Bank Homes,”  http://www.bt-
selem.org/planning_and_building/20170213_2016_demolitions. Last access 12.8.2017. The exact number 
of people left homeless or displaced in the Jordan Valley is difficult to obtain. B’Tselem reports that during 
the last decade, 5,830 people in West Bank Area C were left homeless as a result of demolitions. “Statistics 
on demolition of houses built without permits in the West Bank (Not including East Jerusalem),”  http://
www.btselem.org/planning_and_building/statistics. Last access 12.8.2017
19  Israeli Civil Administration, “Israeli Demolition Orders against Palestinain Structures in Area C, 1988-
2016,” ed. UN OCHA oPt (2016).
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Fig. 37: Demolished concrete house, Fasayil (2014).
Fig. 38: Demolished animal shelter, Fasayil (2014).
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Fig. 39: Sealed doors and windows. Construction of the house halted after the owner received a stop-work 
order. Fasayil (2014).
Fig. 40: Container shelters, EU donation. Unsuitable for the extreme temperatures in the Jordan Valley, the 
shelters are not used for inhabitation, but rather for sanitary purposes. Solar panels provide electricity. Pale-
stinians are not allowed to have their own water wells, and have to buy water from the Israeli water company 
Mekorot. The black water tank (ubiquitous in the West Bank) is filled once a week. Fasayil (2014).
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provide emergency kits and temporary tents for the first three days. Meanwhile, 
other organisations carry out further assessment to prepare the second step of the 
emergency response, which is to provide shelter suitable for the following three 
months. The secondary response is provided within approximately one week. 
Though emergency aid to populations and individuals in distress is regulated by 
IHL, and Israel is liable not to impede such aid being provided, Israeli military 
obstruction of the work of these organisations is a regular occurrence, especial-
ly with regard to the construction of shelter. For this reason, emergency shelter 
assistance is a delicate issue, and the organisations involved must tread lightly in 
order to be able to deliver it.
 During an interview which I conducted with a project manager of an inter-
national NGO, one of the few humanitarian organisations to carry out secondary 
response to house demolitions in Jordan Valley’s Area C, the necessity of abiding 
to a strict definition of the temporal scope of assistance appeared as a matter of im-
mense legal importance to the organisation’s ability to intervene.20 Legality here 
refers to IHL, as Israel proscribes the delivery of shelter. This has to be understood 
in conjunction with the judicial basis for conducting house demolitions, previous-
ly elaborated in chapter III: whether for administrative or military reasons, Pales-
tinian built structures in Area C are demolished because they are considered ille-
gal by Israel, i.e. they lack a building permit, which is unobtainable due to zoning 
regulations. The immediate consequence of unplanning on emergency responses, 
to which the NGO complies, is that permanent buildings are not allowed. In order 
not to infringe on Israel’s control over planning issues in Area C, as stipulated by 
the Oslo Agreements, a response to demolition must be considered temporary. In 
order for the demolition response to be considered temporary emergency assis-
tance as defined by IHL, which Israel respects in theory, the response should not 
exceed the scope of ninety days, after which it is considered ‘development’ aid as 
opposed to ‘emergency’ aid. For the sake of clarity, while humanitarian organisa-
tions consider shelter to be a basic need in an emergency situation, Israel rejects 
this ‘interpretation’ of emergency and proscribes the delivery of tents.
 On my question to the project manager of the NGO about whether their 
work in some way is related to planning, the project manager explains that it is not. 
They build without permits, yet it in correspondence with what has been demol-
ished:
20  The NGO requested not to be identified by name due to the sensitivity of their work. For the full in-
terview — from which information about the NGO’s work was retrieved — see NGO Project Manager, 
interview by Runa Johannessen, 2017, This Thesis
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No, our work is not master planning. We actually build without permits… Through the 
kind of humanitarian work that we are conducting, we are not required to ask for permits. 
This is one of the humanitarian laws that we are following. But sadly, Israel on the other 
side, is not following these same laws. So sometimes the structures we build get demol-
ished, also the tents. We have had stop working orders and demolition orders — struc-
tures that were funded by international donors. What we normally do, is that we build ex-
actly what was demolished. If it was one shelter, we give one shelter, if it was two shelters, 
we give two shelters, and so on.21
The NGO is careful to stress that they provide a pre-ninety days response, and 
that they only provide substitution for what has been lost. However, in the cycle of 
demolition and reconstruction, the substitution of buildings does not take place in 
a 1:1 correlation. According to the project manager, the funding provided to rebuild 
demolished structures is insufficient for a full recovery of all shelters and animal 
sheds. In consequence, Palestinian inhabitation of Area C is gradually shrinking 
for each round of demolition.22
 Whether the response can be considered emergency aid or development aid 
is a distinction that is determined — inter alia — by the material qualities and thus 
durability of the shelter. To ensure that the shelter is not within the scope of de-
velopment, which could subsequently be interpreted as a ‘fact on the ground’, the 
structures the NGO provides must be light and without a solid foundation. The 
tent is evidently a typology of shelter that meets this demand. The NGO has tried 
to improve the quality of the tent, as well as find ways to support or substitute ad-
ditional services that are destroyed with the house, for instance through the clev-
er use of solar energy.23 However, since Israel exempts tents from the category of 
emergency supplies, construction of tents is often obstructed. Such obstruction 
is enacted by confiscation or destruction of materials, or through the issue of im-
mediate stop-work orders to NGO personnel if they are caught during the process 
of building before the roof is constructed. After the roof is constructed, new laws 
are activated, and an issued demolition order is required. For this reason, the NGO 
often builds during the night or on Jewish holidays, when military presence and 
monitoring are potentially less intense. Materials for the tents are unloaded at dif-
ferent locations in more secure areas, after which they are collected and distribut-
21  Ibid.
22  Ibid.
23  Ibid. It should also be noted that although many of the beneficiaries are Bedouins who were tradi-
tionally nomadic and lived in tents, it would be a mistake to think that the emergency tents are adequate 
compensation: traditional tents were made of camel wool, suitable for the climate, while new tents are 
made from plastic or tarpaulin.
148
ed by donkey or other small scale means of transportation. The project manager 
summarises the procedure in this way:
Normally we do not have our own trucks that go directly to the location, as our materials 
have been confiscated several times. We normally drop it in a safe area, and people come 
with their donkeys, or what they have, to collect the material. Most of the time we build 
during the night. The law says that if the building is finished, you cannot send a stop-work-
ing order, and if you want to send a demolition order, you need a court order to do that. 
You go through the whole process, and sometimes it takes up to two years. But if the ICA 
[Israel’s Civil Administration] come while you are building, they can issue a direct stop 
working order on the site, and they might even demolish the structure immediately.
The structures we build during the night are simple, almost like LEGO. You install the 
basis immediately, then you install the arches and the tent. In total, it takes three to four 
hours. We build different kinds of structures. We have tents, in size approximately twenty 
square meters, where the structure is made of steel and the covers of PVC. We also have 
metal sheds. We mainly give this to make animal shelters, or if the family was living in a 
concrete house. But either way we are talking about the same technique, with steel beams 
that can be fixed to the ground immediately, and metal sheets for covering. Fifty square 
meters will take you six to seven hours to build.24 
Taking great care not to be discovered during the process of building is not the 
only tactical consideration, however. The risk of immediate demolition is also 
dealt with by relocation of the new shelter. If the site allows for it, the new shelter 
is erected at least one hundred metres from the site of the demolished structure. 
This reasoning derives from the fact that the initial demolition order is based on 
a GPS coordinate, the project manager explains: “When you have a demolition or-
der, you have GPS coordinates for each structure that they [Israel] want to demol-
ish. That is the reason why we ask people to move one hundred meters, because 
you would then change the GPS coordinates. And then you would need another 
demolition order, which will take more time…”25 By relocating on the ground ac-
cording to the GPS grid, the NGO thus attempts to ‘buy time’ in the legal bureau-
cracy, since a new order for demolition must be issued by Israeli authorities for a 
new coordinate.
 ‘Buying time’ is inevitably a method of deferral that aims to increase the in-
tervals between demolitions taking place: yet relocation has the obvious spatial 
24  Ibid.
25  Ibid.
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limitation of a dependency on available coordinates without a pending demolition 
order. If there is a large cluster of tents or shelters that have been demolished, relo-
cation is not an option. Moreover, many families have seen their shelters destroyed 
three or more times: after several demolitions, possibilities for relocation are de-
pleted by the densification of demolition orders associated with adjacent coordi-
nates.26 
 The NGO’s response is a spatial practice that attempts to bypass Israeli re-
strictions by remaining subtly within the legal confines that direct the implemen-
tation of humanitarian emergency assistance, while exploiting the temporal and 
spatial zones of indistinction that make reconstruction a means of assisting peo-
ple to stay in place. However, as efforts to carry out this assistance are continually 
impeded by Israel, there are few organisations involved in aiding families in Area 
C. In 2014, the recurrent confiscation and obstruction of material supplies for aid 
even caused ICRC to suspend their provision of shelters in the Jordan Valley, re-
ducing their assistance to emergency kits of kitchen utensils, sanitary items, blan-
kets and sleeping mattresses.27 Also the specific NGO referred to in this chapter 
has adjusted its responses, according to the project manager:
Like in Jiftlik now, we do only partial response for the families to have some sort of shel-
ter. But we have delayed the rest of the responses just to test the ground, to see if the ICA 
is coming to take photos to see if there is something going on on the site. We have been 
taking more caution lately, as so many demolitions in areas where my organisation inter-
vened were targeted afterwards. Therefore, we are more cautious than before. Which is 
not totally the opposite of humanitarian work, but we cannot keep being demolished ev-
ery time.28
In the NGO’s response to demolition, deferral of destruction appears as a materi-
ally situated practice, oscillating between compliance to laws — as evidenced by 
26  An example from Jiftlik is here taken to illustrate a cycle of repeated demolition: According to Sahoud 
Saed Kahabna from Jiftlik, he and his family had seen their shelters being demolished three times: first in 
2004, after which Kahabna rebuilt the house in concrete. In 2011 Kahabna got a demolition order. Kahabna 
hired a lawyer to bring a petition to the Israeli High Court. The judge decided to postpone the execution of 
the demolition order for eight years to follow. Despite the court’s decision, in 2013 the Kahabna family’s 
shelters were demolished for a second time. The shelter was rebuilt in concrete, yet demolished again in 
late 2013, after which the family rebuilt their shelters in the form of tents from sacks and plastic. Based on 
the author’s interview with Kahabna in Jiftlik, January 2014, interpreted from Arabic by Rashid Khudairy.
27  For ICRC’s own motivation, see International Committee of the Red Cross, “Information Bulle-
tin: ICRC Suspends the Distribution of Tents to People Affected by House Destruction,” news release, 
4.2.2014. See also Amira Hass, “Red Cross Stops Providing Emergency Tents to Palestinians in Jordan Val-
ley,” Haaretz, 6.2.2014.
28  NGO Project Manager.
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Fig. 41-43:  The Kahabna family in Jiftlik have had their houses demolished three times. The tent, covered with 
coffee sacks, is put up close to the rubble. See note 26 for Kahabna’s case. Jiftlik (2014).
Fig. 44:  Tent serving as a home up in the wake of demolition. Fasayil (2011).
Fig. 41 
Fig. 42 Fig. 43
Fig. 44 
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the choice of temporary tents without solid foundations — and ‘buying time’ in 
the legal system through territorial relocation. Yet since demolished structures 
are not replaced at the same rate as they are being taken down, this cycle cannot be 
maintained into infinity. Citing Judith Butler, the cycle of destruction and recon-
struction even appears as a “macabre rhythm” where the task of renewal assigned 
to NGOs “risk becoming practices that make occupation functional.”29 While Is-
rael takes no responsibility for those lives and lived infrastructures which they de-
stroy, NGOs repair the remains, yet with a vision foreclosed by the scope of ‘emer-
gency’. Though not deliberately, and though their work is essential and needed, by 
abiding to the temporally embedded limits defined by Israel, NGOs responses to 
cycles of destruction are in consequence entering into the scripted logic of slow 
violence and unliveability.
Future Ruin: Jordan Valley Solidarity
Earth architecture using techniques such as mud brick has somewhat surprising-
ly resumed in the Jordan Valley during the last decade through the initiative of a 
handful of Palestinian NGOs, as well as a larger project implemented by United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Building 
with mud is a traditional technique common to the area since the first permanent 
settlement of the valley 12,000 years ago, but was abandoned in the 1950s in favour 
of building with modern materials such as concrete, cement and steel. Modern 
building techniques were favoured as they allowed for bigger and more solid hous-
es that needed less frequent renovation. Moreover, as is the case in most places in 
the world, building ‘modern’ is an important socio-economic signifier. Against the 
economic capability signalled by a concrete house, ‘simple’ earthen architecture 
acquired a stigma of poverty, despite its excellent material performance, tailored 
to the warm, dry climate of the Jordan Valley. Mud delivers a well-insulated house, 
ensuring a good indoor climate protected from heat in summer and cold in win-
ter. In addition, it is a readily available, cheap and eco-friendly material, thus rep-
resenting an opportunity for self-reliance and sustainability when constructing 
a house: mud bricks are made easily from the soil on site by simply adding water 
and leftover straw from the herd’s fodder. Sometimes, if available, pulverised lime-
stone is added to heighten durability. The mixture, called tina, is either shaped in 
wooden moulds or compressed in a machine, before being left to dry on the ground 
under the sun, after which the bricks are ready to be used for construction. Build-
ing from the earth under one’s feet has many apparent virtues. 
 It is not only the geophysical climate that makes the reinstatement of mud 
29  Judith Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2015), 13.
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Fig. 45: Handmade mud bricks drying under the sun. Fasayil (2011).
Fig. 46: Jiftlik. A mud brick model in front of the full-scale mud brick house, one of JVS’s two community 
houses (2011).
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brick building a worthwhile practice, however. Beyond the aforementioned advan-
tages, the political climate induces its own particular logic to the choice of mud as 
a building material. The trigger for commencing a practice of building from the 
earth itself is, not surprisingly, closely linked to the political climate, whose un-
planning mechanisms have led to a continual cycle of destruction and reconstruc-
tion of homes. In this context, notions such as ‘sustainability’ and ‘self-reliance’ 
are connected to concerns for enhancing the prospects of inhabitation in a milieu 
permeated by the political toxicity emitted by destruction.
 The local grassroots organisation Jordan Valley Solidarity (JVS) engages 
with these cycles through building with mud, among other things.30 The motto 
of JVS is ‘To Exist is to Resist’ (and in alternative phrasing, ‘Existence is Resis-
tance’), the popular slogan discussed in relation to sumud and resistance in chap-
ter I, actualised as an expression of literal steadfastness. JVS was set up in 2003 as 
a network of local community groups and international sponsors and volunteers 
to support communities in Area C. While international donors and organisations 
generally abide with Israel’s proviso of not operating in Area C, JVS’s position, on 
the contrary, is to underpin the ability of Area C communities to develop and be 
self-reliant. On-the-ground initiatives of JVS address poor access to infrastruc-
tural amenities such as water, electricity and roads, as well as the need for shelter 
and basic institutional buildings for education and healthcare, recently adding the 
valley’s first library to its list of ventures. A mutual characteristic of JVS’s initia-
tives is an emphasis on using environmentally sustainable technologies from lo-
cally accessible resources, for instance by creating solar energy ovens, biogas reac-
tors, and even introducing cycling as a means for transportation — unusual in the 
area — in their mission to empower vulnerable communities. Using mud bricks for 
construction is part of the same strategy of local availability and environmental 
sustainability.
 According to Rashid Khudairy, the current Palestinian coordinator of the 
JVS campaign, the organisation began building with mud bricks in 2005.31 Ten 
years on from their first building project, JVS had completed fifty mud brick build-
30  I visited JVS three times; first in August 2011, at their community house in Jiftlik village and a second 
time to their mud brick production in Fasayil. The third visit took place in October 2014, when I stayed at 
their community house in Fasayil. Information about their activities was provided by JVS’s campaign co-
ordinator, Rashid Khudairy, local inhabitants, and Palestinian and international volunteers. Visits to other 
localities in the Jordan Valley (from Fasayil to Tubas) to see farms, mud brick houses, demolition sites, 
as well as to talk with families whose houses had been demolished, were accompanied by JVS. For JVS’s 
own presentation of their aims and activities, see their webpage: Jordan Valley Solidarity,  http://jordan-
valleysolidarity.org. Last access 14.8.2017. See also MA’AN Development Center & Jordan Valley Popular 
Committees.
31  Information about scale, cost, etc. in relation to JVS’s mud brick projects were kindly provided by Khu-
dairy via email correspondence, January 2015.
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ings including a school, a health clinic and many family houses. A house of one 
hundred square metres, including fittings and additional building material for 
pillars and beams, roof, doors and windows, costs around 100,000 Israeli shekel 
(around 23.500 €) for materials. Constructing the house is a quick process, usually 
taking around one month for six people to complete, though producing mud bricks 
by hand is time-consuming. For many years, JVS made all bricks by hand with an 
average monthly production of three to four thousand. To put this number into 
perspective, it takes 2,500 bricks to build a house if the walls have a width of one 
brick, but two layers are needed for a more solid construction. In 2015, the organ-
isation acquired a machine that could compress the bricks, enabling an increase 
in productivity to 26,000 per month. Similarly to the humanitarian organisation 
that provides emergency response in the wake of demolition, JVS assists families 
whose houses have been destroyed to rebuild and builds a few hundred metres 
from the demolition site where possible. Khudairy considers the logic for build-
ing with mud brick to be that it is a natural material suitable for the climate and 
inexpensive, as well as the fact that it sustains a building practice rooted in local 
culture. Further, JVS consider their activities to be a strategy that aims to develop 
communities and “to protect the families so they can stay and resist more.”32
 Building with mud incorporates a logic which exceeds cultural and clima-
tological rationales, as was clearly expressed by former coordinator of the JVS’s 
campaign Fathy Khdirat in his address to British supporters of the campaign in 
2011. According to Khdirat, the goal for JVS was to “rebuild Palestine from the 
Earth upwards. We succeeded in Fasayil and now we’ll move on to the rest of the 
Jordan Valley. Yalla!”33 In Khdirat’s statement, building from the earth itself seems 
to hold a symbolic dimension that arguably plays on the literal steadfastness of su-
mud, and indicates that the houses arise from a ruin: they are rebuilding Palestine. 
‘Rebuilding from the earth’ is not merely a symbolic gesture however: while de-
molished concrete becomes building waste, demolished mud bricks may become 
building material all over again. In a situation where building materials are scarce 
due to a lack of financial resources and the fact that construction materials like 
concrete and steel can only be bought from Israel, which often prevents delivery, 
mud represents an opportunity to extricate oneself from a dependence on Israeli 
supplies to a certain extent. The problem of unstable material supplies regulated 
by Israel is not restricted to Jordan Valley, but applies to the entire West Bank, and 
particularly Gaza. The architect Alberto Alcalde — involved with reconstruction 
32  Ibid.
33  Brighton JVS, “Brighton JVS: Dispatches from Palestine - A Report Back Meeting from a JVS Delega-
tion,”  http://jordanvalleysolidarity.org/reports/brighton-jvs-dispatches-from-palestine-a-report-back-
meeting-from-a-jvs-delegation/. Last access 14.8.2017
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in Gaza after the war in 2014 (‘Operation Protective Edge’) — expressed the prac-
ticality of building with mud when supplies are clogged: “A big advantage of mud 
over cement is that it’s not only cheaper, but you can also easily rebuild with it. If [a 
house] was demolished, you just need to add water and mix it.”34
 Building from mud creates a potential material loop of demolition and re-
building, thus benefiting from the very same soil as that targeted for destruction, 
exploitation and confiscation. In other words, by building from the earth, the con-
tested soil of the conflict is incorporated into the building and, moreover, incorpo-
rates the logic of a ubiquitous unplanning practice — destruction — into its very 
material constitution. Consequently, destruction is not only that which appears 
on the horizon for an increasing number of Palestinian houses: the threat itself 
is reflected in a building process that adopts and considers the possibility of the 
building as a ‘future ruin’. Construction is formatted toward its potential destruc-
tion: the future ruin embeds its own potential disassembly and dissolution within 
the materiality of the building scheme, yet with the possibility of arising from the 
very same material over again once the tina is prepared, moulded and left to dry 
under the sun. In short, building with mud bricks inscribes itself into the cycle of 
destruction and reconstruction as a material practice that anticipates the risk of 
its future ruin.
 The potential of the ‘future ruin’ is perhaps an overly optimistic interpreta-
tion on my part. JVS have seen at least one of their mud brick houses destroyed, but 
not rebuilt as the inhabitants chose to move elsewhere. Why, in that case, go out of 
one’s way to laboriously build a solid house calculated upon its own demolition? 
Would a comfortable caravan not be good enough, and perhaps tactically smart-
er as — in theory — it could evacuate the site designated for destruction as soon 
as the military jeeps and bulldozers approached? Khdirat elaborated in another 
statement on JVS’s engagement with the cycle of demolition and reconstruction:
Our reaction to demolition orders is to construct more, our response to a house demo-
lition is to reconstruct the house. The Israelis have succeeded in creating their country 
through facts on the ground, we shall create our own facts on the ground.35
34  In the aftermath of the wars in Gaza of 2008-9, 2012 and 2014, each of which left Gaza in a disastrous 
near-obliterated state, rebuilding processes have been obstructed due to Israel’s restrictions on the deliv-
ery of building materials. Receiving a good deal of public attention, private individuals, UNRWA and vari-
ous organisations started to rebuild with mud. Alcalde’s statement is cited from: Ala Qandil, “Palestinians 
Revive Earthen Architecture,” Al Jazeera, 10.5.2104. On the use of earthen architecture to rebuild Gaza, see 
also Mohammed Othman, “Gaza Engineer Develops New Technology to Replace Cement,” Al-Monitor, 
4.12.2014.
35  Buenaventura Vidal, “Sumud in the Jordan Valley: Ongoing Nakba and Ongoing Resistance,” MIFTAH, 
http://miftah.org/display.cfm?DocId=22594&CategoryId=5. Last access 14.8.2017
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According to Khdirat, the purpose is to surpass Israel’s rate of demolition, but be-
yond that to circumvent Israel’s strategy of creating ‘facts on the ground’ by creat-
ing ‘facts on the ground’ of their own. The solid qualities of mud bricks are of value 
in this regard. Unlike the mobile caravan, a ‘fact on the ground’ is an intervention 
that has a foundation, it is anchored to the ground, it is difficult to move and it con-
stitutes a ‘foothold’ which consolidates a life sustained in situ. By building with 
mud bricks, JVS adopts a situational spatial practice that responds to confronta-
tions in the moment, yet is simultaneously a practice where an attempt is made to 
slow mercurial time through matter.
 As mentioned, JVS are one among several actors who work with mud bricks 
in the Jordan Valley. The question of who was the first to resume building from 
mud is a matter of contention, yet UNESCO’s large-scale project ‘Reviving Earth-
en Architecture’ (REA, 2010-2013) has undoubtedly been influential for other ac-
tors who have taken up the practice.36 REA completed one pilot building for edu-
cative purposes, followed by four women’s centres and tests for ‘forty-eight hour 
emergency shelters.’ UNESCO’s interventions are, unlike those of JVS, in Areas A 
and B, meaning that the buildings are unlikely to be subject to demolition. UNE-
SCO’s project was a sub-programme under the umbrella of United Nations Trust 
Fund on Human Security (UNTFHS), intended to enhance human security for se-
lected communities through the protection and improvement of their living con-
ditions beyond the scope of emergency and humanitarian assistance.37 However, 
according to UNTFHS, “the Programme falls under the category of emergency 
initiatives, which in turn directly affects the impact and the timeframe of its in-
terventions”, though they attempted to “overcome this issue by including several 
measures in the design and the implementation to strengthen the sustainability 
aspect in the Programme.”38 The use of earth architecture in the form of mud brick 
was one of these measures, used as leverage across organisational boundaries. 
UNESCO provided the technical and practical knowledge for building, while local 
skilled and unskilled workers and architects were involved in the building process 
to learn its methods. According to UNESCO, “the production and utilization of 
36  For documentation of REA, see their Facebook page: UNTFHS Joint Programme, “Reviving Earth 
Architecture in the Jordan Valley - Palestine,”  https://www.facebook.com/Reviving-Earth-Architec-
ture-in-the-Jordan-Valley-Palestine-248639418496868/?ref=ts&fref=ts. Last access 19.8.2017. Some archi-
tects involved in REA continued to use earth in their own practice, prominent amongst whom are Sham-
sArd Design Studio, for instance. For their webpage, see ShamsArd Design Studio, “Architecture,”  https://
www.shamsard.com/architecture. Last access 19.8.2017.
37  UNTFHS Joint Programme, “Livelihood Protection and Sustainable Empowerment of Vulnerable, 
Rural and Refugee Communities in the Jordan Valley. Evaluation Report (Mid-Term),” (2012).
38  Ibid., 22.
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mud-bricks, as the primary material for construction, is considered the point of 
departure to foster change towards sustainability in the construction sector.”39
 Conventional discourses on environmental sustainability — at least in a 
Western context — typically circumscribe mechanisms of our bio-habitat as a 
normative solution for reducing the negative human impact on ecological systems 
and cycles as much as possible. Moreover, to work with environmental sustainabil-
ity is also often perceived as an extra-territorial endeavour, insofar as our habitat 
is shared, and environmental hazards can hardly be contained within national or 
other abstract borders.40 We live in the same ecosystem, which makes the envi-
ronment a political matter insofar as it constitutes a shared concern. As already 
indicated, in the case of JVS’s adoption of a discourse of environmental sustain-
ability, its eco-cyclical thinking is tangential but nonetheless slightly different 
from the above generalised idea of environmental sustainability. More precisely, 
its approach is reliant upon what an ecological system has to offer in order to re-
duce negative human impact upon humans. Although JVS’s specific material and 
technological solutions are recognisable as elements common to other projects 
that address environmental sustainability, it is a logic informed first and foremost 
by a cyclical approach to resources for self-reliance, as a consequence of the deple-
tion of resources due to unplanning. Although the approach, scope and implemen-
tation of JVS and UNTFHS/UNESCO’s projects are hugely different, each organi-
sation’s adoption of a discourse on sustainability tied to objectives for self-reliance 
through the use of earth is strikingly ambiguous. In both cases, the application of 
‘sustainability’ as key for these projects exceeds conventional definitions; ‘sus-
tainability’ oscillates between being a rhetorical placeholder for development, and 
a strategy of reliance on environmental systems that offer political and physical 
capacities for the creation of ‘facts on the ground’. Earth is thus not only a political 
matter, but also a matter of resistance to ‘time running out’.
39  Marwa Yousef Tina and Giovanni Fontana Antonelli, “Reviving Earthen Architecture in the Jordan 
Valley Towards Adequate Housing for Marginalized Communities” (paper presented at the Central Eu-
rope Toward Sustainable Development: Low-tech and High-tech Materials and Technologies for Sustain-
able Buildings, Prague, 2013), 1.
40  The distinction between territorial and extra-territorial environmental narratives in an Israeli-Pal-
estinian context is explored by the sociologist Samer Alatout. Alatout argues that the narratives of Israe-
li (IENGO) and Palestinian (PENGO) environmental organisations are fundamentally different in their 
conception of power: for PENGO, the unequal distribution of environmental hazards is attributed to oc-
cupation and lack of Palestinian territorial sovereignty, while IENGO consider such hazards to be shared 
by all living within a shared ecology, assuming sovereignty to be irrelevant for production, management, 
and distribution of hazards. PENGO thus holds a political and territorial sovereignty-based conception 
of space, and IENGO a depoliticised, extra-territorial bio-power conception of space. See Samer Alatout, 
“Towards a Bio-territorial Conception of Power: Territory, Population, and Environmental Narratives in 
Palestine and Israel,” Political Geography 25 (2006).
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Killing Time
In the lecture ‘Dispossess: Kent Klich’s Images of Vacated Life in Gaza after 2008’ 
(2013), Judith Butler reflects on the title of the short film Killing Time by the pho-
tographer Kent Klich.41 Klich’s film is a montage of cell-phone videos recorded by 
a number of Gazans in between the bombardments in the 2008-2009 war, by Isra-
el named ‘Operation Cast Lead’. The videos depict repetitive activities of waiting 
and “useless passing of time” with no further action to anticipate: sitting, smok-
ing, playing football with a chicken, swinging a child around and around, jump-
ing.42 As we learn about the film through the lecture, the cell-phones with which 
the videos are recorded are the phones of people that most of them died during 
‘Cast Lead’. The various forms of ‘killing of time’ seen in the videos are, howev-
er, not mere waiting and nor are they equivalent to wasting time.43 To Butler, it is 
rather a question of how life is lived when a future seems closed: “Part of what we 
see, I would suggest, is a spatialised sense of time that is a killing of all those forms 
of futurity that makes for agency.”44 Though we do not see actual death in the vid-
eos, the killing depicted is the killing of lived life and the destructiveness of closed 
futures that take place in between the intervals of bombardments. Considering 
Killing Time in juxtaposition with images from the series Gaza Photo Album (2009) 
depicting the vacated structures of homes after ‘Cast Lead’, also by Klich, Butler 
notes how the repetitive activities and emptied ruins obscures the difference be-
tween having died and being violently dispossessed.45 There seems to be a collapse 
of temporality, Butler comments, indeed “a kind of killing or dying taking place 
in space and time” yet simultaneously also “a living on that takes place within or 
among these structures that are inhabited precisely by a loss: the chair in which no 
one sits.”46 
 Klich’s film and photographs offers, with the help of Butler’s examination of 
the images, a perspective on how devastation enters into quotidian life.47 Killing 
time between explosions, and the vacated structures in their aftermath, show us 
the undoing of life in its spatial dimension, caused by war: “There is no life without 
41  For a recording of Butler’s lecture, see Judith Butler, “Dispossess: Kent Klich’s Images of Vacated Life 
in Gaza after 2008,” (GSAPP Columbia2013). Klich’s short film can be viewed on his website: Kent Klich, 
“Killing Time,” ed. Kent Klich and Anders Refn (http://www.kentklich.com/movie_3.php2011).
42  Butler, “Dispossess,” 46:32.
43  Ibid., 7:55.
44  Ibid., 7:45, 9:30.
45  Klich’s photo-series from 2009 was published in book form in Kent Klich, Gaza Photo Album (New 
York: Umbrage Editions, 2013).
46  Butler, “Dispossess,” 14:30.
47  Ibid., 28:45.
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the spatial if not architectural conditions of liveability, without its objects, its sup-
ports, and its environment,” why Klich’s images of lived structures “underscores 
that ethical link between architecture and a liveable life.”48 The bombing of Gaza 
evidently destroys Gaza’s houses; the ban on supply of construction materials to 
Gaza obstructs Gaza’s rebuilding; Gaza is organised temporally and spatially by 
wars and siege. What we see in Klich’s images, then, is the absence of agency and 
the obliteration of life not only for those whose bodies are killed, but also for those 
who survive.
 Although Butler is here talking about the case of Gaza, where the levels of 
destruction are even more extreme than those we find in the Jordan Valley, my no-
tion of unliveabilty can clearly be read in conjunction with Butler’s deliberation 
on how war violently organises the temporal and spatial dimensions of lived life. 
The killing of time that is taking place by exhausting possibilities for finding ways 
to live and to cope is one of the most cruel effects of the unplanning of the Jor-
dan Valley. The collapse of temporality that is instigated by cycles of destruction 
and reconstruction is, in my view, what is sought to be exploited or at least worked 
against in the examples of spatial practices presented in this chapter. The struggle 
against retention is materially embedded; as we have seen, time matters by means 
of the more or less solid substance of spatial structures. Though neither tents and 
their relocation, nor mud brick buildings and their potential resurgence, are mate-
rialities that can resist Israel’s destructive weapons of unplanning, they represent, 
in my view, even if only for a short while, an attempt to bring time to life through 
matter.
48  Ibid., 23:30, 28:26.
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Fig. 47: Qalqilya checkpoint. Palestinian workers wait in line from around 3 at night to cross the check-
point, which is open for passing between 7 and 8 in the morning. A market opens every night along the road 
towards the checkpoint, and provides food, coffee and other amenities. Structured by Israel’s movement 
regime, the checkpoints engender distorted circadian rhythms with endless waiting around the point of tran-
sition, its traffic and trade an urbanity formed by the repercussions of occupation (2010).
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Fig. 48: Waiting to cross Tayba checkpoint in Tulkarem around 5am (2014).
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CHAPTER VI
PROBING THE TERRAIN1
A complex geography of visible and invisible borders makes navigation of the phys-
ical and political terrains of the West Bank a difficult task. The lines recorded in 
the terrain are not only multiple, they are also shifting and ambiguous: their align-
ments fluctuate with political currents; their exact positions are equivocal when 
lines on the map are transferred to reality; their legal status is contested; and, 
the areas they circumscribe expand and contract with the help of architectural 
interventions. In effect, these movements create elastic zones of indeterminacy; 
frontiers that have a profound impact on everyday lives. The endemic uncertainty 
engendered by Israel’s enforcement of law by exception is, in other words, mani-
fested in an erratic geographic imprint of lines.
1   This chapter appears in a different version in Runa Johannessen, “Probing the Terrain: Architectures 
of Control and Uncertainty in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,” in Architecture and Control, ed. Annie 
Ring, Henriette Steiner, and Kristin Veel (Leiden: Brill, Forthcoming). In this version, the case and main 
proposition on mêtis are retained, while the history of flexible lines is expanded. The concluding section 
on speculation is new. 
Fig. 49: Schematic plan of HH’s plot.
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Fig. 50: ‘Palestine - Index to Villages & Settlements’, map from 1956 showing the UN Partition Plan of 1947, 
the Armistice Lines (‘Green Line’) of 1949, and the extent of land in Jewish possession by March 1945. Author: 
Palestine Arab Refugee Office. Source: United States Library of Congress’ Geography & Map Division.
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 This chapter will present the case of the covert construction of a chicken 
farm and house-to-be, where Palestinian landowner HH speculates within the 
territorial uncertainty and potential flexibility of the line that divides Area B from 
Area C and happens to cross his plot. The territorial uncertainty that emanates 
from the line is activated with the landowner’s attempt to build on the plot, using 
the house as a probe.
 HH’s building project can be apprehended as an enactment of sumud, cer-
tainly. However, my primary objective, rather than to locate the chicken farm and 
house in the discourse of sumud, is to explore the dynamics that inform its becom-
ing. HH’s disguised building efforts illustrate how endemic uncertainty informs 
a situational spatial practice of navigation in unstable conditions. I will suggest 
that HH’s search for a means to build his house can be read as a specific type of 
action, akin to mêtis (‘skilful, cunning intelligence’), a quality that derives from 
Greek history and mythology. By providing an account of how flexibility adheres 
to the territory through its lines and laws, I seek to make visible the ways in which 
a spatial practice informed by mêtis may compensate for the fleeting nature of the 
terrain probed by HH. 
 ‘Decoding the panorama’ of a landscape of violence, stated as an objective in 
the introduction to this thesis, thus takes on an additional meaning. Understand-
ing how the occupation ‘moves’ — or ‘ticks’, in Neve Gordon’s words — is not only 
a task for the academic researcher: such decoding is a daily undertaking for those 
who endeavour to build in a violent landscape, for whom the task is inevitably more 
urgent and difficult. Decoding the ground, and understanding the forces that op-
erate on it, is crucial in order to manoeuvre within it. It is an asymmetrical rela-
tionship with no comparable balance of power between Israel as a sovereign ap-
paratus and HH as an individual subject. In order to grasp the logic of HH’s plan, 
it is important to comprehend the circular interplay between his actions and an 
unpredictable world.
 I will explore HH’s project in three steps. Firstly, I will present the concept 
of mêtis, akin but not identical to Michel de Certeau’s tactics. While the concept 
of tactics is useful for describing improvised or short-term actions in a space pre-
defined by strategic forces, mêtis enables a duality in the challenge presented by 
endemic uncertainty to be captured: both dominant powers and the resistance to 
these powers move in a fleeting terrain. There are thus two aspects to mêtis that 
are relevant to my analysis: the cunning use of tricks in order to create opportu-
nities where there seem to be none, and navigation in a world that in itself is in 
unpredictable movement.
 As the second step, I will describe the process through which HH builds his 
house ‘in disguise’, and how his particular logic of ‘bullshitting’ — as he express-
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es it — is an attempt to bypass the obstacles with which he is confronted. It will 
be suggested that mêtis is an aspect of HH’s situational spatial practice, useful for 
understanding how this particular mode of thought and action can be considered 
a means of probing an uncertain terrain. 
 Thirdly, the shifting boundaries on the ground, which HH wants to ‘flex’, 
will be placed in perspective. Fostering a polymorphism of lines is an oft repeat-
ed means to avoid fixing territorial borders while the conflict remains unsettled; 
these lines mediate political ends.
 In conclusion, thought will be given to a possible relation of exchange be-
tween HH’s building project and contemporary speculative projects from aesthet-
ic disciplines, of which HH is aware.
Mêtis 
Mêtis, or cunning intelligence, from Ancient Greek thought, is a way of handling or 
manipulating a situation with skilfully deployed tricks rather than conventional 
logical measures and methods. The objective of mêtis is to create openings where 
none seem to exist. In Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society (1991), Mar-
cel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, scholars of Greek mythology and history, 
describe mêtis as follows: 
Mêtis — intelligence which operates in the world of becoming, in circumstances of con-
flict — takes the form of an ability to deal with whatever comes up, drawing on certain in-
tellectual qualities: forethought, perspicacity, quickness and acuteness of understanding, 
trickery, and even deceit.2
The attributes of mêtis should be deployed in ambiguous and unpredictable situ-
ations, not through impulsive acts but the manipulation of those powerful forces 
that cannot be controlled directly.3 Detienne and Vernant find an early testimony 
to the nature of mêtis in Homer’s Iliad, Book 23, in a passage describing Patroclus’ 
funeral games. Here, Antilochus, a young man skilful with horses, takes part in the 
chariot race. Unfortunately, his horses are slower than those of his rivals, but he 
wins the race by using guile. Detienne and Vernant write: 
Antilochus’ trick, as described in the Iliad, is indeed a ‘trap,’ a dòlos of this kind. The young 
man has thought out his plan carefully in advance; he has inspected the terrain and taken 
note of the narrowing of the track. In hatching his plot, he showed himself to be, as his 
2  Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society (Chicago; 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 44.
3  Ibid., 47.
167
father advised him, prudent ( phronéôn), guarded ( pephulagménos) and careful not to act 
in an impetuous manner (aphradéôs) as would a driver not endowed with mêtis.4
By probing the terrain in advance, Antilochus was able to create an advantage for 
himself. He does not seek to solve the problem of his lack of horsepower directly by 
replacing his horses, but instead exploits his knowledge of the track and his esti-
mation of how his opponents will act. Antilochus’ forethought thus leads him and 
his horse swifter through the race than his stronger yet imprudent rivals.
 Both animals and men are reliant on mêtis in order to fish and hunt. The 
Greek-Roman Second Century poet Oppian discusses the qualities of mêtis in his 
Treatise on Fishing and Treatise on Hunting.5 These treatises engaged with the world 
of traps, and introduced foxes, octopuses, frogs, and other animals that exhibit 
exemplary qualities of mêtis: agility, dissimulation and vigilance. Common to all, 
large or small, is residence in a world of fluid and constantly changing situations. 
In such situations, the application of mêtis is required. Mêtis consists of more than 
the ability to seize an opportunity in the moment (kairós, in the Greek); it also con-
cerns agility and preparation in order to carry out a plan successfully, as well as 
denoting the art of navigating the unruly and undifferentiated sea, devoid of stable 
markers.6 Moreover, the only way to defeat an opponent armed with mêtis is to pos-
sess even greater mêtis.7 
 The notion of mêtis — originally a mental quality ascribed to men and dei-
ties alike, as opposed to a fully-fledged concept — resembles the tactics of Michel 
de Certeau in his analysis of tactics and strategies in The Practice of Everyday Life.8 
De Certeau himself regards mêtis as a part of tactical “ways of operating” in ev-
eryday life, and remarks often upon tactical improvisation.9 De Certeau examines 
the operational logic of culture as a set of practices in which tactical manoeuvres 
in the everyday are brought to light and given critical attention. In de Certeau’s 
classification, strategy is the administration of power by a superior, while tactics 
are the subordinate’s attempt to bypass or evade that superior power by means of 
antidisciplinary practices. Tactics are instances — though can become habits and 
4  Ibid., 22.
5  Cross-reference from ibid.
6  Mêtis in relation to navigation at sea is explored in chapter 8, ‘The ‘Sea Crow’” ibid., 215 ff.
7  Metis was also a Greek goddess. Zeus, frustrated by her ability to trick him, solves the problem by eating 
her, swallowing her whole. He assimilates her capacities within his own substance, thus securing “the drug 
which imparts the ultimate intelligence and cunning, the true phármakon of everlasting sovereignty.” Ibid., 
120.
8  Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (University of California Press, 1984).
9  Ibid., 61-76.
168
ordinary ways of conduct — enacted in a stable world of institutions. While strat-
egy assumes “a place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from 
which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats … can be man-
aged”, tactics are:
…a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus. No delimitation of an 
exteriority, then, provides it with the condition necessary for autonomy. The space of 
a tactic is the space of the other. Thus it must play on and with a terrain imposed on it 
and organized by the law of a foreign power. It does not have the means to keep to itself, 
at a distance, in a position of withdrawal, foresight, and self-collection: it is a maneuver 
“within the enemy’s field of vision”… This nowhere gives a tactic mobility, to be sure, but 
a mobility that must accept the chance offerings of the moment, and seize on the wing the 
possibilities that offer themselves at any given moment. It must vigilantly make use of the 
cracks that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers. 
It poaches in them. It creates surprises in them. It can be where it is least expected. It is a 
guileful ruse.10
Tactics seize possibilities of the moment. The important distinction between strategy 
and tactics is their differing relationship to time and space. According to de Cer-
teau, “strategies pin their hopes on the resistance that establishment of a place offers 
to the erosion of time; tactics on a clever utilization of time, of the opportunities it 
presents and also of the play that it introduces into the foundations of power.”11 
According to cultural theorist Ian Buchanan, the essential difference between de 
Certeau’s concepts of tactics and strategy is their disparate response to the vari-
ables that everyday life throws at us.12 While strategy simply reduces the amount of 
variables by creating rules for itself, tactics is an approach to everyday life for when 
the variables presented are impossible to take measures against. In the words of 
Buchanan, “tactics refers to the set of practices that strategy has not been able to 
domesticate.”13 This means that tactical practices are those enacted in the gaps be-
tween strategic controls. However, the implication is not that strategy and tactics 
are binary pairs; rather than appearing as opposites, they are a conceptual pairing 
whose internal logic is dialectical.14 Strategic and tactical calculations are based 
on different logics, yet they can both mutate. For instance, when the strategist’s 
forces are weakening, her ability to use deception and trickery increases, which de 
10  Ibid., 35,37. Emphasis in original.
11  Ibid., 38-39. Emphasis in original.
12  Ian Buchanan, Michel de Certeau: Cultural Theorist, Theatre, Culture & Society (London; Thousand 
Oaks: SAGE, 2000), 89.
13  Ibid.
14  For more on the dialectics of the concepts, see ibid.
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Certeau translates as the transformation of strategy into tactics.15
 The notions of strategy and tactics are derived from military language and 
transported by de Certeau into a cultural theory of everyday practices. It is not dif-
ficult to see how these concepts may be applied to everyday spatial practices in the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, given that we are discussing variables of daily lives that 
are already deeply saturated by militaristic politics. Quotidian struggles might 
thus be interpreted as actions within a military scheme, where warring parties 
fight with weapons that are strategically or tactically deployed. In the present the-
sis, this struggle is certainly perceived as one within which both Israeli and Pales-
tinian tactical manoeuvres are held to be weapons. However, the goal of deploying 
the concept of mêtis is to grasp a discrete aspect of a spatial practice that unmis-
takably ‘acts otherwise’ in a given situation, yet whose actions have been meticu-
lously planned in advance. Mêtis is not political action, nor is it resistance in any 
conventional sense. Rather, it is the specific disposition one requires in order to 
circumvent and navigate unpredictable and hostile environments. Mêtis presides 
over a range of activities through which, in the words of Detienne and Vernant, one 
must “manipulate hostile forces too powerful to be controlled directly but which 
can be exploited despite themselves.”16 The mêtis of orienting oneself in a world of 
unstable conditions thus requires a certain ‘navigational agility’, be it for purposes 
of resistance, survival or winning the game.17 
 Without opposing de Certeau’s categorisation, I wish to underscore how mê-
tis provides another paradoxical perspective in situations where the superior side 
in an asymmetrical power relation feeds off instability. In the case of Israel’s exer-
tion of power in the OPT, strategy itself is in movement, deploying tactical means. 
This situation requires a counter-tactics, not only in order to find alternate routes, 
but also the means to compensate for a strategically fleeting world. Equally, mê-
tis does not consist of improvisation in the same manner as tactics. More than 
merely reactive to external events, mêtis takes action: it is not only about seizing 
the opportunity (kairós) that circumstances offer. Through mêtis, the subject at-
tempts to overcome or change the circumstances in themselves, thereby distort-
ing the ordinary hierarchy of superior and inferior power. However closely mêtis 
is related to tactics, I would suggest that a conceptual distinction is useful in the 
case of everyday spatial practices that seek to combat adversary powers, which are 
15  Certeau, 37.
16  Detienne and Vernant, 47.
17  The term ‘navigational agility’ is taken from the architect Matthew Barac’s analysis of daily life in pre-
carious urban contexts. Matthew Barac, “Changing Places: Navigating Urbanity in the Global South,” in 
Phenomenologies of the City, ed. Henriette Steiner and Maximilian Sternberg (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2015), 257.
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in themselves spatial rather than localisable, and unpredictable rather than truly 
disciplinary. In such cases, both parties work within a schema of actions that is 
fleeting and unstable. Mêtis s is a general logic that defines the individual logics of 
both parties, even when the power relation is asymmetrical, as in this case. To beat 
mêtis, you need more mêtis, as Detienne and Vernant assert. This is the paradox I 
wish to emphasise.
House in Disguise
When HH, a West Bank resident, set out to investigate the possibility of legally 
constructing a house on his family’s plot in a small West Bank village in 2011, he 
was aware that defining the exact legal boundaries on the ground would be prob-
lematic. As seen in the chapter ‘Unplanning’, the three main administrative zones 
of the West Bank  — ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’  — officially designate the extent of Palestinian 
and Israeli control in each respective area. Within Area C, covering more than half 
of the West Bank, Israel has full control over both military and civilian matters. 
The extreme rarity of building permits being granted to Palestinians in this area, 
combined with Israel’s extensive practice of demolishing unauthorised houses, is 
the reason for HH’s concern.18 As became clear, the line separating Area B from 
18  Submitted Palestinian building applications for Area C 2010-14 resulted in 33 permits issued and a 
Fig. 51: The first floors of HH’s house with intended future extension on top (2014).
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Area C runs through HH’s plot, and the exact location of this line on the terrain 
proved decisive for his prospects of being issued a building permit.
 The way in which HH hatches his plot corresponds to the idea of mêtis, its ap-
plication necessitated by the ambiguous conditions produced by the occupation. 
Although HH’s plan is not about winning a race, nor setting a trap, he needs the 
qualities of mêtis if he wishes to achieve more than a simple capitulation to a ruling 
apparatus that he can have no expectation of endorsing his specific goal to build 
a house on his plot of land. During an interview I conducted with HH in 2012, he 
explained his considerations as follows:
The line [between Area B and Area C in the West Bank] is flexible. How do we flex it? … For 
example, a few months ago I wanted to get a permit to start construction of my apartment 
[on our family plot], and I could not recognise if it is Area B or Area C. Through my expe-
rience, I thought, maybe it is behind the line. But I wanted to be more specific, to know if I 
could get a permit. … But I am going to construct anyway. This is my point of view. Still, I 
want to understand! The local government told me it is C. So, come on, show me a map that 
tells it is Area C, let me see a map! “No, we can’t”, they said at the local government, “but 
we can tell you it is C.” I don’t believe it. They said, “You can go and make a survey with an 
accordance.” They take the accordance and overlay it with the map, to get the answer. But 
hey, come on, what are you doing, it is not scientific at all! Comparing two photos? We are 
not doing it like this! They said, “Are you going to teach us our work?” …
But I will build anyway, either if it is B or C. What I will do is to do it quiet and clean. I will 
not spend a lot of money but make a small place. I don’t want to make it as a home at first. 
… I will start with the basement before I construct the rest, and I want to use it as a chick-
en farm. It is like a double-phased plan. First I want to see if it is going to be destroyed. In 
the meantime, the farm could benefit my family a little bit. So, this is the way I will do it. 
There is no other way, because I don’t have any other land. I want to see the flexibility. So, 
maybe I can bullshit!
I will use concrete. The main thing is that if the Israelis come to destroy it, it must be a 
concrete construction element, because if it is a wooden construction, it might resist 
demolition. In my case, I will use concrete. I want to make it more seriously. I don’t want to 
make a farm with wooden frames, but concrete, otherwise I will not be able to construct 
over it later. We will see.19
rejection rate of 98.5%. See UN OCHA oPt, “Under Threat: Demolition Orders in Area C of the West Bank,” 
(2015).
19  Excerpt from the author’s interview with HH, West Bank, April 2012. HH’s name and location are not 
disclosed due to the sensitive nature of his project. 
172
When HH discovered that the part of his plot appropriate for new construction 
was — in all likelihood — within Area C, he decided to test the viability of building 
in this border zone. HH would undertake his project carefully, aware of potential 
Israeli reactions. He did not want to spend too much money on a project that might 
sooner or later be demolished. And so he had to invent what — to me — sounded 
like a spectacular plan: to begin building his future home as a chicken farm. Hid-
ing the building is for all practical purposes impossible, but would it be feasible to 
build his house in disguise? Could this even work as a stratagem; a tool to manipu-
late the location of the line?
 The equation is partly a simple calculation of financial risk: houses for chick-
ens are cheaper to build than houses for humans, and the possible destruction of 
the chicken farm, in its early stages, would be less of a loss than the destruction of 
a fully constructed home. It is also partly an equation based upon a calculation of 
contingencies by attempting to manipulate future events. The temporal delay in 
construction means that during the process of building, unexpected things can 
happen and circumstances can change. Perhaps a chicken farm would not be re-
garded as an unwanted expansion of the Palestinian built-up area and would thus 
be tolerated by Israel. Perhaps the line between Area B and Area C would become 
locally negotiable over time, depending on Israeli plans for settlements and roads 
Fig. 52: Survey of HH’s house from my notebook (2014).
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in the area, according to assessments of security and interference with potential 
Israeli expansions. These possible outcomes are mere speculations. HH is not in 
a position to provide for all possible contingencies, but he tries to exploit the fact 
that there are indeed contingencies to account for in order to make sense of what 
the more-or-less fluid future may bring.
 Contemplating the viability for a house on his plot, HH considers an attempt 
of his trick worthwhile. In 2013 he begins construction, and by spring 2014 he has 
started up his chicken farming enterprise in the basement, while awaiting a good 
moment to add more floors. At this initial stage, there is nothing conspicuous about 
the appearance of the building. Common construction techniques are used for the 
farm/house, and the material dimensions are standard for this kind of small-scale 
building: for the structural elements, pillars and horizontal slabs are made from 
reinforced concrete, cast in situ using wooden formwork. The walls are built with 
hollow concrete blocks. It is built on a slope with a small base plinth supporting the 
ground floor, covering an area of approximately 200 square meters. 
 The building is designed more or less on the spot, without drawings any 
more developed than preliminary sketches. Speculation as to future conversion 
into a dwelling informs HH’s ideas and the decisions taken for the design, simul-
taneously preparing it for future transformation. Technical infrastructure such as 
electric cables and water pipes are planned and prefigured as holes threaded with 
Fig. 53: Fodder trays in the living room, waiting for the breeding of the next batch of chickens (2014).
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garden hose, reinforcement bars are left protruding from the concrete slab in cer-
tain places to sustain the possibility for the addition of suspended slabs and canti-
levers, and openings and a staircase are planned with added floors in mind. If the 
building survives its first years as a chicken farm, HH will — when he deems the 
time is right — extend the building by two additional floors, integrate a water cis-
tern and rain water collection on the roof, and refine the rough walls of the façade 
using a combination of plastered concrete and limestone cladding. There will be a 
small courtyard with a pergola, and around the house he will landscape dry-stone 
terraces and an orchard. Future development is envisioned in great detail. Again, 
the building technique and its compatibility with future transformation — highly 
visible in the reinforcement bars inviting construction of additional floors — are 
not conspicuous elements: it looks like any other building site. The rationale be-
hind it, however, goes beyond the regular scheme of building a family house.
 HH attempts to build his house in spite of its potential illegality and to use it, 
almost as a hoax, to test whether flexibility exists that might be used to his future 
advantage. He tries to orientate in the changing geography of the West Bank, while 
consciously avoiding triggering the alarm of Israeli attention through dissimula-
tion of his actions. What HH deploys in devising his future home is an ability to 
probe the political terrain analytically in a cognitive process that shifts between 
assessing contingencies and creating possibilities, thus attempting to override 
Israel’s modes of control. As already suggested, the skill which HH deploys when 
navigating this terrain shares attributes with the practical, cunning intelligence of 
mêtis, with which he overcomes obstacles.
 The background for HH’s endeavours to build a future home, taking a de-
tour through the gradual processes of its transformation from a chicken farm into 
a family house, is based in uncertainty concerning the way that political interests 
affect the local exercise of power. In this particular case, eventual demolition is 
the obvious risk HH faces. However, uncertainty can serve as a loophole to be ex-
ploited. I take HH’s building project as illustrative of a situational spatial practice 
that leans on improvised, yet pre-planned tactics and occurs in confrontation with 
controlling yet unpredictable forces. It is a practice that is both adaptive and agen-
tial: HH meticulously considers the powers he is up against in the form of rules and 
practices, adapts to their logics and complies (at first) with the rules as they are 
set. But through this ‘adaptation’ he calculates how to ‘act otherwise’, attempting 
not only to find gaps, but also to create a situation where he can obtain the upper 
hand in order to influence and alter the power relation of which he is a part.
 When HH builds on the border between Area B and Area C, he attempts to 
create a vector that captures the flexibility and negotiability of the frontier in order 
to generate a new border, however impossible this might seem. HH does not select 
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a direct line to his primary goal — a future home on his family land — but takes a 
detour via a slowly constructed chicken farm; in the conceptual model of mêtis, 
this is the oblique means of arriving at the desired point via the shortest route.
Flexible Lines
Cartographic representations of the West Bank show an intricate filigree of lines 
and hatches dividing the surface of the territory. Multiple lines — some even bear-
ing multiple names — run across the map, slicing the area into different admin-
istrative and legal zones: from the outer boundary of the Green Line demarcat-
ing the OPT from Israel, intersected by the meandering route of the separation 
barrier, closures of no-man’s lands, the municipal lines of Greater Jerusalem and 
expanding settlements, to the internal divisions of Areas A, B and C. Beneath, his-
torical partition plans have left their mark on present conditions. On the map, the 
maze of lines creates zones resembling a complex camouflage pattern.
 Yet few of these thousands of kilometres of lines are static. Beyond the de-
lineation of zones on maps is a frontier geography that represents a superimposi-
tion of two ethno-national layers, simultaneously interlaced and separated from 
each other, with boundaries that are constantly pushed and pulled.20 These fluc-
tuating boundaries keep the territorial conflict alive. There are no mutually rec-
ognised borders between Israel and the West Bank, but rather lines that are acted 
upon and can be experienced on the ground as visible and invisible technologies of 
control. 
 Several commentators on the issue of borders, boundaries and frontiers in 
the Israel-Palestine conflict remark upon their protean nature. Israeli sociologist 
Ronen Shamir argues, in ‘Occupation as disorientation: The Impossibility of Bor-
ders’ (2009), that the logic of the occupation is an ‘anti-border’ logic which inces-
santly sustains the impossibility of establishing borders. Shamir holds that in the 
absence of borders, “dimensions of distance and proximity lose analytical valid-
ity and are replaced by an everyday-life phenomenology of cultural and political 
disorientation.”21 Anti-border logic rests on a clever utilisation of time where the 
absence of a proper locus benefits objectives of territorial expansion, recalling de 
20  The distinction between borders, frontiers and boundaries is crucial for grasping disputes over terri-
torial lines and the reluctance to define borders in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Here, relying on sociolo-
gist Elia Zureik’s cogent definitions, borders are bounded units that are closely regulated and demarcate 
jurisdiction between states. Frontiers denote states in the making, where territories are not defined, thus 
appearing as a “zone of interpretation.” Boundaries are permeable and dynamic aspects of a state, expand-
ing or contracting according to political situations. See Elia Zureik, “Constructing Palestine through Sur-
veillance Practices,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 28, no. 2 (2001).
21  Ronen Shamir, “Occupation as disorientation: The Impossibility of Borders,” in The power of inclusive 
exclusion: anatomy of Israeli rule in the occupied Palestinian territories, ed. Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni, and Sari 
Hanafi (New York: Zone, 2009), 590-1.
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Certeau’s temporality of tactics. The temporal and spatial indeterminacies of bor-
ders are instrumental for manipulation of what happens on the ground.
 Similarly, in the words of architect and cartographer Malkit Shohsan in At-
las of the Conflict: Israel-Palestine (2010), the fluctuations of borders and patterns of 
spatial intervention have resulted in “a unique and ever evolving spatial practice of 
temporality”, which in sum “define a fluid state of existence.”22 As Eyal Weizman 
puts it, the lines of the elastic frontier geography are “dynamic, constantly shift-
ing, ebbing and flowing; they creep along, stealthily surrounding Palestinian vil-
lages and roads. They may even erupt into Palestinian living rooms, bursting in 
through the house walls.”23 It is this ‘fluid state of existence’ of an ‘ebbing and flow-
ing’ frontier geography that generates the fleeting, disorienting terrain of unset-
tled lines that HH engages with.
 HH suggests that his line of reference — the line between Area B and Area 
C — is flexible. This flexibility is a feature of a territorial conflict and military occu-
pation that has historically and continuously redefined its borders and frontiers in 
terms of their legal and spatial designations. Flexibility adds to the basic condition 
of uncertainty deployed as a mode of control in the OPT, as previously discussed in 
relation to unplanning and unliveability (in chapters III and IV, respectively). The 
occupied territories are zones where neither space nor its regulations are reliable. 
Frontiers, laws, mechanisms of control and modes of power are in flux. The very 
structure of the architecture of occupation — both in the systemic and the ma-
terial sense — gains efficiency through its flexibility and is adaptable to different 
circumstances and shifting political objectives. The dynamic features of control 
strengthen its capacities for control, but this same flexibility can also be used to 
weaken it. The latter possibility is what HH seeks to exploit and accomplish, based, 
not least, on his knowledge of how territorial lines have developed historically. 
 The interactions, excesses, and contradictions that have been conducive 
to shaping and reshaping Israel’s means of control thus also adhere to the way in 
which border fluctuations have emanated, been erased, exceeded and solidified. 
Commencing at the outer perimeter of the occupied territories is the Green Line, 
originally drawn as the Armistice Agreement lines between Israel and Jordan in 
1949. The most important document used to authorise the agreement was a map 
22  Malkit Shoshan, Atlas of the Conflict, Israel-Palestine (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2010), 8.
23  The political elasticity of the frontier is described in depth by Eyal Weizman, Hollow land: Israel’s Ar-
chitecture of Occupation (London; New York: Verso, 2007). The territory’s continuous military transforma-
tion interferes with even the most basic architectural unit – the oikos, the family home – and erupts into 
its living rooms. The oikos takes on a political and military function when it defends borders and creates 
frontiers (as is the case in the form of settlements), when it is subsumed into a new territory by physical or 
legal borders (as is the case in the separation barrier or in the rezoning of land), or when it is targeted for 
destruction (to clear or secure land). Ibid., 6.
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at 1:250,000 scale, upon which new lines were drawn using a one millimetre-thick 
pencil, subsequently reproduced in green on official Israeli maps, which gives the 
Green Line its name.24 The line reflects the position of troops at the end of hostil-
ities, as well as indicating the positions of Homa Umigdal (‘wall and tower’); the 
architectural fortifications of strategic points first built in the 1930’s.25 Following 
the Armistice Agreement, the boundary of the Green Line was physically imple-
mented with fences and patrol roads.
 After the 1967 war, the sealed boundary was transformed into an internal 
administrative line of division whilst concurrently made permeable for Israeli 
settlements, thereby turning the OPT into a frontier for Israeli territorial expan-
sion.26 At the same time, cartographic representations changed. Mirroring each 
other’s means — but each to their own ends — both Israeli and Palestinian official 
maps and school text books ‘erased’ the Green Line in order, discursively, to form 
a mental image of a ‘whole’ homeland in the entire area of Mandate Palestine.27 
However, despite its cartographic omittance, the Green Line still served as an ad-
ministrative demarcation of Israel from the OPT, thus — most importantly — al-
lowing for a differentiation to be sustained between Israelis as citizens of Israel 
and Palestinians as occupied population.
 With the First Intifada, the comportment of the Green Line changed again. 
A less abstract boundary regime was imposed and close monitoring of movements 
across the line introduced, as well as the occasional imposition of curfews, closure 
of areas near the Green Line, and deposition of roadblocks.28 The process of rein-
forcing the demarcation between Israel and Palestine, converting it into a sealed 
24  The cartographic scale, cited from political geographer David Newman, refers to the official maps 
resulting from the Rhodes Agreement of 3 April 1949. See David Newman, Boundaries in Flux: The ‘Green 
Line’ Boundary Between Israel and the West Bank — Past, Present and Future, vol. 1 no.7, Boundary and Terri-
tory Briefing (University of Durham, International Boundaries Research Unit, 1995). However, these maps 
were drawn on basis of the cease-fire maps from 30 November 1948. According to Meron Benvenisti, the 
cease-fire agreement between Israel and Jordan was sketched on a Mandate map at 1:20,000 scale. The 
signatories and ‘cartographers’ Moshe Dayan and Abdullah al-Tal used green and red pencils, respectively, 
making lines three to four millimetres wide. These lines, when scaled to reality, represented sixty to eighty 
meters in width. Moreover, the maps were drawn on an uneven surface and thus full of errors and ambigu-
ities that were reproduced in subsequent maps, including those of the Rhodes Agreement. The thickness 
of the line had dire consequences, especially in urban areas of Jerusalem where entire neighbourhoods 
were left within the thickness of the line of indeterminacy. Meron Benvenisti, City of Stone: The Hidden 
History of Jerusalem (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1996), 56-58.
25  David Newman, “Borders and Conflict Resolution,” in A Companion to Border Studies, ed. Hastings 
Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 253. Sharon Rotbard, “Wall and 
Tower: The Mold of Israeli Adrikhalut,” in Territories: Islands, Camps and Other States of Utopia, ed. Anselm 
Franke and Kunst-Werke Berlin. (Berlin, Köln: KW, Verlag der Buchhandlung Walther König, 2003).
26  Newman, Boundaries in Flux, 1 no.7.
27  Ibid., 15.
28  “Borders and Conflict Resolution,” 254.
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barrier as it had been in 1949, culminated in the construction of the West Bank sep-
aration barrier, which commenced in 2002.29 These lines do not coincide, however: 
in the decades since the Green Line was originally drawn, realities on the ground 
have changed drastically due to Israel’s settlement activity. Official Palestinian 
claims for an internationally recognised border between the State of Palestine 
and the State of Israel follow the route of the Green Line; a territorial concession 
insofar as it circumscribes less than a third of Mandate Palestine.30 Conversely, 
adherence to the Green Line would for Israel constitute a withdrawal of its entire 
settlement infrastructure. The Green Line is not, therefore, a recognised border, 
an administrative boundary, a physical separation, nor a desired scenario, but 
rather an abstract line that initially enabled an ethnic differentiation, and is also 
the articulation of a Palestinian territorial compromise. Likewise, the route of the 
separation barrier is not a physical manifestation of the Green Line, but of Israel’s 
settlement colonisation of the West Bank.
  Though the borders are neither reconciled nor fixed, their flexibility has de-
creased with the construction of the separation barrier.31 By 2017, approximately 
sixty-five percent of the barrier had been completed. Its physical properties vary, 
consisting of eight meter-high concrete walls, preferred in urban areas where spa-
tial constraints place limits on the creation of wide exclusion zones, or a multi-lay-
ered fence system consisting of barbed wire, equipped with electronic sensors and 
surveillance cameras, and surrounded by an exclusion area of trenches and patrol 
roads, installed in areas of lower building density and occupying an area with an 
29  The name of this structure is often debated and varies according to political objectives: often denoted 
as a security or anti-terrorist wall, fence or barrier by the Israeli side, and separation, Apartheid, or coloni-
sation wall, fence, or barrier by the Palestinian side. The apparent conflict over the proper noun pertains 
to its function — is it a means of security or a means of discrimination? — yet is also a semiotic issue per-
taining to its physical appearance. For instance, for some critics, ‘barrier’ fails to convey the more violent 
associations provided by ‘wall’. I choose to denote it as a ‘separation barrier’ in order to cover the disso-
ciative function of a spectrum of different spatial constructions: concrete walls, barbed wire fences, roads, 
trenches and so on.
30  Political views on the matter of Palestinian territorial sovereignty evidently vary; from claims for the 
whole area of Mandate Palestine, to the total erasure of borders by creating a united state of Israel and Pal-
estine. Considering the Green Line as an international border of the de jure State of Palestine is the official 
position and demand of the PLO.
31  In addition to concerns for violations of human rights, the scenario of fixing the border by means of the 
physical barrier led the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to declare it illegal according to 
their advisory opinion in 2004. The ICJ notably emphasised the risk of created facts on the ground imped-
ing a politically settled border. International Court of Justice, “Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004..” For further analysis of the 
barrier’s impact a decade after its construction, see for instance: Stéphanie Latte Abdallah and Cédric Par-
izot, (eds), Israelis and Palestinians in the Shadows of the Wall: Spaces of Separation and Occupation (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2015).; Reece Jones, Christine Leuenberger, and Emily Wills Regan, (eds), “The West Bank Wall,” 
Journal of Borderland Studies  (2016).
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average width of sixty metres.32 Media images of the wall might lead one to believe 
that the barrier is made entirely of concrete. However, segments of the barrier con-
sisting of concrete wall actually constitute no more than five percent of its entire 
length. The projected length of the barrier is an accumulation of over 700 circu-
itous kilometres, more than double the length of the 330 kilometre long Green 
Line.33 Eighty-five percent of the planned barrier is positioned on the West Bank 
side of the Green Line, creating a ‘seam zone’, accessible with special permit only, 
as well as forming pockets that loop into the West Bank to include settlements. For 
the remaining fifteen percent, the opposite is the case, and the wall loops outside 
of the Green Line in order to omit areas with a Palestinian population. Movement 
across the separation barrier and the Green Line into Israel requires special per-
mits and takes place through one of twenty-six checkpoints guarded by the IDF.
 Israel’s official political argument for building the barrier relies on securi-
ty: it is designed to prevent terrorist attacks.34 However, the security argument is 
called into question by opponents of the barrier, amongst others the Israeli law-
yers Shaul Arieli and Michael Sfard. According to Arieli and Sfard’s examination 
of the initial political and military arguments used to legitimate the barrier’s con-
struction, the barrier reflects the political view of how Israel would like to see the 
borders of its state: based on demography rather than a convincing argument for 
security.35 Initially, the construction of the barrier was opposed by the IDF, which 
denounced its security aspects and argued that it would intensify Palestinian ter-
rorism.36 Nevertheless, construction of the barrier complex was imposed, and the 
32  For a description of the multi-layered fence structure, see Israel Ministry of Defence, “Operational 
Concept,”  https://www.thecaseforisrael.com/pdf/Israel%20Security%20Fenc.pdf. Last access 31.7.2017. 
For a description of the appearance of the concrete wall sections, see Weizman, 161 ff., chapter 6. In con-
trast to the raw structure visible from the Palestinian side, the concrete walls are cautiously designed to be 
as visually inoffensive as possible when seen from the Israeli side.
33  For statistics and progression on the construction of the barrier, see B’Tselem, “The Separation Barrier 
- Statistics,”  http://www.btselem.org/separation_barrier/oldstatistics. Last access 27.7.2017.
34  For Israel’s arguments for the barrier as a measure against terrorism, see for instance Israel Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, “Saving Lives: Israel’s anti-terrorist fence - Answers to Questions,”  http://www.mfa.
gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/saving%20lives-%20israel-s%20anti-terrorist%20
fence%20-%20answ.aspx. Last access 31.7.2017.
35  Arieli and Sfard examine the political debates concerning the barrier in advance of its construction 
and the consequent routing of the barrier, wherein the IDF complied with political objectives to push the 
barrier eastward rather than constructing it according to a military and security assessment that desig-
nated a route to the west of the Green Line. See Shaul Arieli and Michael Sfard, “A Wall of Folly: The War 
the IDF is Waging via ‘The Seam Zone’” (paper presented at the Space and Security, Van Leer Institute, 
Jerusalem, 2010). See also website of the Israel Ministry of Defence, “Israel’s Security Fence,”  http://www.
securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/default.htm. Last access 10.3.2016.
36  Arieli and Sfard quote Shaul Mofaz, IDF chief of staff during the early 2000s, as maintaining that the 
IDF would “build the fence during the day and fight for it at night, and [it] would not solve a thing.” Arieli 
and Sfard,  2.
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IDF subsequently conducted the task according to the expressed political (demo-
graphic) objectives. The quest for control of a maximum of territory containing a 
minimum of its Palestinian population is thus an equation that has informed the 
barrier’s meandering route, stretching deep into the West Bank.37 Over the course 
of the fifteen years since its inception, and following numerous demonstrations, 
political battles and legal cases that have amended its route, the barrier has shaped 
a physical edge that — precisely because of its perceived solidity and the spatial 
and ethnic differentiation it affords — might easily be mistaken for a state border 
demarcation.38
 Hence, ‘flexibility’ now adheres not so much to the Green Line or to the 
path of the separation barrier, as to internal frontiers and pressure placed upon 
Palestinian localities through the expansion of Israeli settlements. The division 
between Area B and Area C is therefore important as a frontier zone. The carto-
graphic ambiguity produced by the inevitable imprecision that comes with trans-
ferring lines drawn on a map to a physical reality has, like the Green Line, had con-
sequences for the fragmented post-Oslo landscape. Lines have been the subject 
of legal disputes, as even the thickness of the line on the map, or the percentage 
of one’s house belonging to one side of the line or the other, is critical for know-
ing to which governing apparatus one is ultimately subject.39 The determination, 
interpretation, physicality and management of these boundaries for zoning land 
are key for mechanisms of unplanning to be applied, consequently affecting how 
spatial practices develop. In HH’s case, it is the imprecision with which the trans-
fer of the cartographic line onto the terrain was carried out — in addition to the 
five-meter thickness of the line in reality — that could potentially be decisive in 
determining whether he would be given a building permit. Yet the precise position 
37  That the separation barrier is a demographic instrument is confirmed by the Israeli geographer Arnon 
Soffer, who has been influential in developing Israel’s security policies. Soffer considers Palestinians to 
pose a demographic threat. In the report Israel: Demography, Soffer and Evgenia Bystrov list their “achieve-
ments as academics” in terms of their effect on Israeli policies, amongst which they cite the separation 
barrier: “The separation fence in Judea and Samaria has been established and consolidated, its line gen-
erally according with the authors’ perception of ‘Palestinians are there and Israelis are here’.” Evgenia 
Bystrov and Arnon Soffer, Israel: Demography 2013-2034 — Challenges and Chances, 6 ed., Israel: Demogra-
phy (University of Haifa, 2013), 13.
38  For Weizman, there is an ethical frustration and dilemma to engagement with legal means for rerout-
ing the separation barrier: should one use the Israeli legal system to push the boundary in selected places, 
or should one dismiss this option and oppose the barrier in its totality? See Weizman, 175. Sfard also raises 
the concern that, as prosecutor and plaintiff, one becomes complicit with designing the barrier when ar-
guing for ‘better’ paths. This paradox is actualised for Sfard as a result of his work for the Israeli human 
rights organisation Yesh Din. See Yesh Din - Volunteers for Human Rights,  https://www.yesh-din.org/en/. 
Last access 31.7.2017.
39  Alessandro Petti et al., Architecture after Revolution (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2013), 150-65. and DAAR, 
“The Lawless Line in Court,”  http://www.decolonizing.ps/site/the-lawless-line-in-court/. Last access 
5.8.2017.
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of the line is not the only issue at stake: just as HH realises that the line might ac-
tually cross the plot at the exact section most suited to construction, the testing of 
the line’s flexibility is just as relevant to political enactment upon such lines.
 The maze of boundaries mediate the flow — and disruption — of the infra-
structure of life. In the essay ‘Where, Where to, and When in the Occupied Ter-
ritories’ (2009), Ariel Handel argues that the most crucial question with regards 
to the fragmentation of the territories is not the sum of ‘absolute values’ (total 
area size) of land but rather the ‘use value’ of the land that remains.40 Unpredict-
able closures of border crossings and volatile procedures for the issue of border 
crossing permits, for example, impede movement and disrupt ordinary, everyday 
pursuits such as going to work or school. The impossibility of properly calculating 
how to deal with the most mundane tasks, such as getting somewhere on time — or 
getting there at all — creates uncertainty and disorientation. While Handel refers 
to the impact of a movement regime on the pursuit of daily activities, his initial 
observation also arguably applies to the impact of unplanning mechanisms on the 
use value of the land’s surface. In HH’s case, it is not the absolute value of his plot 
that has been trimmed, but its use value that has been invalidated by the position 
of an interim line drawn in the 1990s.
Speculative Exchange
HH’s plan to bypass the restrictions on building is a far from exceptional example, 
either of cunning ideas or the means to implement them. In the West Bank, ma-
noeuvres through situational spatial practices are manifold and often necessary 
for the daily conduct of life, something that this thesis attempts to show.
 Building while at risk of the building being demolished is a typical problem 
that gives rise to practices of dissimulation. Although HH cannot hide the house 
he is building, examples can be found of attempts to do precisely this. Illegal build-
ing often takes place on Shabbat, the Israeli holiday, when military surveillance is 
thought to be less comprehensive, and inventive techniques of visually camouflag-
ing construction activity are tested continuously.41 In Atlas of the Conflict, Shoshan 
shows, amongst maps and building typologies, a description of the process for 
constructing building ‘scenography’ for vertical extensions in areas less thor-
oughly inspected from the ground but surveilled by cameras from above.42 A verti-
40  Ariel Handel, “Where, Where to, and When in the Occupied Territories: An Introduction to Geogra-
phy of Disaster,” in The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tories, ed. Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni, and Sari Hanafi (New York: Zone, 2009).
41  Building on Shabbat is also a practice of aid organisations that help rebuild after demolitions. Howev-
er, surveillance of changes on the ground also takes place on Shabbat, so it is no safeguard against detec-
tion. See for instance Appendix A in this thesis.
42  Shoshan.
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cal extension of added floors, visible only by measuring the length of the shadow it 
casts, might provide a means of avoiding demolition. Furthermore, in addition to 
practical measures for building covertly, unauthorised building has become part 
of a calculated economy of expenditure. According to a Palestinian architect re-
siding in Jerusalem, some Palestinians speculate upon not only whether the house 
will be demolished, but also the heavy fines that accompany pending demolition 
orders should their building project be discovered. Since the demolition order can 
remain pending for several years, paying the fines can become a form of calculated 
‘rent’ for those living in unauthorised houses.43 
 HH’s engagement with frontiers and his attempt to test the flexibility of the 
line is an endeavour that requires intimate knowledge of the political situation and 
the evolution of dynamic boundaries. HH is not the first to address the possibility 
of manipulating lines either by intervening on the ground or pointing to the inher-
ent absurdities the cartographic lines produce. For instance, in his account of the 
“cartographic monstrosity” of the drawing of the Green Line, resulting in sixty 
to eighty metre wide zones, Meron Benvenisti asks “Who owned the ‘width of the 
line’?”44 In the years between the 1948 and the 1967 war, Benvenisti remarks, this 
zone of indeterminacy led to severe conflicts and even bloodshed, and was flexed 
in numerous ways.
 Moreover, Benvenisti’s question was reformulated by Decolonizing Archi-
tecture Art Residency (DAAR) in their investigative and speculative project ‘The 
Lawless Line’.45 In this project, DAAR took the thickness of the line separating 
Area B from Area C and the municipal borders of Jerusalem as a starting point 
for exploring the latent possibilities that reside in these strips of extraterritorial 
land. For DAAR, the lines represent a “thin but powerful space for potential po-
litical transformations”, suggesting that they might constitute “all that remains” 
from Palestine: to this end, DAAR follow their route “along the edges of villages 
and towns, across fields, olive and fruit orchards, roads, gardens, kindergartens, 
fences, terraces, homes, public buildings, a football stadium, a mosque and finally 
a large castle recently built.”46 By tracing the lines, DAAR encountered the “bor-
derline disorder” of the West Bank from an academic and artistic perspective.
 One of their encounters was a legal case where the municipal line of Jeru-
salem crossed the house of a Palestinian family. Since its position was crucial for 
43  The remark on calculating fines emerged during a conversation with the architect on planning issues 
in East Jerusalem. It is not clear how widespread this practice is.
44  Benvenisti, 57.
45  See the chapter ‘A Common Assembly’ with Nicola Perugini in Petti et al., 150-77. and DAAR, “The 
Lawless Line,”  http://www.decolonizing.ps/site/the-lawless-line-in-court/. Last access 5.8.2017
46  “The Lawless Line”.
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entitlement to a temporary Israeli ID required for Palestinian residency in Jerusa-
lem, the family brought the case to court.47 However, in this instance no thickness 
was assigned to the line, and the surveyor commissioned by the Labour Court of 
Jerusalem found that 51.2 percent was outside of Jerusalem; the family’s Jerusa-
lem residency was consequently revoked.
 Another encounter with the Jerusalem municipal line, which coincides with 
the Oslo line, took place in the abandoned Palestinian Legislative Council (‘Pales-
tinian Parliament’) building in Abu Dis.48 Built in 1996 following the Oslo Agree-
ment, the Palestinian leadership decided to bypass Israel’s demand that no Pal-
estinian institutions be allowed in Jerusalem by placing the Parliament building 
half within the line, thereby staking a Palestinian claim to the city. However, when 
the separation barrier was built in 2003, the Parliament was left outside of Jerusa-
lem’s de facto border and its symbolism as a Palestinian Parliament in Jerusalem 
became void. Construction was halted and the building abandoned.
 HH is familiar with the particularities of these projects, as well as the histor-
ic specificity of how the lines have fluctuated. There is a kinship between his way 
of thinking — combining historical knowledge, political consciousness, and prac-
tical cunning when devising his future actions — and the speculative imagination 
of projects like DAAR’s. However discouraging the outcome of these cases might 
seem, the attitude of challenging the flexibility of the line is a mode of thought they 
have in common. There seems to be a mutual relation of exchange between HH’s 
spatial practice and DAAR’s explorations: HH is aware of the discourse and meth-
ods of speculative practices that address the political potentials of the ‘borderline 
disorder’, yet these academic and artistic practices are also informed by practices 
that already take place on the ground, aiming to saturate the ability of these more 
concealed actions of everyday practices to articulate political demands. Mêtis is 
thus, in my view, an attitude that is shared by spatial practices in real life and vir-
tual practices of speculation; an attitude of endeavouring to manipulate hostile 
forces too powerful to be controlled directly, and of creating openings where none 
seem to exist. 
 In this chapter, I have attempted to show how the structural uncertainty 
posed by the dynamics of the occupation necessitates a certain navigational agili-
ty. The production of an environment characterised by erratic changes affects the 
conduct of spatial practices in daily life and the obstacles to remaining present on 
the ground that it creates. The case of HH’s disguised building efforts illustrates 
how endemic uncertainty informs a practice of navigating unstable conditions 
47  Petti et al., 163-65.
48  Ibid., 166-77.
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by deploying the mental attitude of mêtis. My articulation of mêtis as an attitude 
that informs navigation in an unstable world is not driven by a wish to celebrate 
‘creative survival skills’, but rather to point to fundamental obstructions posed by 
the occupation, necessitating the perspicacity of tricks. By providing an account 
of how flexibility adheres to the territory through its lines, I have sought to make 
visible how HH’s attempt to compensate for the fleeting terrain is a spatial practice 
common to the West Bank, informed by and informing further speculation on the 
creation of openings in a conflict that has so far evaded any clear lines of agree-
ment.
185
CONCLUSION
YET UNBORN REALITIES1
Some years ago I was offered the chance to add a new stamp to my passport. Unlike 
the usual encounter this would entail, it did not take place while entering a sov-
ereign state at the border, it was not an official border control officer that offered 
the stamp, and the state depicted in the graphics of the stamp did not exist. The 
stamp’s imprint read ‘State of Palestine’, together with a depiction of a humming-
bird and an olive branch. 
 The situation triggered an instant uncertain hesitation in my mind, almost 
perfectly mirroring a recent feeling of reluctance that I had experienced at Ben Gu-
rion airport in Tel Aviv. Here, I am always anxious about being questioned exhaus-
tively and whether I will be allowed or denied entry. Today, the manual ink stamp 
1  This chapter is based on a paper presented at the conference ‘F(r)ictions of Art’ in Berlin (2014), with 
proceedings published in Runa Johannessen, “Yet Unborn Realities: Imprints of Possibility in Khaled Jar-
rar’s State of Palestine Stamp.,” Paragrana Journal 25, no. 2 (2016).
Fig. 54: Passport with State of Palestine stamp. Image: Khaled Jarrar.
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is replaced by a printed visa, but on my first visit to Ben Gurion in 2010, when the 
stamp was still in use, I was reluctant to request the required stamp be placed on 
a separate paper. Though this was possible in principle, I had heard rumours that 
it might raise suspicions about potential political affiliations and my agenda for 
entering Israel, thus presenting an unnecessary obstacle. My ambivalence toward 
‘tarnishing’ my passport with an Israeli stamp was linked to a simple pragmatic 
evaluation of the fact that certain other countries I wished to visit do not permit 
entry to visitors with Israeli visas in their passports: Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen all deny entry on these grounds. At the same 
time I was afraid of being refused the very same stamp, my ticket to pass the pass-
port counter into Israel and from there travel to the West Bank, my destination.
 When presented with the option of the State of Palestine stamp, my anx-
iousness was rekindled in reverse. Hesitant about ‘tarnishing’ my passport but 
this time with a Palestinian stamp, I figured that it could be incompatible with my 
wish to later pass safely through Ben Gurion. It is not because the one necessarily 
rules out the other, but the potential denial of entry on the basis of ‘security con-
cerns’ occupied my mind. Thus, I had misgivings about the Palestinian stamp for 
practical and political reasons. I speculated as to whether I could perhaps have two 
passports or have this stamp on a separate paper, ridiculously symbolic as it would 
be. Moreover, I was stuck with the embarrassment, paranoia and cowardice that 
came with even doubting.
 The venue was Kunstwerke in Berlin, during the 7th Berlin Biennale in 2012, 
and the author of the stamp was the Palestinian artist Khaled Jarrar.2 Jarrar’s 
stamp was an offshoot of ‘Live and Work in Palestine’, an ongoing artistic project 
that is also an invitation or ironic summons: to live and work in Palestine.3 The 
project was initiated in 2011 with Jarrar stamping non-Palestinian’s passports at 
the central bus station in Ramallah, thus simultaneously mimicking Israeli border 
control practices and installing himself as a representative of a fictional state on 
an alternative border. Jarrar has since repeated the action on a number of occa-
sions at various locations, stamping hundreds of passports.
 Jarrar’s project highlights several emblematic conditions and mechanisms 
of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The themes apparent are, for example, those of the 
border regime and corresponding checkpoints coupled with the lack of fixed bor-
2  The 7th Berlin Biennale was dedicated to the question of, “how art can allow citizens to influence real-
ity and foster critical attitudes in society.” The publication accompanying the show bears the imperative 
title Forget Fear; what the curator Artur Zmijewski asks us to do, despite our anxiety toward engaging with 
the unpleasant and the political. Artur Zmijewski et al., Forget Fear: 7. Berlin Biennale für Zeitgenössische 
Kunst (Köln: König, 2012).
3  ‘Live and Work in Palestine’ is documented on the project’s Facebook page Khaled Jarrar, “Live and 
Work in Palestine,”  https://www.facebook.com/lawi.pal/timeline. Last access 30.10.15.
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ders; the correlation between identification, affiliation and rights through official 
documents; and, the quasi-authority of the Palestinian Administration, devoid as 
they are of any governmental autonomy. Above all, the symbolic gesture elicits the 
absence of a sovereign state: an authoritative stamp from a Palestinian State is far 
from sight.
 My encounter with Jarrar’s work evoked two orders of reflection in relation 
to these themes. The first has to do with tactical considerations in daily life. In my 
immediate response, a feeling of uncertainty was prompted: an aesthetic experi-
ence of an artwork, to be sure, but nonetheless parallel to particular encounters 
with mechanisms that invoke such uncertainties in real life. In my case, the un-
certainty related to passport control, though exceeding what may be considered 
merely a private issue, the stamp evoked the pragmatism of tactical everyday prac-
tices required in a context saturated by uncertainty toward the future: those — 
often situational — spatial practices that this thesis has aimed to gain an under-
standing of.
 However, besides this initial reaction, the stamp also motivated a reflection 
around the particular form of thought that imbues such practices, be they quotidi-
an activity or artistic expression. I consider this form of thought to be a speculative 
imagination in action. In chapter VI, on HH’s probing of the possibility for flexing 
the line between Area B and Area C, I argued that HH’s actions are informed by an 
attitude of mêtis, standing in a relation of exchange with speculative projects from 
artistic and academic fields. However, whether these practices directly serve as in-
spiration for each other — an assertion that is difficult to prove — is not the issue, 
but rather the fact that both seem to operate on a level of speculative imagination; 
tactical pragmatism and speculative imagination intersect. Common to both is an 
endeavour to create openings where none seem to exist. To ‘create openings’ per-
tains to allowing for the future to be thought differently than present conditions 
might suggest. In the same vein, characteristic to an artwork like Jarrar’s stamp is 
its complex relation to the future as a potential in the present. 
 In the following, the aim is to consider such future-thinking by inquiring 
into a moment of friction between reality and possibility, the present and the fu-
ture, and the actual and the fictional, conveyed by the stamp. To this end, I will 
first explore what it might mean to have a sense of a possible future, before consid-
ering speculation as an operation.
Sense of possibility
I suggest that Jarrar’s fictional State of Palestine can be viewed as a state ‘yet un-
born’. That it is ‘unborn’ reflects the factual absence of a self-determining state 
highlighted by the fictional and symbolic seal of sovereignty. However, the ‘yet’ 
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reflects the fact that the stamp articulates the potential presence of a Palestinian 
State in the future. This latency is central to Jarrar’s project. As noted by art his-
torian Simon Faulkner, commenting on Jarrar’s stamp, “the legend ‘State of Pal-
estine’ exists in the passports stamped by Jarrar as a phantasmic premonition of 
what might be.”4 In Jarrar’s own words, he hopes the stamp “will remind people 
that [Palestine] is a nation waiting to be born.”5 
 If a Palestinian State is waiting to be born, and exists only as a premonition, 
how are we to understand its latency in the present? If a state is thought of in the 
future tense, in what sense is it anything more than a mere expression of hope or 
wishful thinking? For me, Jarrar’s fictional passport stamp triggered a rumina-
tion on the future state as a ‘yet unborn’ reality. I borrow this expression from the 
author Robert Musil’s monumental novel The Man Without Qualities from 1932. In 
the chapter ‘If there is such a thing as a sense of reality, there must also be a sense 
of possibility’, Musil, describing the protagonist Ulrich — the Möglichkeitsmensch, 
the man of possibilities — writes:
4  Simon Faulkner, “Contesting the Antiborder Condition: Khaled Jarrar’s Live and Work in Palestine 
Project,” https://simonsteachingblog.wordpress.com/2011/07/10/contesting-the-antiborder-condi-
tion-khaled-jarrar’s-live-and-work-in-palestine-project/. Last access 23.8.2017
5  Kyle Chayka, “Artist Creates Fake Palestinian Passport Stamp,”  http://hyperallergic.com/27630/
fake-palestine-passport-stamp/. Last access 23.8.2017
Fig. 55: Cancelled passport with State of Palestine stamp. Image: Khaled Jarrar.
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Since his ideas, in so far as they are not mere idle phantasmagoria, are nothing else than 
as yet unborn realities, he too of course has a sense of reality; but it is a sense of possible 
reality and moves towards its goal much more slowly than most people’s sense of their real 
possibilities.6
Ulrich’s sense of reality is, according to his author, different to most people’s not 
because his ideas are unrealistic, but because they are thus far not realised. The 
man of possibilities conjures a possible reality instead of assessing what could be 
considered do-able or probable from the standpoint of the present. Like Ulrich’s 
ideas, a Palestinian State is a possible reality; not redeemed, and only slowly — if at 
all — moving towards its goal.
 The ‘yet unborn’ Palestinian State was conceived decades ago but is still 
pending, punctuated by moments of imagined birth. The Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation declared the de jure State of Palestine from its government in exile in 
Algiers in 1988, and in 1993 the signing of the first part of the Oslo Agreements was 
intended to inaugurate the process of establishing a Palestinian State alongside 
Israel. More than two decades later, and despite the State of Palestine being grant-
ed non-membership observer status in the UN in 2012 — strongly disapproved by 
Israel — a de facto Palestinian State is still, or yet, unborn. However, to recognise 
a state’s condition as a ‘yet unborn’ reality, even if its birth is a long time coming 
— or never coming at all — implies that a possible reality exists, to reuse Musil’s 
phrase, and is not simply an empty negative denoting an absence. It is precisely 
this sense of a possible reality that is set in motion in Jarrar’s work through the 
enactment of a gesture normally reserved for official representatives of a state. 
 Palestinian curator Reem Fadda contemplates the temporal dimension of 
the Palestinian situation in a similar way in the essay ‘Not-yet-ness’ (2009).7 In 
the troubled occupied territories, being somewhat magnetic for artists and aca-
demics, history-in-the-making can be witnessed in ‘real’ time, equivalent to my 
reading of unintentional monuments as manifestations of ‘history taking place’ 
in chapter II. The present tense contributes to thinking history as futurity or time 
continuum, according to Fadda.8 Having recently attended a conference entitled 
‘Crisis States: The Uncertain Future of Israel/Palestine’, Fadda notes that she is 
reassured to know that both artists and academics “obsess about this question of 
6  Robert Musil, The Man without Qualities: Vol.1: A Sort of Introduction (New York: Capricorn Books, 1965), 
11, 13.
7  Reem Fadda, “Not-yet-ness,” in Liminal Spaces, ed. Eyal Danon and Galit Eilat (Holon: 2009).
8  Ibid., 224.
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futurity.”9 In a time saturated by uncertainty towards the future — a condition 
characteristic for the order of the occupation, as has been reiterated many times 
in this thesis — and in a time and state of political stagnation with regard to any 
genuine move towards peace, Fadda calls for imagination and existential thinking 
about how to deal with the future. Fadda thus offers the temporal term not-yet-
ness, which includes a layer of potentiality to the notion of history-in-the-making. 
In the Palestinian context, not-yet-ness is applied as a temporal term for some-
thing that is actively absent but also existent in its potential to become present. 
Fadda writes:
Not-yet-ness refers to the state of not being a state, or a sovereignty in the traditional 
sense that is not fully reinstated or wants to create its own permutations and understand-
ings of what constitutes a sovereign project. … Unpacking the term ‘not-yet-ness’ with-
in that context from a more theoretical point of view, one finds that it unfolds multiple 
meanings: that which is, and which is not. Or that with the potential to be, but is not.10
Reading Fadda against the words of Musil, not-yet-ness consists of possibilities 
that are not pure illusions or phantasms, but ideas produced with a sense of a pos-
sible reality. To act within the parameters of not-yet-ness, according to Fadda, is to 
claim agency and liberty to create one’s own definitions and permutations — it is 
to act on one’s potentiality. This is the strategy adopted by Jarrar when he stamped 
passports during the Biennale in Berlin. Without being prescriptive for how this 
state could come about, or normative as to its constituency, Jarrar evokes the con-
tours of agency in the seemingly stagnated state of Israel-Palestine.
 As we have already seen in the chapter ‘Time Matters’, ‘stagnation’, ‘im-
passe’, ‘standstill’ and ‘deadlock’ are temporal terms often called upon to describe 
the frustration of a conflict that is politically stuck. Concurrently, history materi-
alises and time seems to be running out for a Palestinian state; at least in the form 
of the self-determined state projected long ago. How can one avoid a sense of time 
running out and of defeat, but rather awake a sense of the possible in this situation? 
Is it possible to claim agency for provoking change or seeing other possibilities for 
the future than those outlined by the political gridlock of impossibilities? Clearly, 
Jarrar’s act of stamping will not lead the political echelon to revise their opinions. 
Instead, his strategy for provoking change is to create an opening of the future 
through directing our attention to an imaginary state of what might be. What is 
important is that the opening of the future is also an opening of the present, that 
9  Ibid., 225.
10  Ibid., 227.
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we are prompted to consider its current configurations, provisions, and practices: 
among which, the disruption of the infrastructure of life produced by an incessant 
border regime and the unliveable spaces such disruptions bring about.
 The passport stamp also raises questions about how to expand the imagina-
tion; not only what will be possible in the future, of what the future could possibly 
look like, but also an imagination and understanding of what is at present. Specu-
lation toward the future, toward what is not present in our time, elucidates what 
is actual, here and now: what is possible at present? Articulating the question with 
Musil’s words, this is not a question of the yet unborn realities of a phantasmic fu-
ture, but rather a question of the yet unborn realities of the present.
Speculation
In conventional terms, speculation is a term denoting calculated high-risk invest-
ments that promise high financial returns. As such, the word is well-known and in 
some cases negatively connoted, at least in the building sector, where speculation 
often is to the detriment of the end user. Within a scientific context, to speculate 
is to engage with the unknown through calculation. Through formal practices of 
calibration and measuring, uncertainties and contingencies can be converted into 
risks or possibilities to be managed. This kind of speculation is a contingent cal-
culation, probing real — or realistic — possibilities rather than possible realities.
 By contrast, I suggest that the term speculation may be used as a label for an 
act of imagination that elucidates that which we are not able to calculate or predict. 
In this sense of the word, speculation evades or circumvents a present situation 
and its rules of conduct, and directs the vision toward what is fundamentally un-
certain. To speculate is ‘to observe’ or ‘to spy on’, from the Latin root specere and 
speculari. Speculating, in the sense of the concept I am developing here, is to spy on 
something that is obscure and not evident, thereby addressing potential without 
actually calculating all the steps to reach it. It is at the same time a sense of pos-
sible reality and a non-contingent guesswork into the yet unborn realities of the 
present.
 To speculate, therefore, entails a certain logic, a way of calculating, as 
though present circumstances have been transcended, exceeded or cut across; as 
though something has actually taken place, such as the premature inauguration 
of the Palestinian State. This ‘transcendence’ is what makes speculation effective. 
But perhaps more than anything else, it reflects what is here and now and what 
is yet unborn. Consequently, speculation becomes an instrument of reflection by 
which the present becomes visible: it can be understood as a mirroring of present 
realities, expressed in imaginaries that find their time and place in multiple tem-
poralities, or time continuum, recalling Fadda. It is a reflection that might find its 
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‘place’ in the future, or simply ‘out of time’, but always, I would contend, as a reflec-
tion of what is here and now. It is an operative device that reflects a potential.
 An understanding of speculation as reflection is offered by the philosopher 
and art critic Boris Groys in his essay ‘Visible and Invisible Sides of Reproduction’ 
(2005). As Groys points out, in addition to observing and spying, speculation — 
from the Latin speculum — also means mirroring. Groys writes:
Speculation is both a true reflection of reality as it presents itself as an empirical fact, as 
well as a reflection on reality that may be hidden behind its empirical image. In other words, 
speculation is a reflection on the mirror and not merely the reflection in the mirror.11
Thus, speculation is not just a reflection of something real and factual — a reflec-
tion in the mirror — but also a reflection on the reality it reflects — a reflection on 
the mirror. In my reading of Groys’ statement, speculation, understood as a reflec-
tion in this double sense, throw reality back at us through musing upon what can-
not only be grasped as empirical fact. In the same vein, the cultural critic Fredric 
Jameson writes in his essay ‘Utopia as Method’ (2015):
The utopia, I argue, is not a representation but an operation calculated to disclose the lim-
its of our own imagination of the future, the lines beyond which we do not seem able to go 
in imagining changes in our own society and world (except in the direction of dystopia 
and catastrophe).12
Jameson’s utopia, as an operation that discloses limits to our imagination of how 
things can actually (be seen to) be different, corresponds with a logic of specula-
tive imagination as a transcendence of present circumstances. Utopia and spec-
ulation are usually considered incompatible. Nonetheless, the methodologies of 
the two operations are very much alike insofar as they deploy an imaginary future 
that has the capacity to impart boundaries in our own time. In line with Jameson, 
it is the operation itself — that of transcending the boundaries of our imagination 
of change — that makes speculation a transformative instrument. Speculation be-
comes productive in its capacity to kindle the sense of the possible, to paraphrase 
Musil once again.
11  Boris Groys, “Visible and Invisible Sides of Reproduction,” in Speculation, Now: Essays and Artworks, 
ed. Vyjayanthi Venuturupalli Rao, Prem Krishnamurthy, and Carin Kuoni (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2015), 33.
12  Fredric Jameson, “Utopia as Method, or the Uses of the Future,” in Utopia/Dystopia: Conditions of 
Historical Possibility, ed. Michael D. Gordin, Helen Tilley, and Gyan Prakash (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: 
Princeton University Press, 2010).
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 Jarrar is not alone in operating within a logic of speculation. A number of 
other artists, architects, activists and academics make use of this strategy when 
dealing with the Israel-Palestine conflict. For instance, a central concern of De-
colonizing Architecture Art Residency (DAAR), discussed in the previous chapter, 
is to explore how the spatial remains of the occupation can be dealt with in a de-
colonised future. Other individuals and collectives also deal with the occupation’s 
spatial aspects by projecting a reality into the future or by deploying subversive 
strategies that intervene in the present. These speculative projects are not neces-
sarily ‘utopian’ in the sense of a smooth and desired reality; projecting bleak fu-
tures is also part of a speculative imaginary.
 The Palestinian artist Larissa Sansour, for example, makes use of a projec-
tive strategy when exploring the spatial confinements and shrinking of Palestin-
ian territories in the dystopian science fiction short film Nation Estate: Living the 
High Life (2012).13 Sansour creates a vertical solution for how a two-state solution 
can come about: in Nation Estate the Palestinian State takes the form of a solitary 
high-rise. By distributing the Palestinian territories, its institutions and popula-
tion across various floors, the film alludes to the contraction, densification and 
displacement of Palestinian space. Sansour reflects the present situation in a ver-
tical absurdity, where the ‘state’ becomes an ‘estate’ of symbolic replacements for 
land and identity; at once ludicrous and ludicrously close to the microcosm of a 
confined Palestinian territory in reality.
 Other artists make use of projective speculative strategies in similar but less 
improbable ways. The architect, artist and curator Yazid Anani, in collaboration 
with artist Emily Jacir, critically engages with the future prospects of the Palestin-
ian national project through the public intervention Al-Riyadh (‘Paradise’, 2010), 
in which billboards of fictional building projects in Ramallah are placed around 
the city.14 The intervention was a reaction to booming construction in Ramallah 
in the late 2000s, accompanied by omnipresent advertisements that, according to 
Anani, were “telling about the future of Ramallah”, whereby “you could see the 
13  Nation Estate is one of several projects by Sansour that deal with spatial speculation in a Palestinian 
context. One of her most recent works is entitled In the Future They Ate from the Finest Porcelain (2016); a 
future-fiction film which, in Sansour’s words, explores the role of myth in history, fact and national iden-
tity. Sansour’s webpage documents all projects. For documentation of Nation Estate, see Larissa Sansour, 
“Nation Estate: Living the High Life,”  http://www.larissasansour.com/nation_estate.html. Last access 
7.8.2017.
14  Anani described the idea behind, and circumstances around, the creation of the Al-Riyadh tower proj-
ect during an interview I conducted with him. See Yazid Anani, interview by Runa Johannessen, 2017, This 
Thesis. For a brief documentation of the project, see for instance Nafas Art Magazine, “Emily Jacir and 
Yazid Anani: Al-Riyadh,”  http://u-in-u.com/nafas/articles/2010/ramallah/img/14-jacir-anani/. Last access 
7.8.2017
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portal to the future only by looking at billboards.”15 By copying the colours and 
logo used by the grand but private Palestinian city development project Rawabi, 
and placing billboards with images of — what they considered to be — preposter-
ous development projects at strategic sites in Ramallah, Anani and Jacir aimed to 
provoke a discussion around the idea of Palestine as a nation: had a building proj-
ect replaced the building of a state and its institutions? The choice of Rawabi as a 
model for the billboards was not coincidental, but rather ironic: the city, its con-
struction encircling the upper slopes of a hill, strongly resembles the architecture 
of Israeli settlements. In the event, critical reception did not appear as Anani and 
Jacir expected and intended; their fictional buildings were perhaps closer to the 
real possibilities for Palestine than they had wished.
 Others make use of speculative strategies that situate interventions in the 
present as subversions through which mechanisms of the occupation are put on 
display. In the short video Deflect (2014), artist Luca Vanello smuggles pulverised 
building material from a demolished Palestinian house in East Jerusalem into bags 
of cement on a construction site in Tel Aviv.16 Interpreted in line with my first or-
der of reflection, Deflect gives associations to everyday tactical practices such as 
smuggling, and looking for ways-out, to re-quote Ariella Azoualy and Adi Ophir.17 
In addition, partly tongue-in-cheek and partly as an act of immortalising the Pal-
estinian ruin, Vanello makes tangible the process of building Israel on — and out 
of — the ruins of Palestinian houses and the dispossession and displacement this 
process inevitably engenders. By covertly using the ruins as a construction mate-
rial, Deflect seems to suggest that the history-in-the-making we are witnessing is 
in itself ruinous.
 Jameson’s operation of Utopia, functioning as a discloser of limits to our 
imagination of the future, is directed toward transgression of the boundaries of 
ideology and stifled imagination. Stamping passports with a fictitious emblem 
has a pragmatic dimension as well as an imaginary one, however: the ‘birth’ of an 
imaginary Palestinian State snaps back, highlighting how a place can function 
through its mundane aspects. Similarly to Vanello’s act of smuggling, in Jarrar’s 
work the operation of reflecting how things are done in practice, not only how they 
are thought, is of equal importance. Jarrar’s choice of medium and method for 
articulating problems related to the Israel-Palestine conflict exhibits the tactical 
pragmatism with which one deals with statelessness, permits and border-cross-
ings in daily life.
15  Anani.
16  Luca Vanello, “Deflect,”  http://www.lucavanello.com/_/Deflect.html. Last access 7.8.2017.
17  Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir, “The Order of Violence,” in The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: Anatomy of 
Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, ed. Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni, and Sari Hanafi (New York: 
Zone, 2009), 120.
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Fig. 56, 57:          Stills from Larissa Sansour’s Nation Estate: Living the High Life (2012)
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Fig. 58:  Manual of Decolonization, conceived by Decolonizing Architecture and developed together with the  
research and design studio Salottobouno. The manual presents architectural ‘strategies of subversion’ of Is-
raeli settlements as scenarios in a post-colonial future, using the settlement of P’sagot on the hill of Jabal Ta-
wil as object of study. The manual proposes strategies such as ‘de-parcelling’, ‘un-grounding’, ‘re-combining’, 
‘re-settling’, ‘re-plugging’, ‘un-homing’, ‘un-folding’ and ‘un-roofing’ of the spatial configuration of the settle-
ment as an architectural means to decolonize occupied territory. See (Salottobuono 2010) and (DA AR).
Fig. 59, 60 >>       Stills from the film project United Israel Palestine UIP27 by the artist Joachim Hamou (2015). 
UIP27 projects a future re-colonisation of Israel and Palestine under the United Nations in 2027. The film un-
folds the legal case of a land dispute between a Jewish and a Palestinian claimant in the wake of UN’s inter-
vention, and speculates on the repercussions of a violent history into a future ‘solution’ to the conflict. UIP27 
was conceived by Hamou as a performative project, inviting scholars, artists and activists to take part in the 
un-scripted development of the film (Hamou 2015).
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Fig. 61: Al-Riyahd, Emily Jacir and Yazid Anani (2010). Real billboard, fictional project, at al-Manara Square, 
Ramallah. Image: Emily Jacir and Yazid Anani.
Fig. 62: Al-Riyahd, Emily Jacir and Yazid Anani (2010). One of the ‘advertisements’ depicts a housing project 
with settlement-style villas. The red tiles on a pitched roof is a strong architectural signifier of Israeli settle-
ments, but has also –  with modifications – been adopted by Palestinian builders in the last decades. Image: 
Emily Jacir and Yazid Anani.
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Fig. 63: Wallpaper showing a 3D model illustration of the city of Rawabi inside Rawabi’s visitors’ centre, 
which is located on the hilltop above the ongoing construction of the city. Jacir and Anani’s logo is similar to 
Rawabi’s logo, visible on the left wall (2014).
Fig. 64: Rawabi under construction, seen from the visitors’ centre (2014). Rawabi is a major development 
and built investment project in Area A: a city planned from scratch, thus unique in Palestine. However, Rawabi 
has received massive criticism, not least because of its architecture, reminiscent of Israeli settlements, as well 
as for the high prices, meaning that most Palestinians cannot afford to live there. Yet beyond these concerns, 
there is also a more difficult question of the way in which architecture is able to mimic a ‘free’ Palestine; con-
structing its cities but lacking the fundamental political freedom to lay foundations for its institutions.
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 Jarrar addresses these tactics in a more direct way in his documentary Infil-
trators (2012).18 The mounting of challenges to the potential violence of the mili-
tary border apparatus, and its strict but changeable directions for proper conduct, 
are almost inconceivable at the checkpoint itself. Tactical gestures for crossing 
the barrier therefore tend to avoid the checkpoints. In Infiltrators, Jarrar focusses 
on crossings of the separation barrier, which not only separates Palestinian areas 
from Israel, but also from other Palestinian localities. The crossing attempts de-
picted, some of which are successful and some not, do not take place at the regu-
lated checkpoints. Rather, Infiltrators shows the irregular crossings of individuals 
that for various reasons cannot obtain or cannot wait for a permit from the Israeli 
administration. Searching for ways to pass the barrier, a whole catalogue of tech-
niques to smuggle oneself and others is presented: climbing-over, crawling-under 
and jumping-off, finding secret passages, or simply finding a place to talk through 
a door in the wall, or pass old photographs beneath it.
 The denial of authorised permits for crossing the barrier is a political is-
sue with consequences for the individual, which the stamp parodies in reverse. 
Though, according to Jarrar, the stamp did not cause much trouble for individuals 
passing international Israeli borders, it draws one’s attention to border practices 
and even the possibility of receiving the wrong stamp: ‘Entry Denied’, allegedly 
used increasingly often against persons that are considered enemies of the Israeli 
state, on the basis of supporting the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) move-
ment for instance.19 Although the possible implications of the stamp for a foreign 
visitor like me are nothing more than a faint reflection of the everyday reality of 
having to deal with the various obstructions posed by the occupation, there is a 
flash of recognition experienced through the encounter with the artwork: a recog-
nition of the fundamental condition of having to assess tactical manoeuvres with-
in a politically charged field for the purpose of movement.
Fiction/Friction
Speculative imaginaries accentuate the improbable or inconceivable, while every-
day tactics are acts on reality as it is presented by the variables that everyday life 
throws at us, to reuse the words of Ian Buchanan. Hence, speculative imaginar-
ies operate outside of the space of power, transcending it. In order to transcend 
power in this way, one must, if only by imagination, position oneself outside of the 
limitations provided by the given relations of power. To speculate is an attempt to 
18  Khaled Jarrar, “Infiltrators,” (Palestine/Israel: Idioms Film, 2012).
19  Some of those who had their passports stamped by Jarrar stamp actually got into trouble when sub-
sequently trying to enter Israel, and at least one Israeli passport was cancelled at Ben Gurion airport as a 
result of the stamp. See interview by Alistair George, 2011, International Solidarity Movement
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create room for manoeuvre outside the space of power, like the one Jarrar creates 
when he invokes the State of Palestine and claims the power to issue a stamp in vis-
itors’ passports. Conversely, the tactical pragmatism of the everyday is a situated 
agency immanent to power relationships that attempts to find and exploit gaps in 
the structural logic and create opportunities and openings where there seem to 
be none. To act tactically is an attempt to create a room for manoeuvre inside the 
space striated by sovereign power.
 However, what I have tried to show is that speculation and tactics intersect 
through acts premised on a sense of the possible. Speculation is not merely about 
addressing the possibilities of the future, but simultaneously the actualities and 
potentials contained in our own time, without succumbing to its present restric-
tions. Jarrar highlights what is at stake in the present through its reflection in the 
symbolic gesture of the passport stamp, thus creating a friction between that 
which is not — the sovereign state — and that which actually is — the violent re-
gime of occupation.
 Jarrar’s ‘State of Palestine’ invites the participant not only to reflect polit-
ically, but also to act with potential political implications. Jarrar states that his 
project deploys art as an “open confrontation with reality.”20 This confrontation 
20  “Graphic Project #12: Khaled Jarrar,” in Truth is Concrete: A Handbook for Artistic Strategies in Real Poli-
tics, ed. Anne Faucheret, et al. (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2014).
Fig. 65: Still from Khaled Jarrar’s Infiltrators (2012).
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elicits the participant’s reflection both through a fiction of the future and in fric-
tion with reality. Invoking the State of Palestine, a confrontation with reality 
through fiction, asks that the participant think about and speculate upon the fact 
that there is no such authoritative state. Additionally, as the fiction of what is not 
(yet) a reality, speculating upon it points ‘backwards’ to the present; it displays 
the current reality of the occupation. Speculation is an imaginary agency, as well 
as an agency of the imagination, that thinks itself independent of actual spaces of 
power: it disconnects itself from actual power. This is what Jarrar is doing when 
he evokes the State of Palestine through the stamp, embossing a fragment of polit-
ical reality onto an official document with the means of imagination and ink, and 
thereby highlighting what is yet unborn.
 The fictional stamp of a possible or impossible future state thus draws atten-
tion to particular practices and mechanisms of today as well as ways of imagining. 
It activates what is present through speculation about the future. The participant’s 
aesthetic experience of the artwork mirrors experiences of a political reality. It 
evokes or produces a ‘friction’ between aesthetic experience and pragmatic rea-
son; an ‘open confrontation with reality’ that occurs through the creation of fric-
tion against the current state of affairs. Thus, across the fields of artistic, archi-
tectural and spatial practices of the everyday, there is a transversal dialogue of 
political imagination: against unplanning and the unliveability it engenders, the 
situational spatial practices considered in this thesis deploy speculative strategies 
that seek to find loopholes and possibilities where there seem to be none, while 
aesthetic practices make use of speculative strategies that indeed detach their fic-
titious scenarios from our present, yet simultaneously saturates conditions of real 
(im)possibilities. Under the weight of the political pressure of occupation, specu-
lative strategies converge in a dialogue which is necessary for continued defiance 
against dispossession.
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ABSTRACT
The thesis Unliveable Spaces: Architecture and Violence in the West Bank is concerned 
with spatial practices of resistance employed in Palestinian struggles against Isra-
el’s violent dispossession of Palestinian land through half a century of occupation. 
In the political configuration of the built space of the West Bank, architecture ap-
pears as a tactically deployed weapon of territorial control and a dialectical resis-
tance to displacement. Standing in the position of being both a means to achieve 
an objective and the objective in itself, the elementary gestures of architecture 
— to control and inhabit a place — are employed in a conflict that concerns, fun-
damentally, who has the right to a future in this land. By viewing architecture in 
its dual dimension of praxis and object, built structures are investigated as agents 
that induce and manifest territorial struggles. The spatial instrumentalisation of 
architecture is effected by Israel through commonplace civic practices of spatial 
organisation, forming a distinct category, in this thesis denoted as unplanning, 
and whose violent and attritional effect is the production of unliveable spaces. Con-
versely, Palestinians inhabiting Palestinian land turn to a number of tactical tools 
against unplanning and its detrimental effects. Some of these tools are employed 
to challenge the mechanisms of the occupation, and others used for survival in ev-
eryday life. Together, these practices form a spectrum of practices that the thesis 
proposes to explore as situationally moulded acts. The main objective of the thesis is 
to unfold this spectrum: under circumstances where both coloniser and colonised 
deploy architecture as tactical weapons for expanding or, conversely, protecting 
land, the fundamental volatility of the order of occupation requires the colonised 
part to navigate a territory in constant movement. Through case studies of Pal-
estinian spatial practices, and historical and theoretical considerations on power, 
resistance, and violence, the thesis ventures to show how said navigation by means 
of spatial practices stands in a dynamic relationship with the occupation, yet also, 
through acts of speculation, attempts to exceed the restrictions given by a regime 
that ceaselessly produces obstructions to Palestinian inhabitation of Palestinian 
land. The thesis proposes that there is a common ground between the kind of spec-
ulation that is conjured in the mounting of situational spatial practices of the ev-
eryday, and speculative imagination evident in artistic and activist practices con-
cerned with the Israel-Palestine conflict.
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RESUME (DANSK)
Ph.d.-af handlingen Unliveable Spaces: Architecture and Violence in the West Bank 
(Ulevelige rum: arkitektur og vold på Vestbredden) handler om de rumlige mod-
standspraksisser, som palæstinenserne har anvendt i kampen mod Israels volde-
lige annektering af palæstinensisk land gennem et halvt århundredes besættelse. 
I den særegne politiske situation på Vestbredden fremstår arkitekturen som et 
våben, der kan anvendes taktisk både til kontrol og til dialektisk modstand mod 
fordrivelse. Arkitekturens grundlæggende gestus – at kontrollere og bebo et sted 
– spiller med andre ord en rolle i en konflikt, der dybest set handler om retten til 
en fremtid i landet. Idet af handlingen fastholder arkitekturen i dens dobbelte rolle 
som praksis og som objekt, undersøger den bygget struktur som agens, der insti-
tuerer og manifesterer territoriale kampe. Israel instrumentaliserer arkitekturen 
gennem en række gængse former for organisation af det kollektive rum og danner 
derved en særlig form for rumlig praksis, som denne af handling foreslår at benæv-
ne som unplanning, “uplanlægning”. Det er denne voldelige og udslidende praksis, 
der producerer unliveable spaces, “ulevelige rum”. På den anden side anvender de 
palæstinensere, der er bosat på palæstinensisk jord, en række taktiske værktøjer 
mod denne “uplanlægning” og dens ødelæggende virkninger. Nogle af disse værk-
tøjer bruges til at imødegå besættelsen, andre anvendes med henblik på overlevel-
se i hverdagen. Tilsammen udgør de et spektrum af praksisser, som af handlingen 
sætter sig for at undersøge som situativt formede handlinger. Af handlingens over-
ordnede mål er at udfolde dette spektrum af praksisser. I en situation, hvor både 
kolonisatorerne og de koloniserede bruger arkitekturen som et taktisk våben til 
enten at udvide eller beskytte territorier, medfører besættelsens grundlæggende 
omskiftelige natur, at de koloniserede må forsøge at navigere rumligt i et territo-
rium, der er i konstant bevægelse. Gennem casestudies af palæstinensiske rumlige 
praksisser, og gennem historiske og teoretiske overvejelser over magt, modstand 
og vold, vil af handlingen vise, hvordan denne navigation via rumlig praksis indgår 
i et dynamisk forhold til besættelsen. Derudover vil af handlingen vise, hvordan 
denne navigation, gennem spekulation, forsøger at omgå eller overskride de re-
striktioner, der uophørligt producerer forhindringer for den palæstinensiske be-
boelse af palæstinensisk land. Af handlingen foreslår, at der er vigtige fællestræk 
mellem den form for spekulation, der anvendes i forbindelse med hverdagens si-
tuative rumlige praksisser, og den spekulative forestillingskraft, der kommer til 
udtryk i de kunstneriske og aktivistiske praksisser, der beskæftiger sig med Isra-
el-Palæstina-konflikten. 
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All figures by the author unless otherwise credited.
Fig. 1: Southern Jerusalem hills (2011).
Fig. 2: Israel, OPT, map.
Fig. 3: West Bank, zoning, map. 
Fig. 4: Diagram, agency/adaption
Fig. 5: Diagram, situational fold
Fig. 6: Mughrabi Bridge, Haram al-Sharif/Har haBáyit. (2011).
Fig. 7: Mughrabi Quarter (June 1967). Image: David Rubinger / Corbis via www.palestin-
esquare.com.
Fig. 8: Ada Karmi-Melamede Architects: preliminary proposal for Mughrabi Bridge (2006). 
Fig. 9: Eli Elan Architects: proposal, town plan, Mughrabi Bridge (2011).
Fig. 10: Western Plaza, military parade (April 2010).
Fig. 11: Mughrabi Bridge, entrance (April 2010). 
Fig. 12: Mughrabi Bridge, ascent (April 2010).
Fig. 13: Mughrabi Bridge, riot shields (April 2010).
Fig. 14: Mughrabi Bridge, Al-Aqsa (August 2011). 
Fig. 15: Mughrabi Bridge, scaffolding (August 2011). 
Fig. 16: Mughrabi Bridge, lookout position (August 2011). 
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APPENDIX A
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO DEMOLITION
INTERVIEW WITH HUMANITARIAN NGO PROJECT MANAGER
INTRO
TT is an architect and Project Manager for an international nongovernmental organi-
sation (NGO) providing humanitarian aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The 
name of TT, the NGO, as well as names of other NGOs, are not disclosed here due to the 
political sensitivity of their work.  The interview is revised and attested for reproduction 
by TT.
The interview took place in the NGO’s headquarter in the West Bank in January 2014. I 
contacted this specific organisation because of their involvement with humanitarian re-
sponses to house demolitions in Area C and East Jerusalem, interested in gaining insight 
into the procedures of post-demolition aid. The focus of the interview was thus the prac-
tical steps taken by the organisation when rebuilding shelters. How do they deal with 
reconstruction in a situation embossed by recurrent demolitions, in an area regulated 
by restrictions and an absence of planning, rather than development? The information 
shared by TT provided valuable insight in the particular way aid organisations on the 
one hand complies with laws and regulations, yet, on the other hand, navigates the ob-
structions these regulations creates, in order to defer further destruction.
—
RJ: Your organisation is working in response to house demolitions. Can you tell about 
what areas you are covering and how your work is being conducted?
TT: Until now we have been working with response to house demolitions and 
against displacements of Palestinian communities from their original spaces. Our 
main target area is Area C. Because we are working with Area C, ninety percent of 
our beneficiaries are Bedouins. So, when we are talking about reconstruction of 
demolished houses, we are not talking about modern architecture, but about the 
architecture of the Bedouins: the tents, the shelters, and shelters related to animal 
farming. We also work in East Jerusalem, but because it is a special case in East 
Jerusalem we normally do not undertake reconstruction of demolished houses. 
In East Jerusalem cases, we provide temporary subsidies for the family to find a 
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place for the first three months after demolition and in some cases assessments 
[for reconstruction]. This is the general objective of the program we are running. 
For how we are dealing with the transformation of these spaces: we actually do not 
– as we do not, for now, have a master plan for Area C.
RJ: There are certain organisations working on master planning level, like the UN Hab-
itat, the EU and the IPCC etc. Your work is not related to planning in the areas you are 
intervening in?
TT: No, our work is not master planning. We actually build without permits. This 
is because of the Israeli law: if you want to get a permit, you must have a master 
plan for the area that you are supposed to develop. But if you look at the total area 
of Area C, you see that it is already planned, and thus you can’t get any type of 
building permits [as the existing master plan does not allow for new expansions 
and development].
Through the kind of humanitarian work that we are conducting, we are not re-
quired to ask for permits. This is one of the humanitarian laws that we are follow-
ing. But sadly, Israel on the other side, is not following these same laws. So some-
times the structures we build get demolished, also the tents. We have had stop 
working orders and demolition orders — structures that were funded by interna-
tional donors. What we normally do, is that we build exactly what was demolished. 
If it was one shelter, we give one shelter, if it was two shelters, we give two shelters, 
and so on. But because of the laws and the idea that we are trying to help these 
communities survive, wherever you have a demolition, we have to move away from 
the same site of the structure that was demolished, at least one hundred meters.
RJ: In Jordan Valley, for example, there are families that have had their houses demol-
ished 4 or 5 times. Does this mean that every time your house is demolished and a new 
one is constructed, you move within the perimeter of your land? Is it privately owned 
land then?
TT: No. This is the other issue that is making this problem. If it is privately owned 
land — and if the owner was there prior to 1967, he has a Palestinian ID and his land 
registered — then his land would be within the limits of the master planned area. 
If the land was a state land according to Jordanian law, which quite many spaces in 
the Jordan Valley were, the land is now Israeli state land. The law says that you can 
use this land for public use. In some cases, they [Israel] transformed the public use 
into settlements. So, they are manipulating the law so that they can use the land 
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for settlement expansion, roads etc.
In some cases, we ask the Bedouins to rent: if the land is privately owned by some-
body else, we ask them to make a rent contract. It will not stop the demolition or-
der, but it will give them more time. Sometimes it gives three or four years in the 
court. 
When you have a demolition order, you have GPS coordinates for each structure 
that they [Israel] want to demolish. That is the reason why we ask people to move 
one hundred meters, because you would then change the GPS coordinates. And 
then you would need another demolition order, which will take more time…
RJ: The practice of moving one hundred meters is then a question of gaining time in the 
Israeli legal system?
TT: Exactly. To [gain time to] find a good solution in response to demolition … In 
most cases it works out, like in cases where you have one tent or two tents. But 
in extreme cases where you have ten tents or shelters that have been demolished, 
then moving away one hundred meters does not help. Then you will not have extra 
space on the land to move your shelters to. In some cases, we build in the same 
area, and you get demolished immediately — without a demolition order — or you 
get a stop working order immediately. 
In four cases this year, we had to move the whole community to another space. One 
was in Bir Nabala, and the other one we moved recently, is in Dayr Ammar near 
Ramallah. We had to move them because there was no space left to rebuild, and 
the whole community of six families had their houses demolished. The Palestinian 
owners of the land was not willing to rent out the land to the Bedouins. Therefore, 
we had the solution to move them to another area, near Anata Camp in the Anata 
area.
We have one case in Aouja, but until now they are still there. They have had their 
houses demolished three times, they have moved three times, and now they don’t 
have any more space in the same area.
We also have one case in Jiftlik this year. In Jiftlik the person decided to live with 
his parents, until we find a solution for his problem. Depending on each case and 
incident, you have to work out the space and the shelters.
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RJ: This means that you find tactical solutions for each case?
TT: According to each case, yes. We also have the support of another international 
organisation, which give us legal support in most cases. They even have lawyers 
that work for free for the beneficiaries, with issues in the court that they have to 
follow up. We also have the support of UNRWA, one of our partners in these proj-
ects. In cases where the Bedouins are registered as refugees, UNRWA gives sup-
port and cash assistance to the refugees, and they give psycho-social support and 
all these things. If they are non-refugees, we have other organisations that follow 
up on different things. We have coordination with an educational cluster, the psy-
cho-social cluster etc. in order to cover the areas for each family.
RJ: In the case that your house is demolished, what does your status become? If you are 
not a refugee? Does it change anything about your status, like to what municipality you 
belong, or are you named as ‘internally displaced’?
TT: You will be named ‘internally displaced’, but it will not be documented in your 
ID. We have Bedouins who have been displaced from one area to another, but in the 
Palestinian identification papers nothing changes. If you move between Ramallah 
and Nablus for example, your registration papers will be changed, but not if your 
house get demolished. But we never document anyone as internally displaced.
RJ: What places in Area C are most severely afflicted by house demolitions?
TT: Tubas and Jericho are the worst, and they have the highest numbers of demo-
litions.
RJ: But Jericho is Area A?
TT: Only the city. If you go from Jericho to the north, not the road 90 but from Jer-
icho to Al-Awja, you will notice the difference in the buildings. You will find con-
crete buildings in Area A and Area B. In Area C, you will find less concrete build-
ings and more shacks, immediately when you cross the line.
RJ: The Bedouins in this area have settled; this means that they are not nomads anymore?
TT: Yes, they have settled, which is also because of the situation: it is harder to 
move around because of restrictions.
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RJ: What kind of houses would you find in the Jordan valley area before 1967?
TT: Before 1967 it was all earthen architecture. I was part of a UNESCO team in 
which we worked in Jordan Valley. It was a project called ‘Reviving Earthen Ar-
chitecture in the Jordan Valley,’ a project started in 2011. We did some research in 
the area, and found houses built with mud bricks, covered with wood. Concrete 
and metal sheets were used from the 50s and beginning of the 60s. But before that, 
in the Jordan Valley, everything was built as earthen architecture, using different 
techniques. We can still see some remains.
RJ: The Jordan Valley Solidarity Campaign (JVS) also works with mud bricks, as far as 
I know.
TT: JVS works mainly in Jiftlik and areas close to Jiftlik, not in the whole Jordan 
Valley. UNESCO had a project in Bardalah, two projects in Jericho, one in Al-
Dyouk, and one in Aqbat Jaber. The workers — who did not have any prior skills to 
building — were both refugees and normal workers. We had architects who were 
trained in this project, and now there are two architects that were trained in the 
program that have their own studio, ShamsArd. We had workers that were actu-
ally very hesitant to work in such a project in the beginning, but now they are very 
skilled and can produce bricks and build with them. Young people who now really 
have the skills for building in the way that people built fifty years ago.
RJ: Taking up the traditional architecture makes much sense in this area, i.e. in terms of 
climate?
TT: Yes, climate is one thing. But also, one of the main reasons why UNESCO ini-
tiated this project, was because of mobility in the region and the cost of material. 
You can get material for mud bricks anywhere, it does not cost you anything, and 
you can build your own house. UNESCO is now finalising a manual [on building 
with mud bricks] that will be distributed to all the communities and houses in the 
Jordan Valley.
The work with UNESCO led me to the NGO that I am currently working for. We 
had a joint project in Bardalah to improve the shelters that my organisation nor-
mally gives. We added an extra layer, as the shelters normally only have one layer. 
This made it easy to collect water. We also added solar panels to the shelter. We 
added earth bags to use internally in order to increase the thermal resistance in-
side.
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We also introduced the beneficiaries to an old technique called zeer, a natural way 
to have a fridge without electricity. The zeer is not in the soil, but consists of two 
clay pots inside each other with sand insulation, kept constantly moist, between 
the two pots. Then you can put your food inside the inner pot and cover it with 
a damp cloth. The clay pots are kept in the shade, outside, and with air and heat 
you get evaporation, from inside to outside, which keeps the inside cool. The tem-
perature inside the pot was consistent of fourteen degrees inside in one of our 
test-pots. The higher the temperature is outside, the lower it gets inside. But you 
need to keep it moist and damp all the time. The fridge will cost you fifty shekels to 
make, so it is cheap. The families were happy to have electricity through the solar 
panels, but were also happy about the fridge — more than the tent itself. So, small 
change makes a big difference.
RJ: Your current organisation’s work is concentrated on temporary housing. Can you 
tell about how the work is conducted?
TT: Yes, we are working with temporary housing. On the ground, we are work-
ing with ninety-days responses, as we are supposed only to give shelter for three 
months. After that, other organisations will interfere to provide post-ninety-days 
interventions.
RJ: This means that your intervention is the very first aid intervention?
TT: [Censored] We carry out the second intervention in the area. In some cases, 
like in Wadi Al-Makhrour in September 2013, our trucks, materials and tents were 
confiscated. And other places, like in Jiftlik now, we do only partial response for 
the families to have some sort of shelter. But we have delayed the rest of the re-
sponses just to test the ground, to see if the ICA [Israeli Civil Administration] is 
coming to take photos to see if there is something going on on the site. We have 
been taking more caution lately, as so many demolitions in areas where my organ-
isation intervened were targeted afterwards. Therfore, we are more cautious than 
before. Which is not totally the opposite of humanitarian work, but we cannot 
keep being demolished every time…
RJ: …which only would mean that you would have to repeat the process over and over 
again…Where does people stay after their home has been demolished, in cases when or-
ganisations like yours don’t provide pre-ninety-days intervention?
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TT: Sometimes they stay in tents donated by an organisation that provides the first 
aid intervention, sometimes they stay with other families. Normally you would not 
find one Bedouin family living on its own: they are clans, tribes, and you will not 
find them living alone. Most of the time they help each other in these situations. 
RJ: Do you have a demographic overview over the population in the Jordan Valley that 
tells how many are Bedouins and who are not? And does it make any difference if you are 
Bedouin or not?
TT: For us it does not make any difference. But we are talking about Bedouins be-
cause of the way they live, which is different from people living in villages or cit-
ies. Historically they were moving around. They live in tents still, not in concrete 
houses, although they have settled. They live in the outskirts, they want privacy, 
and to be away of the modernity of the villages and urban places. Bedouins are tra-
ditionally nomads, moving around, but now they are not moving around anymore 
because of all the restriction. So now the Bedouins are living neither as nomads 
nor as village or city-people. They are in-between. They have a special way of life. 
Their shelters are not the same as the residential shelters that we have, with con-
crete and straight roof. They live in shacks or tents. Their main source of income 
is by herding and in some cases agriculture, but not in all cases. They are not farm-
ers, and they do not want to be called farmers. If they work with farming, it is for 
household scale. 
RJ: In the Fasayil villages for example, you find both concrete houses and more provi-
sional shelters and tents. Does this mean that since the villages are a mixture of concrete 
houses and tents, it is a mix of Bedouins and other Palestinians living there?
TT: Yes, it is a mix in the villages. When the separation of land was done, it became 
divided into the areas A-B-C [as part of the Oslo Agreements]. I think if this had 
not been done, you would have found the houses in the villages and the Bedouins 
in the outskirts. But because of the distribution of land, there were cases where 
people would have to move all the time. That is the reason why you now find this 
mix, especially in Jordan Valley. But in the west of the West Bank, outside Ramal-
lah for example, you will find the Bedouins in the outskirts: not far from the city, 
yet not inside it.
RJ: I would like to get back to the process of building. You said that you build without a 
permit, which, according to Israeli law, is illegal, and thus you face a threat of demolition 
each time you build. How do you manage the building process? You mentioned that you 
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are being more cautions now, as for example by waiting a while before you build. Do you 
have other sort of ways to hide the way you build?
TT: Normally we do not have our own trucks that go directly to the location, as 
our materials have been confiscated several times. We normally drop it in a safe 
area, and people come with their donkeys, or what they have, to collect the mate-
rial. Most of the time we build during the night. The law says that if the building 
is finished, you cannot send a stop-working order, and if you want to send a dem-
olition order, you need a court order to do that. You go through the whole process, 
and sometimes it takes up to two years. But if the ICA come while you are building, 
they can issue a direct stop working order on the site, and they might even demol-
ish the structure immediately.
The structures we build during the night are simple, almost like LEGO. You install 
the basis immediately, then you install the arches and the tent. In total, it takes 
three to four hours. We build different kinds of structures. We have tents, in size 
approximately twenty square meters, where the structure is made of steel and the 
covers of PVC. We also have metal sheds. We mainly give this to make animal shel-
ters, or if the family was living in a concrete house. But either way we are talking 
about the same technique, with steel beams that can be fixed to the ground im-
mediately, and metal sheets for covering. Fifty square meters will take you six to 
seven hours to build. 
RJ: Do you meet patrols in the night?
TT: All the time. That is why we have coordination with local governments, espe-
cially in Tubas, they are very active. We are in contact with them, and they can tell 
when there are patrols going on, or if they are going around taking photographs. It 
is a network.
RJ: Are there other ways of hiding?
TT: We do sometimes build on Shabbat, but even these days you can meet difficul-
ties…
RJ: Have you been building yourself?
TT: With UNESCO I did, I built with my hands, but now I do not — I do assess-
ments. We are right now looking at the quality of our interventions, in order to im-
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prove the quality of the tents and also to reduce the costs.
RJ: Is it a standard type of tents you are using?
TT: The tents we use were designed with the help of UNHCR, who normally use 
these tents. You can say it is standard, but the type of material is different. 
RJ: How will you improve it?
TT: I am still looking into it, first at the market for materials, as it has to be acces-
sible materials. It would be ridiculous to design something that is not accessible 
here. One of the main problems is the heat in the summer and the cold in the win-
ter. The cover itself is not very heat resistant.
RJ: Would it be possible to put up a tent, and then build a mud brick house from inside?
TT: This is what we call a post-ninety-days intervention, which we are not allowed 
to. Even with our donors, there are a set of rules that you have to follow. For ex-
ample: your buildings cannot be permanently fixed to the ground, as they have to 
be temporary. You have to check the materials that are on the market, you have to 
check your rules, you have to check the donors’ rules, and then come up with a de-
sign that is suitable. We coordinate with the beneficiaries, and sometimes the type 
and the shape of the buildings are made by themselves. We do not want to come as 
a Frank Gehry or something totally different of what they want. 
I am still looking [for a suitable material], it has been three months now. 
RJ: It seems like it is not so hard to get funding for pre-ninety-days intervention, as it is 
defined as humanitarian aid. But what about funding for post-ninety-days: is it impos-
sible?
TT: It is like seventy percent impossible. Because post-ninety-days interventions 
are considered to fall between humanitarian aid and development, it is like a grey 
zone. There are some proposals, most of them made by UNDP [United Nations De-
velopment Programme], but it is hard to get funding for development projects. If 
you take the shelters that were built [pre-ninety-days in response to demolition] 
and you are going to do a development project, you have to do a different kind of 
politics. Because if you have policies done by Israel itself then you are not going 
anywhere. It is a closed circle that no one is able to break. Post-ninety-days [inter-
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ventions as development] — until now I have not heard of anyone doing that.
RJ: To understand you correctly: donors do not want to give money for projects in Area 
C, because projects in Area C are considered illegal according to Israeli law, and because 
there is a high probability that the building will be demolished?
TT: Exactly, this is the issue. This is the big problem. I attended a workshop with 
the Ministry of Planning in Palestine. What shocked me the most, was that the PA 
[Palestinian Administration] themselves considered humanitarian projects as de-
velopment projects. 
RJ: Which means putting governmental responsibilities on NGOs?
TT: Yes. The NGOs — national and international ones — are actually fighting the 
governments to push Israel to at least stop demolishing. But the governments do 
not want to do that. I have heard from at least three or four Head of Missions in 
NGOs that they are very pessimistic about this issue. When I was with UNESCO, 
we were not supposed to interfere in Area C. Our projects were in Area A and B, 
and for the project that was done in Area C, we could not even document it. So, we 
organised it in a way so that it would be funded by UNESCO, but carried out by my 
current organisation. This meant that we could not even put any pictures about 
our work on the UNESCO Facebook site. We were not allowed to work in Area C. 
This is the problem with the post-ninety-days and development projects: you can-
not do anything in Area C without approval from Israel — which is impossible to 
get. And now all the donors do not want to start this difficult political game with 
Israel.
RJ: From a birds-eye view then, we have area A that is the built-up areas …
TT: …yes, the built-up areas at that time [when the zoning was done], during the 
Oslo process…
RJ: … that does not allow for expansion
TT: …which is the case in Ramallah, where a five hundred square meters flat costs 
more than two million dollars. All expansion is going vertical, and there is no land 
left.
RJ: Area B is sort of a middle ground then…
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TT: …the areas around the cities and villages, and the rest is Area C.
RJ: If I were to summarise, this means that if you look at transformation on the ground 
since the Oslo Accords, you will see that area A is more and more dense, in Area B you 
can get permits and construction is expanding, and when you look at Area C, no devel-
opment is happening. So what happened since the Oslo Accords, is that Area C is kept in 
a cycle of destruction and reconstruction, holding the status quo of the built up area on 
a close to zero level…
TT: If you look at rebuilding and building in Area C, the donors’ policies, and the 
cuts in funding, you would find that somebody that ten years ago owned one hun-
dred square meters of animal sheds, now own only forty square meters. Because it 
got demolished the first time, and the NGOs could not fund the whole one hundred 
square meters, they funded only seventy, and then the second time it got demol-
ished…. It is shrinking. Contrary to Area A and B, which are densifying.
RJ: The Israeli settlements are in Area C though.
TT: Yes, and they are expanding, like cancer. 
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APPENDIX B
POST OSLO URBANISM
INTERVIEW WITH YAZID ANANI
BIO + INTRO
Yazid Anani (Ramallah, 1975) is an architect, artist, curator, and scholar of landscape 
architecture and urban planning. Anani was an Assistant Professor at the Department 
of Architecture and the Master Program in Urban Planning and Landscape at Birzeit 
University, Palestine, from 1997-2016. He is currently acting as Director of Public Pro-
grammes at the A.M. Qattan Foundation in Ramallah, and chairs the Academic Council 
of the International Art Academy Palestine. Anani’s work and research inquire into is-
sues of space in colonial and postcolonial settings, as well as exploring themes on archi-
tecture, art, and culture under the auspices of neoliberal development. Anani has been 
involved in several collective projects, such as Decolonizing Architecture and Ramallah 
Syndrome, and has curated and co-curated a number of exhibitions, notably the 2nd, 3rd, 
4th, and 5th edition of the Cities Exhibition in Palestine.
The present abridged interview was conducted at Anani’s office at Birzeit University in 
January 2014 on the basis of my request to talk with him about urban development in the 
West Bank. In the context of this thesis, the interview provides a perspective on the par-
adox of state-building in Palestine: an urban neoliberal ‘dream’ of a postcolonial state is 
constructed all the while the required political power to build the state is absent, caused 
both by a continued colonial condition and current politics succumbing to market forces. 
My first question concerned the transformation of Ramallah and its surrounding land-
scape due to Israel’s practices of destruction and spatial restrictions: however, accord-
ing to Anani, to understand Ramallah’s urban configuration, we should rather look to 
the phases of development since the Oslo Agreements in the 1990s.
—
YA: I am not really interested in the history of the relation between the occupied 
and the occupier and demolition; it has been there for ages, it continues, and we 
are still under colonialism. What interest me — being raised in a place like Ra-
mallah, and being accustomed to a certain spatial configuration and processes of 
the city — is the sudden shift that comes after the Oslo Agreements. Especially 
because I studied architecture during the peace negotiations from 1992 to 1997. I 
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was studying architecture yet at the same time looking at these spatial shifts. So, I 
continued, also after my studies, to monitor the transformation of space. You can 
read from the transformation of the city the politics behind it: who has the money, 
where does the money come from, who has the power to shape this place, at this 
time. Therefore, urban transformation — in Ramallah in particular — has been 
my interest. I am not really interested in occupation, because it has been there 
most of the time.
But, of course I am interested in the colonial setting, and I am talking about it, in-
directly, through the transformation of the city. Eyal Weizman’s work has been an 
insight for me, because he is lucky to have access to all the archives and knowl-
edge from the Israeli side, yet he has also access from the Palestinian side. It is the 
dream of any researcher to have that kind of material in front of you — I wished 
I was in the same position, to have this dual relationship. But Eyal’s work is less 
focused on the PA [Palestinian Administration] era, and how transformation is re-
flected in the political project of the Palestinians. 
I can tell about the several phases of transformation that I find. I do not talk about 
typologies, which is a framing of certain formalistic relationships, but rather about 
processes. For example: in the years between Oslo in 1992 until slightly after 2000, 
before the second intifada, there were lots of internal investments by Palestinians. 
We started seeing rich Palestinians making investments in villages around Ra-
mallah. Most of the inhabitants of these villages have families in America, Brazil, 
Chile, where they have their own businesses and they are well of.
If you go to these villages today, you will see big villas instead of the traditional 
and expected village with Ottoman architecture. You will see villas with red tiled 
roofs, and that kind of grotesque architecture where different types of stone are 
put ugly together. You know, if you go to inspect who is living in that kind of build-
ing, it is the old grandmother and maybe in summertime there are the sons of the 
family. The sons come to spend the summer in Palestine — in these huge spaces, 
which are most of the time not used — because their parents want to assure them 
some kind of connection with Palestine. 
Some of these investors — members of these families who have money and stayed 
here — started investing during the peace process. There was so much influx of 
people coming back: returnees of the PA, for instance; and people from the West 
Bank working in ministries in Ramallah. Ministries were constructed — or, rath-
er, already existing structures, mostly residential buildings, were rented out and 
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transformed into ministries. It was never built as ministries. 
Many people invested in buildings, both ministries and housing. The architecture 
was very utilitarian: simple, cheap, functional, and the investors took as much rev-
enue as they could, exploiting the demand of the market. Some neighbourhoods in 
Ramallah just exploded, like a boom. There is a monstrosity to that architecture: it 
looks like a sort of stone and concrete forest. So that was one phase.
After the Second Intifada, building almost stopped. People did not want to waste 
their money by investing in buildings when the political situation was so uncer-
tain. Therefore, the second phase started around 2007 when Fayyad took over 
[Salam Fayyad, PA Prime Minister 2007-2012]. That phase is coined by the trans-
national impact on Palestine. Like in other capitals — in Lebanon, Jordan, and 
Egypt for instance — money from the Gulf was starting to reach Palestine. Why 
money from the Gulf? September 11. Investment from the Gulf in America and Eu-
rope was reduced, so surplus money from oil found new ways to big capitals: to the 
Abdali project in Amman, the Solidere project in Beirut, and projects in various 
cities in Egypt, for example. In Palestine, we have Rawabi, where PIF [Palestine In-
vestment Fund] went into a public private partnership with an international Gulf 
partner. 
I do not want to talk about how awful the first phase was, because the second phase 
is what has really transformed the city into an alien space. At least for me. Investors 
in both phases did not really care about the social and historical aspects of the city 
and its buildings.
In Ramallah, there used to be cinemas, beautiful streets, wonderful restaurants, 
like Bardoni and other restaurants inspired by Lebanon in the 1970s. These spac-
es have been destroyed. Instead, we have new commercial and residential towers. 
Building the new Ramallah — ‘the new Palestine,’ between quotations — has hap-
pened on the corpse of history. They demolished the historical monuments and 
turned it into a commercial one. This is a crucial point for me: the PA has managed 
to create a tabula rasa of history and built its architecture as if Palestine never ex-
isted, and as if the PA is starting a new Palestine. It is a sort of reinvention of Pal-
estine through looking at the architecture that is manifested in the city. The PA is 
not concerned with preserving the history of the place but rather for replacing it 
for more revenue and for sustaining the neoliberal concept that came with Fayyad. 
What Fayyad has done is awful in my eyes. He is being praised by every single gov-
ernment, but for me he is very awful: he managed to deregulate the economy, thus 
allowing foreign investment in Palestine, allowing facilitation for businessmen to 
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be excepted from taxation to get the free sources they needed in order to build the 
architecture. His political intention was to prove to the international community 
that Palestinians are capable of making a state. For them, having a state is real-
ly building the architecture, building public buildings, building housing projects. 
This is the kind of modern visual signs that intrigues the international community 
to believe that Palestinians are capable of being modern and not as brutal as they 
are shown in the media, like the stereotype about the suicide bombers and Hamas.
Fayyad was also promoting visual signs that are very similar to middle-class 
Europe. You can see this visual language in the advertisements for projects like 
Rawabi, or in the new clean, sterile, minimalist coffee shops, for instance. ‘Middle 
class’ has been the play of Fayyad. He tried to build the whole consumption and 
business in Palestine based on the middle class. Most of them are working with 
NGOs as a business, and others are working in the private sector partnered with 
international companies, through Israel:
Everything is under occupation. We have to bear in mind that everything goes 
through Israel: if you want to import, or open a business, export, travel — you got 
to have an Israeli agent. Israel is the mediator for everything. Even planning reg-
ulations are controlled through the Oslo Agreements. The confinements and lim-
itations of the Oslo Agreements are still part of the PA’s official planning schemes. 
If the Oslo Agreements says that something is forbidden, then the PA will tell you 
“don’t do that!” They are abiding, and it affects planning, health, transportation, 
infrastructure: everything is structured according to the interim agreements of 
Oslo, and we are still stuck. The interim has become permanent, and it limits us 
instead of making us imagine something beyond it, like solutions that are not con-
fined and restricted by Oslo.
Fayyad managed to regulate the economy, support businessmen, and to create 
the foundation of interesting projects like Rawabi, for example. These projects are 
also problematic for Palestine. They are exclusionary. They look like settlements. 
Not only visually, but also as a confinement on top of the hill, for a special commu-
nity of Palestinians, away from the history, away from the cities, away from all the 
problematics of what is Palestine. It is very introverted: it represents the idea of 
spending time on shopping, consumerist activities, without having any relation-
ship to the surrounding landscape and villages. 
Looking at the images in the advertisements for Rawabi is very interesting. There 
is, for example, an image of a rectangular house with a family that look like upper 
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middle-class Palestinians. Most Palestinians are simple farmers, but such imag-
es present a particular model of what a good, modern Palestinian is. The one who 
lives in Rawabi are referenced as a good Palestinian. The crown of the PA is that 
kind of image. Yet the landscape is empty and clear: many of the villages are not 
in the images. The villages are perceived as something problematic and they do 
not want to see it in the images. The interior is state of the art: modern, minimalist 
furniture, and orientalist, with coffeepots…. It’s done in a crazy way, it shakes you. 
You start thinking: is this the liberation project, is this the new Palestine? Is this 
what we hoped for in the 1980s?
Another example is PIF, Palestine Investment Fund. PIF is a private public institu-
tion built with PLO money that has accumulated over the years. The private sec-
tor wanted to use PLO ’s money to invest in Palestine. Salam Fayyad gave a green 
light to PIF to use any public facility or public land for any development. It is very 
problematic, because if you expect from somebody to provide public housing, for 
instance, you would expect it to be from the PLO and PIF. But it is not about social 
and affordable housing; they are building for the middle class and the upper mid-
dle class, not the rest of the 80 percent of Palestinians. It is business. This duali-
ty of the political regime that is investing in Palestine is crazy to the degree that 
any political solution that wold threat the revenue that comes from investments 
in housing would be stopped by the PA. If we decided to make an intifada, it would 
be against Abu Mazen’s business [PA’s president Mahmoud Abbas]. Most of the PA 
is into business, and they invest in Palestine. That kind of duality has made us in-
clined into the abyss of the whole liberation project.
To go back to architecture: after 2007, you started seeing all these big projects ris-
ing up: Al-Bireh business towers and so on, which looks so alien. Ugly buildings 
from the first phase was okay; it was a transitional phase. But now you see archi-
tecture that tells about the provider, the Gulf, and it has a certain visual identity 
that relates to projects in Iraq, Jordan etc. You can see that the money is coming 
from the Gulf. The Gulf — and its money — is manifesting itself in the region with 
a kind of architecture that basically are consumerist based projects.
The Riyad Tower project [by Yazid Anani and Emily Jacir] is about this. Coming 
back after travelling, we were both shocked about how things were changing. The 
construction after 2007 was crazy, and we saw advertisements everywhere telling 
about the future of Ramallah: you could see the portal to the future only by looking 
at billboards. We were shocked and wondered if this really was the Palestine we 
wanted: is Palestine a building project? Where is the liberation project? We want-
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ed to test that idea by the picture project called Riyad. We used the same colours 
as those used in Rawabi advertisements, and we made a logo inspired by Rawabi’s 
logo. ‘Riyad’ means not only the capital of Saudi Arabia — it is also a synonym for 
Paradise. Most of these housing projects, like Rawabi, are really talking about 
houses as Paradise: the promise of such projects is to create a Paradise.
The Riyad project fits with the kind of projects built with money coming from the 
Gulf. We [Anani and Jacir] decided to touch upon these sensitive areas, with the 
possibility that people might reject the project and say “no, we cannot allow you to 
build here.” Our project did not really convey the message, and I can tell you why:
The first billboard was a tower that should replace Hesbeh, the market in Ramal-
lah, which is a dear place — socially and historically — that we all know and where 
we use to go there to shop vegetables. The Riyad project was funded by the mu-
nicipality of Ramallah, as part of a big festival in Ramallah. The municipality said 
“it’s fine, they’re doing art.” They thought that we were doing paintings, and they 
did not know we were doing these big billboards. The evening before the opening 
of the festival, we placed the billboards in the city. The next morning, workers 
from the municipality were going around, and said “this place shouldn’t have bill-
boards!” They took the billboards down and sent them to Beitunia, to the munici-
pality storage. We called the municipality, had a fight, and told them to put it back. 
In the morning, the mayor wanted to have a rush inspection in Beitunia. He saw 
the billboards — and asked “what the hell is that?” We got a call from the ministry 
of culture, who said that the billboards would not go up. It took a lot of time and 
fight before the billboards were installed. We managed in the end, on the condition 
that there would be a sign on them telling that it was an art work.
The reactions from people on the first billboard were diverse. Some people said: 
“Finally we’re becoming interesting, like Dubai,” while others said we were “col-
laborators with the Israelis.” So, people aren’t really conscious about what kind of 
architecture that represents the future of us as Palestinians. This responds also to 
the dilemma that we are living in politically at the moment.
The other billboard projects a settlement inside the historic centre of Ramallah. 
People were very angry. We had to run away as people were gathering. They said 
“this is our houses and our lands, the municipality cannot do that!” They were 
rushing to the municipality — very angry and aggressive. The next day we passed 
through, and saw that the billboard was cut with a knife. After a couple of days, it 
was torn down. It was disastrous.
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We concluded that people do not really react before it is about something that 
touches upon their vital and private space. Public space is not really an interest for 
people. It does not matter if Rawabi looks like a settlement, it is their own private 
business.
RJ: Do you see this indifference purely as an effect of the occupation and the trajectory of 
the last decades, or is it something you could compare to what is happening with public 
space also other places in the world? What are the differences between Palestine and glob-
al trends related to public space?
YA: The idea of creating ‘public space’ has, in my view, not been an urban practice 
in Palestinian cities. Nablus perhaps, but then again, it has its own particularity. 
The first initiatives of creating public spaces were promoted by the Ottomans in 
the late 19th century, when Abdul Hamid [Ottoman Sultan in the period 1876-1909] 
promoted this big civilisation movement. Jaffa, Akka, Jerusalem, Nablus, Beirut, 
Damascus — the ‘hausmannification’ and Europeanised modernisation of these 
cities reached us through the Ottoman Empire, with parks, plazas, and modern in-
frastructure. Public space was introduced to a few bigger cities in the region, and 
was not really a practice of smaller towns and villages. In the smaller towns and vil-
lages, it was the square or the mosque that functioned as a social space, rather than 
spaces regulated by the government. The notion of public space and its treaties did 
not exist in smaller towns. Most of the population in Palestine lived in smaller vil-
lages, and there was no executive body that regulated public space. There was an 
organic relation to ‘public space’ as a common space. Public space in bigger cities 
is not a common: it is served and regulated by the government; designed and owned 
by the state. These are the two definitions of public space here. Afterwards, un-
der the British Mandate, public spaces developed in cities like Ramallah. They [the 
British] tried to control the cities through infrastructure, roads, squares etc. Yet it 
was also a control of space, where they could survey what was going on. 
Of course, before the Oslo agreement, people demonstrated in public space. But 
there was also this clash between trying to communalise and make it your own 
— to use political posters and the flag of Palestine, trying to take power and de-
regulate it by being there — and public space as a space of contention, defined as 
an ownership of Israel, the occupier. People were trying to communalise it. And 
throwing garbage! Trashing that kind of space, making it dirty, like “I don’t care 
about it so I throw garbage there,” is also partially a way to take the power out of 
the space of the occupier. I like to look at it this way, but it also becomes a habit, 
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unconsciously. It continues up to now.
I have a problem with a certain definition of public space, also in Europe. I do not 
think, actually, that you, in Europe, own public space. There are signs like “don’t 
step on the grass.” It is regulated and you are guided by definitions of public space 
done by experts of the municipality. There are political messages behind, as al-
ways.
RJ: True — there are lots of rules that regulates public space in Europe. But if we say that 
in Palestine there’s a ‘lack’ of public space, understood as an absence of common space: 
how do you construct the common, or take part in the common?
YA: ‘The common’ has been an issue that has been discussed extensively in the 
last two years, especially since Cairo, Gezi Park — all the recent changes in the 
Arab world. It goes back to the common: it is a sort of symptom that appears be-
cause of the hegemony of the private over everything, including public space. It is 
the private that can buy public space. If you have money you can brand New York 
Central Park, like Christo and Jean Claude did — if you manage to have money 
from the rich cultural scene, you can do that. The public is hegemonised by the pri-
vate. Lieven de Cauter [philosopher and art historian] talks about how the agora 
has reversed. In the traditional agora, public space was all about politics, and the 
economy belonged to private space — now it is vice versa. Today, you watch poli-
tics in TV, and you are not allowed to go outside and protest or deal with politics. 
Public space is commercialised. You shop in the streets; you do not discuss poli-
tics in the streets. Cultural activities are also commercialised. Jawwal [Palestine 
Cellular Communications Company], for instance, is doing a festivity about Pales-
tine. They add a big screen, and it becomes permanent in public space. This is how 
public space is shaped today, and you cannot use it as a political space. The young-
er generations have tried to protest, but they get smashed by the police. After the 
massacres in Gaza, people gathered spontaneously at the Manara [central square 
in Ramallah], but got beaten by the police because you are not allowed to use public 
space to protest against Israel. For me that is an accentuation of the fact that the 
PA is an extension of the colonial regime, and it brings us to a new conception of 
what colonialism is. It is a type of colonialism that allows you to have your own 
government and space, and yet there is a colonial regime.
The idea about construction and destruction which you started by asking about: 
we destroy this space and reconstruct it. The reconstruction is a process of design. 
Construction of Palestinian space is now actually designing the state, which has 
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no resistance, no anti-Israeli or anti-colonial politics, and submits the idea that 
market economy is the only way for salvation. I think this is a fucked-up thing.
RJ: The idea of ‘designing the state’ — through images, as you talked about earlier, and 
as a process of financial investment and construction of houses — makes me think about 
how ‘speculation’ is a mode of thinking connected with thinking about the future. If we 
go back to 2007 or so, Weizman published Hollow Land, we saw the work of DAAR [De-
colonizing Architecture Art Residency], Arena of Speculation and a number of different 
actors that were dealing with space and art in a kind of subversive way. These projects 
struck me as a very specific way of projecting thoughts and visions into the future: not by 
creating utopias, but about explicating the present by implementing things virtually in 
the future. But now it seems to me — especially when you are talking about the advertise-
ments — how that is actually the present and consensual way of projecting the future. 
Is it a clash of dreams? What does artistic speculation in the form of future scenarios do 
different than the visual representations of paradise that go along with the actual build-
ing speculation that is taking place on the ground? 
YA: First of all, I do not believe in art that is only doing artwork. This is my problem 
with DAAR: they are not really using their work as a tool to raise awareness of the 
options of the future, so that the practitioners and decision-makers would look at 
it differently. Much of their work was produced here in Palestine, but was exhibited 
outside. Even the books are not available here. I tried to push them to teach ‘Decol-
onizing Architecture’ in my classes, but DAAR was not interested in that.
I am myself inclined towards art because art, for me, is a means to reach out. Also, 
to use the card of the artist as a fool. You can do whatever you like and just say “Oh, 
I’m just an artist.”
The other thing, the clash of dreams, is very interesting. There were dreams of lib-
eration in the 80s where the rural was the base and what was promoted in arts. 
You can see it in the paintings of artists, and in embroidery, the olive groves, ag-
riculture. PLO was thinking about the independence of Palestine as a state from 
the history of Lebanon, Tunisia. And the PA came and brought this dream from 
outside, which clashed with the original one. Maybe Tunis, with its decadence, 
is what is the model now, and what is actually happening: the deconstructed Pal-
estinian state. You can see how they envisaged Palestine to be part of the global 
scene, which is what you also can see in the ads. It is about business, the upper mid-
dle class, housing, loans, banks. These things that you can see everywhere else. 
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Rawabi becomes a very interesting point: it becomes a sort of fast forward into the 
future, as an implementation of a Utopia. It is like reading a book about a Palestine 
happening after the liberation, where someone says “this is the ideal for Palestin-
ians.” And when reading the book, we could laugh and use it as a beacon to think 
about what Palestine is. But it is happening now, while the liberation project is not 
there. It is a time rupture: Rawabi as a postcolonial project, happening in a colonial 
time. The questions of Rawabi, with its aesthetics etc. etc., is a postcolonial ques-
tion, while we are still under colonialism. It is schizophrenia. Settlements, road 
blocks, area A B C, and so on, are all there, and at the same time, we build postcolo-
nial projects, like the ministries, and Rawabi. It is a discrepancy of dreams.
DAAR should try to show those two dreams: PA’s dreams of postcolonial state 
building, and the unfulfilled liberation dream, and put them together and superim-
pose them — and then show us other possibilities to really criticise this situation. 
Their speculations into the future are very interesting. But they are also talking 
about a Palestinian postcolonial state, and they miss the dilemma of construction 
of a Utopia that should really not be constructed. We should be conscious about 
this construction. 
In Jericho, for our Cities Exhibition [Jericho — Beyond the Celestial and the Terres-
trial, 2012] we have been investigation a wonderful project that took place in 1945, 
created by a Palestinian called Mussa Halami. He decided — inspired by the idea 
of the kibbutz — to make a place with vocational training, education and so on. So, 
he created this strange, agricultural facility in Jericho, out of the desert. People 
worked there, sold their produce to Iran, to Lebanon, and the orphan refugee kids 
were trained. Halami made a manifesto saying that 35 areas in Palestine should 
be transformed into such areas. It is a sort of different proposition, as you have a 
different imagination of nation in this project. It is based on productivity, instead 
of consumerism, there is a different relation to the environment, it contains a mul-
tiplicity of identities. Halami was an intellectual farmer. This is art that I like. 
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